• Title/Summary/Keyword: 컨센서스

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Affective Polarization, Policy versus Party: The 2020 US Presidential Election (정서적 양극화, 정책인가 아니면 정당인가: 2020 미대선 사례)

  • Kang, Miongsei
    • Analyses & Alternatives
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    • v.6 no.2
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    • pp.79-115
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    • 2022
  • This study aims to account for electoral choice in the 2020 presidential election by focusing on social identity which forms the basis for core partisan groups. Two views compete to explain the origins of polarization, policy versus party. One emphasizes policy as more influential in choosing presidential candidates. This follows the tradition of retrospective voting theory in which voters' choice rely on government performance. Incumbent president whose performance proves well are rewarded to be reelected. Policy performance is based on measures around distinctive preferences for government spending. Republican Individuals prefer individual responsibility to government support, while Democratic counterparts support government support. Another perspective put an emphasis on the role partisanship which favors in-party members and disfavors partisan out-groups. Interparty animosity plays the key role in determining electoral behavior. This study relies on the Views of the Electorate Research (VOTER) Survey which provides a panel data of several waves from 2011 to 2020. A comparative evaluation of two views highlights three findings. First, policy matters. Policy preferences of voters are the primary drives of political behavior. Electoral outcomes in 2020 turned out to be the results of policy considerations of voters. 53.7 percent of voters tilted toward individual responsibility voted for Trump, whereas 70.4 percent of those favorable views of government support than individual responsibility voted for Biden. Thus effects of policy correspond to a positive difference of 26.4 percent points. Second, partisanship effects are of similar extent in influencing electoral choice of candidates: Democrats are less likely to vote for Trump by 42.4 percent points, while Republicans are less likely to vote for Biden by 48.7 percent points. Third, animosity of Republicans toward Democrat core groups creates 26.5 percent points of favoring Trump over Biden. Democrat animosity toward Republican core groups creates a positive difference of 13.7 percent points of favoring Biden.

Continuation and change of Taiwan's New Southbound Policy in the De-Sinicization: The dynamics of Balancing and Bandwagoning (탈중국을 위한 대만 남향정책의 지속과 변화: 균형과 편승의 동학)

  • Kim, Sunjae;Kim, Suhan
    • Analyses & Alternatives
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    • v.6 no.1
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    • pp.69-114
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    • 2022
  • This paper analyzes Taiwan's 「New Southbound Policy」 from the perspective of 'balancing' and 'bandwagoning' in international politics. Specifically, it examines the changes and characteristics of 'Southbound policies' that have continued since the period of the Lee Teng-hui(李登輝) administration, and examines the meaning of the New Southbound Policy promoted by the Tsai Ing-wen(蔡英文) administration. Taiwan's foreign policy has been strongly influenced by external variables such as U.S.-China relations. Previous Taiwanese governments have actively promoted Southbound policies to advance to Southeast Asian countries such as ASEAN with the aim of 'De-Sinicization', but have not achieved much results. This is because variables such as cooperative U.S.-China relations and strong checks from China played a role at the time. In this environment, Taiwan had to pursue an appropriate 'balancing' between the United States, China, and Southeast Asian countries. However, since the inauguration of the Trump administration, strategic competition between the U.S. and China has been maximized, creating a new space for Taiwan's foreign policy. This is because the U.S. valued cooperation with Taiwan in the process of embodying the 'Indo-Pacific Strategy' to curb China's rise. The New Southbound Policy promoted by the Tsai Ing-won administration is different from the existing Southbound policies in that it seeks to link with the U.S. India-Pacific Strategy and attempts to advance to South Asian countries such as India. From an international political point of view, the Tsai Ing-won administration's New Southbound Policy can be interpreted as a 'bandwagoning' to the United States, not a balanced strategy between the U.S. and China. Strategic competition between the U.S. and China is expected to intensify for a considerable period of time in the future, and honeymoon between Taiwan and the U.S. are also expected to continue. Taiwan's bandwagoning strategy, which actively pursues a link between the New Southbound Policy and the India-Pacific Strategy, is also expected to be maintained.

