• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.31-68
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• 1990

The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.32
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• pp.215-249
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• 2011

This essay reflects on the modernity of Korea by examining the transformation of the traditional knowledge system from a historico-semantic perspective with its focus on the opposition and collision of the old and the new conception occurred in the early period(1890~1910) of the acceptance of the Western modern civilization. With scientific success, trick of reason, Christianity and evolutionary view of history, the Western modernity regarded itself as a peak of civilization and forced the non-Western societies into the world system in which they came to be considered as 'barbarism(野蠻)' or 'half-enlightened(半開).' The East Asian civilization, which had its own history for several centuries, became degraded as kind of delusion and old-fashioned customs from which it ought to free itself. The Western civilization presented itself as exemplary future which East Asian people should achieve, while East Asian past traditions came to be conceived as just unnecessary vestiges which it was better to wipe out. It can be said that East Asian modernization was established through the propagation and acceptance of the modern products of the Western civilization rather than through the preservation of its past experience and pursuit of the new at the same time. Accordingly, it is difficult to apply directly to East Asian societies Koselleck's hypothesis; while mapping out his Basic Concept of History, he assumed that, in the so-called 'age of saddle,' semantic struggle over concepts becomes active between the past experience and the horizon of expectation on the future, and concepts undergoes 'temporalization', 'democratization', 'ideologization', 'politicization.'The struggle over the old and new conceptions in Korea was most noticeable in the opposition of the Neo-Confucian scholars of Hwangseongsinmun and the theorists of civilization of Doknipsinmun. The opposition and struggle demanded the change of understanding in every field, but there was difference of opinion over the conception of the past traditional knowledge system. For the theorists of civilization, 'the old(舊)' was not just 'past' and 'old-fashioned' things, but rather an obstacle to the building of new civilization. On the other hand, it contained the possibility of regeneration(新) for the Neo-Confucian scholars; that is, they suggested finding a guide into tomorrow by taking lessons from the past. The traditional knowledge system lost their holy status of learning(聖學) in the process of its change into a 'new learning(新學),' and religion and religious tradition also weakened. The traditional knowledge system could change itself into modern learning by accepting scientific methodology which pursues objectivity and rationality. This transformation of the traditional knowledge system and 'the formation of the new learning from the old learning' was accompanied by the intersection between the old and new conceptions. It is necessary to pay attention to the role played by the concept of Sil(hak)(實學) or Practical Learning in the intersection of the old and new conceptions. Various modern media published before and after the 20th century show clearly the multi-layered development of the old and new conceptions, and it is noticeable that 'Sil(hak)' as conceptual frame of reference contributed to the transformation of the traditional knowledge system into the new learning. Although Silhak often designated, or was even considered equivalent to, the Western learning, Neo-Confucian scholars reinterpreted the concept of 'Silhak' which the theorists of civilization had monopolized until then, and opened the way to change the traditional knowledge system into the new learning. They re-appropriated the concept of Silhak, and enabled it to be invested with values, which were losing their own status due to the overwhelming scientific technology. With Japanese occupation of Korea by force, the attempt to transform the traditional knowledge system independently was obliged to reach its own limit, but its theory of 'making new learning from old one' can be considered to get over both the contradiction of Dondoseogi(東道西器: principle of preserving Eastern philosophy while accepting Western technology) and the de-subjectivity of the theory of civilization. While developing its own logic, the theory of Dongdoseogi was compelled to bring in the contradiction of considering the indivisible(道and 器) as divisible, though it tried to cope with the reality where the principle of morality and that of competition were opposed each other and the ideologies of 'evolution' and 'progress' prevailed. On the other hand, the theory of civilization was not free from the criticism that it brought about a crack in subjectivity due to its internalization of the West, cutting itself off from the traditional knowledge system.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• KOREAN JOURNAL OF CROP SCIENCE
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• v.47
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• pp.15-32
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• 2002

