• Title/Summary/Keyword: 테러리스트 위조 공격

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A Light-Weight RFID Distance Bounding Protocol (경량 RFID 경계 결정 프로토콜)

  • Ahn, Hae-Soon;Bu, Ki-Dong;Yoon, Eun-Jun;Nam, In-Gil
    • The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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    • v.17C no.4
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    • pp.307-314
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    • 2010
  • Recently, it is proved that contactless smart-card based RFID tags, which is used for proximity authentication, are vulnerable to relay attacks with various location-based attacks such as distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. Moreover, distance bounding protocols have been researched to prevent these relay attacks that can measure the message transmitted round-trip time between the reader and the tag. In 2005, Hancke and Kuhn first proposed an RFID distance bounding protocol based on secure hash function. However, the Hancke-Kuhn protocol cannot completely prevent the relay attacks because an adversary has (3/4)$^n$ attack success probability. Thus, this paper proposes a new distance-bounding protocol for light-weight RFID systems that can reduce to (5/8)$^n$ for the adversary's attack success probability. As a result, the proposed protocol not only can provide high-space efficient based on a secure hash function and XOR operation, but also can provide strong security against the relay attacks because the adversary's attack success probability is optimized to (5/8)$^n$.

A Storage and Computation Efficient RFID Distance Bounding Protocol (저장 공간 및 연산 효율적인 RFID 경계 결정 프로토콜)

  • Ahn, Hae-Soon;Yoon, Eun-Jun;Bu, Ki-Dong;Nam, In-Gil
    • The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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    • v.35 no.9B
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    • pp.1350-1359
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    • 2010
  • Recently many researchers have been proved that general RFID system for proximity authentication is vulnerable to various location-based relay attacks such as distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. The distance-bounding protocol is used to prevent the relay attacks by measuring the round trip time of single challenge-response bit. In 2008, Munilla and Peinado proposed an improved distance-bounding protocol applying void-challenge technique based on Hancke-Kuhn's protocol. Compare with Hancke-Kuhn's protocol, Munilla and Peinado's protocol is more secure because the success probability of an adversary has (5/8)n. However, Munilla and Peinado's protocol is inefficient for low-cost passive RFID tags because it requires large storage space and many hash function computations. Thus, this paper proposes a new RFID distance-bounding protocol for low-cost passive RFID tags that can be reduced the storage space and hash function computations. As a result, the proposed distance-bounding protocol not only can provide both storage space efficiency and computational efficiency, but also can provide strong security against the relay attacks because the adversary's success probability can be reduced by $(5/8)^n$.