New Normality in the Asia-Pacific Region: Beijing between Moscow and Washington (Новая нормальность в АТР: Пекин между Москвой и Вашингтоном)

  • Sergey A. Lukonin;Sung Hoon Jeh
    • Analyses & Alternatives
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    • v.7 no.1
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    • pp.229-258
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    • 2023
  • For the main countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States, China and Russia, a situation of "new normality" is emerging. Moreover, for each of the countries, this "new normality" has its own meaning. For the United States, this is an aggravation of the military confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait. For China, this is an increase in the degree of rivalry with the United States and a slowdown in the pace of economic development with a very high probability of their decline in the future. For Russia, this is an almost complete curtailment of relations with the United States against the background of a special military operation and imposed sanctions. These nuances, in addition to the results of the 20th CPC Congress, will determine the main trends in Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations. It seems that China's attitude towards Russia will not change against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Beijing will maintain a position of "benevolent neutrality" towards Moscow. At the same time, the balance between "goodwill" and "neutrality" may vary depending on the scope of Sino-Russian cooperation. For example, in the economic sphere, Chinese companies will be afraid to cooperate with Russian partners for fear of secondary sanctions. However, in general, Russia will retain its importance for China as the strongest anti-American pole. In relations with the United States, China will continue to firmly defend its interests, while at the same time not excluding the normalization of relations with Washington in certain areas of cooperation: strategic stability, non-traditional threats, ecology, etc. In general, the decisions of the 20th CPC Congress do not allow us to say either in favor or against the idea of China's readiness to resume dialogue with the United States in the post-congress period. Sino-American relations, as noted above, have their own logic and will probably continue to develop within its framework. However, so are Sino-Russian relations. Within the framework of these logics, Beijing seems to continue to balance between the two vectors of its foreign policy. On the one hand, this is the development of bilateral cooperation with Russia in order to strengthen its own negotiating positions in the confrontation with the United States: military cooperation with an emphasis on joint exercises, political cooperation based on anti-Americanism, economic cooperation with an eye to the risks of secondary sanctions. On the other hand, it is unacceptable for China to recognize the collapse of Ukraine, the inadmissibility of a direct military clash with the United States and the extreme undesirability of further aggravation of relations with the United States on the factor of Chinese friendship with Russia.

An Analysis of the 20th National Congress Report through Text-mining Methods (텍스트 마이닝을 활용한 중국공산당 20차 당대회 보고문 분석)

  • Kwon, Dokyung;Kim, Jungsoo;Park, Jihyun
    • Analyses & Alternatives
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    • v.7 no.1
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    • pp.115-145
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    • 2023
  • The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter referred to as "the 20th National Congress") was under the global spotlight long before it was held for seven days from 16 to 22 October 2022. People wondered whether Xi Jinping would secure a third term as China's leader or whether he would lay the foundations to be in power forever during the third term. In Korea, the press and media questioned whether the event would become the "crowning of Emperor Xi (Xi Huangdi)," whose power rivaled that of the first emperor in China, Shi Hunagdi, and featured the scene where Hu Jintao was forced to leave the venue during the Congress. On the other hand, many Korean academics focused more on how Xi would organize the Politburo and its Standing Committee and whether the outline of his heirs would appear during the event. This tendency in academia in turn worsened the media's concerns. This paper presents a quantitative analysis of the 20th National Congress Report, as opposed to an analysis of Xi's political intentions at the event. The National Congress Report outlines the Party's visions, goals, and strategies for the next five years in politics, economy, society, culture, foreign affairs, and relationship with Taiwan. The authoritative document is rich in narrative and logic and deserves academic study. This research analyzes the 18th, 19th, and 20th Reports by identifying their keywords and regular expressions and checking their frequency and percentage through text-mining methods. This approach enables the quantification and visualization of the significant changes in the Party's sovereign vision over the fifteen years of Xi's rule from 2013 to 2027.

The historical study on the Ukrainian territorial conflicts: Focusing on the Crimean War and the German-Soviet War (우크라이나 영토분쟁에 관한 사(史)적 연구: 크림전쟁과 독소전쟁의 사례를 중심으로)