The endeavors enhancing the grain quality of high-yielding japonica rice were steadily continued during 1980s-1990s along with the self-sufficiency of rice production and the increasing demands of high-quality rices. During this time, considerably great progress and success was obtained in development of high-quality japonica cultivars and quality evaluation techniques including the elucidation of interrelationship between the physicochemical properties of rice grain and the physical or palatability components of cooked rice. In 1990s, some high-quality japonica rice cultivars and special rices adaptable for food processing such as large kernel, chalky endosperm, aromatic and colored rices were developed and its objective preference and utility was also examined by a palatability meter, rapid-visco analyzer and texture analyzer, Recently, new special rices such as extremely low-amylose dull or opaque non-glutinous endosperm mutants were developed. Also, a high-lysine rice variety was developed for higher nutritional utility. The water uptake rate and the maximum water absorption ratio showed significantly negative correlations with the K/Mg ratio and alkali digestion value(ADV) of milled rice. The rice materials showing the higher amount of hot water absorption exhibited the larger volume expansion of cooked rice. The harder rices with lower moisture content revealed the higher rate of water uptake at twenty minutes after soaking and the higher ratio of maximum water uptake under the room temperature condition. These water uptake characteristics were not associated with the protein and amylose contents of milled rice and the palatability of cooked rice. The water/rice ratio (in w/w basis) for optimum cooking was averaged to 1.52 in dry milled rices (12% wet basis) with varietal range from 1.45 to 1.61 and the expansion ratio of milled rice after proper boiling was average to 2.63(in v/v basis). The major physicochemical components of rice grain associated with the palatability of cooked rice were examined using japonica rice materials showing narrow varietal variation in grain size and shape, alkali digestibility, gel consistency, amylose and protein contents, but considerable difference in appearance and texture of cooked rice. The glossiness or gross palatability score of cooked rice were closely associated with the peak, hot paste and consistency viscosities of viscosities with year difference. The high-quality rice variety "IIpumbyeo" showed less portion of amylose on the outer layer of milled rice grain and less and slower change in iodine blue value of extracted paste during twenty minutes of boiling. This highly palatable rice also exhibited very fine net structure in outer layer and fine-spongy and well-swollen shape of gelatinized starch granules in inner layer and core of cooked rice kernel compared with the poor palatable rice through image of scanning electronic microscope. Gross sensory score of cooked rice could be estimated by multiple linear regression formula, deduced from relationship between rice quality components mentioned above and eating quality of cooked rice, with high probability of determination. The $\alpha$-amylose-iodine method was adopted for checking the varietal difference in retrogradation of cooked rice. The rice cultivars revealing the relatively slow retrogradation in aged cooked rice were IIpumbyeo, Chucheongyeo, Sasanishiki, Jinbubyeo and Koshihikari. A Tonsil-type rice, Taebaegbyeo, and a japonica cultivar, Seomjinbyeo, showed the relatively fast deterioration of cooked rice. Generally, the better rice cultivars in eating quality of cooked rice showed less retrogradation and much sponginess in cooled cooked rice. Also, the rice varieties exhibiting less retrogradation in cooled cooked rice revealed higher hot viscosity and lower cool viscosity of rice flour in amylogram. The sponginess of cooled cooked rice was closely associated with magnesium content and volume expansion of cooked rice. The hardness-changed ratio of cooked rice by cooling was negatively correlated with solids amount extracted during boiling and volume expansion of cooked rice. The major physicochemical properties of rice grain closely related to the palatability of cooked rice may be directly or indirectly associated with the retrogradation characteristics of cooked rice. The softer gel consistency and lower amylose content in milled rice revealed the higher ratio of popped rice and larger bulk density of popping. The stronger hardness of rice grain showed relatively higher ratio of popping and the more chalky or less translucent rice exhibited the lower ratio of intact popped brown rice. The potassium and magnesium contents of milled rice were negatively associated with gross score of noodle making mixed with wheat flour in half and the better rice for noodle making revealed relatively less amount of solid extraction during boiling. The more volume expansion of batters for making brown rice bread resulted the better loaf formation and more springiness in rice breed. The higher protein rices produced relatively the more moist white rice bread. The springiness of rice bread was also significantly correlated with high amylose content and hard gel consistency. The completely chalky and large grain rices showed better suitability far fermentation and brewing. The glutinous rice were classified into nine different varietal groups based on various physicochemical and structural characteristics of endosperm. There was some close associations among these grain properties and large varietal difference in suitability to various traditional food processing. Our breeding efforts on improvement of rice quality for high palatability and processing utility or value-adding products in the future should focus on not only continuous enhancement of marketing and eating qualities but also the diversification in morphological, physicochemical and nutritional characteristics of rice grain suitable for processing various value-added rice foods.ice foods.