• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.13 no.9
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• pp.297-302
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• 2015

The increase in applying IT to vehicles has given birth to smart cars or connected cars. As smarts cars become connected with external network systems, threats to communication security are on the rise. With simulation test results supporting such threats to Convergence security in vehicular communication, concerns are raised over relevant vulnerabilities, while an increasing number of studies on secure vehicular communication are published. Hacking attacks against vehicles are more dangerous than other types of hacking attempts because such attacks may threaten drivers' lives and cause social instability. This paper designed a Convergence security protocol for inter-vehicle and intra-vehicle communication using a hash function, nonce, public keys, time stamps and passwords. The proposed protocol was tested with a formal verification tool, Casper/FDR, and found secure and safe against external attacks.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.205-210
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• 2015

The auto industry has significantly evolved to the extent that much attention is paid to M2M (Machine-to-Machine) communication. In M2M communication which was first used in meteorology, environment, logistics, national defense, agriculture and stockbreeding, devices automatically communicate and operate in accordance with varying situations. M2M system is applied to vehicles, specifically to device-to-device communication inside cars, vehicle-to-vehicle communication, communication between vehicles and traffic facilities and that between vehicles and surroundings. However, communication systems are characterized by potential intruders' attacks in transmission sections, which may cause serious safety problems if vehicles' operating system, control system and engine control parts are attacked. Thus, device-to-device secure communication has been actively researched. With a view to secure communication between vehicular devices, the present study drew on hash functions and complex mathematical formulae to design a protocol, which was then tested with Casper/FDR, a tool for formal verification of protocols. In brief, the proposed protocol proved to operate safely against a range of attacks and be effective in practical application.