  • Eunchae Lee;Ikhyun Jang
    • Analyses & Alternatives
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    • v.8 no.2
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    • pp.65-86
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    • 2024
  • This study delves into the geopolitical tensions surrounding Ukraine throughout modern European history, aiming to shed light on its significance in geopolitical discourse. Since the 19th century, European powers, particularly the Anglo-Saxons and Germans, have formulated distinct geopolitical strategies concerning the Eurasian continent, with Ukraine at its focal point. The Crimean War and the German-Soviet War serve as key events to analyze these powers' geopolitical ambitions and interests. The British Empire, driven by its doctrine of thwarting land powers with sea power, intervened in the Crimean War against Russia. Its objective was to disrupt Russian dominance over Ukraine, thereby hindering Russian expansion into the Black Sea and Central Europe. On the other hand, the Third Reich of Germany, fixated on creating a European sphere exclusive from Anglo-Saxon sea powers and the Russian land power, initiated the German-Soviet War. This move aimed to secure a vast territory, including Ukraine, to facilitate expansion into the Caucasus and establish a buffer zone against the Soviet Union. Three key insights emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the absence of a dominant power rooted in Ukraine since the fall of the Principality of Kiev made geopolitical clashes inevitable. Secondly, these clashes ultimately result in a hollow victory for all involved parties, signifying the high costs and minimal gains of such confrontations. Lastly, the root cause of these clashes lies in the discord between exclusive geopolitical visions that fail to accommodate sustainable coexistence among diverse geopolitical spheres. In essence, the study underscores Ukraine's pivotal role in shaping European geopolitics and highlights the recurring clashes driven by competing visions of dominance and control over its territory. From the Crimean War to the German-Soviet War, the struggle for influence over Ukraine reflects broader geopolitical dynamics and the pursuit of strategic advantage by major powers. Ultimately, the study emphasizes the enduring significance of Ukraine in European geopolitics and the complexities inherent in managing its geopolitical tensions.

Conclusion of Conventions on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft in Flight to Third Parties (항공운항 시 제3자 피해 배상 관련 협약 채택 -그 혁신적 내용과 배경 고찰-)

  • Park, Won-Hwa
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.35-58
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    • 2009
  • A treaty that governs the compensation on damage caused by aircraft to the third parties on surface was first adopted in Rome in 1933, but without support from the international aviation community it was replaced by another convention adopted again in Rome in 1952. Despite the increase of the compensation amount and some improvements to the old version, the Rome Convention 1952 with 49 State parties as of today is not considered universally accepted. Neither is the Montreal Protocol 1978 amending the Rome Convention 1952, with only 12 State parties excluding major aviation powers like USA, Japan, UK, and Germany. Consequently, it is mostly the local laws that apply to the compensation case of surface damage caused by the aircraft, contrary to the intention of those countries and people who involved themselves in the drafting of the early conventions on surface damage. The terrorist attacks 9/11 proved that even the strongest power in the world like the USA cannot with ease bear all the damages done to the third parties by the terrorist acts involving aircraft. Accordingly as a matter of urgency, the International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) picked up the matter and have it considered among member States for a few years through its Legal Committee before proposing for adoption as a new treaty in the Diplomatic Conference held in Montreal, Canada 20 April to 2 May 2009. Accordingly, two treaties based on the drafts of the Legal Committee were adopted in Montreal by consensus, one on the compensation for general risk damage caused by aircraft, the other one on compensation for damage from acts of unlawful interference involving aircraft. Both Conventions improved the old Convention/Protocol in many aspects. Deleting 'surface' in defining the damage to the third parties in the title and contents of the Conventions is the first improvement because the third party damage is not necessarily limited to surface on the soil and sea of the Earth. Thus Mid-air collision is now the new scope of application. Increasing compensation limit in big gallop is another improvement, so is the inclusion of the mental injury accompanied by bodily injury as the damage to be compensated. In fact, jurisprudence in recent years for cases of passengers in aircraft accident holds aircraft operators to be liable to such mental injuries. However, "Terror Convention" involving unlawful interference of aircraft has some unique provisions of innovation and others. While establishing the International Civil Aviation Compensation Fund to supplement, when necessary, the damages that exceed the limit to be covered by aircraft operators through insurance taking is an innovation, leaving the fate of the Convention to a State Party, implying in fact the USA, is harming its universality. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that the damage incurred by the terrorist acts, where ever it takes place targeting whichever sector or industry, are the domain of the State responsibility, imposing the burden of compensation resulting from terrorist acts in the air industry on the aircraft operators and passengers/shippers is a source of serious concern for the prospect of the Convention. This is more so when the risks of terrorist acts normally aimed at a few countries because of current international political situation are spread out to many innocent countries without quid pro quo.

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