• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.91-129
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• 2008

이 논문은 '만약(If)$\sim$라면, (then) ...이다.' 형식의 조건문 중에서도 직설법적 조건문의 적법한 사용이 어떠한 조건을 만족시켜야 하는가에 대한 글이다. 일반적으로 직설법적 조건문은 발화자가 전건을 확신하지 못하는 인식적 상태를 표현하는 것으로 이해되며, 가정법적 조건문은 전건이 성립하는 특정한 세계에 대한 진술로 이해된다. 직설법적 조건문의 인식적 수용조건을 도출하기 위해, 기존 이론의 조건문의 수용과 주장을 진리조건적으로 설명하는 것이 불만족스럽다. 기존 이론의 문제점을 고찰하여 보면, 한 언어의 유창한 사용자가 조건문에 대해서 기대하고 있는바가 무엇인지, 그리고 적절한 직설법적 조건문의 사용이 어떤 조건을 요구하는지가 드러난다. 그리고 이 요구를 수용함으로써 직설법적 조건문에 대한 대안적 사용 조건인 '인식적 수용조건'을 정식화 할 수 있다.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.31-57
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• 2006

직설법적 조건문의 이론이 해결해야 할 문제 중 하나는 각자 옳을 것 같지만 모두 참일 수 없는 직설법적 조건문에 관한 세 원리들이 있다는 것이다. 먼저 직설법적 조건문을 진리 함수적으로 분석하는 것은 '주관적 확률'을 고려할 때 이 문제를 해결할 수 없다고 논증할 것이다. 필자는 여기서 직설법적 조건문에 관한 성향적 분석을 제시하고 이 이론이 세 원리들의 문제를 해결한다고 주장한다. 그리고 잘 알려져 있는 직설법적 조건문의 수용 조건 혹은 주장가능성 조건을 제시하는 아담스 논제는 조건부 확률이 두 절대적 확률의 비로 정의된 다면 옳지 않을 것이라고 주장한다. 조건부 확률을 성향적으로 정의할 경우에만 아담스 논제는 옳을 수 있다. 마지막으로 아담스 논제의 주장가능성 조건을 진리 조건으로 제시하는 이론도 논박될 것이다.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.251-272
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• 2012

Recently Professor Lee has suggested the analysis of the indicative conditional based on Sellars-Brandom's inferentialism. In this paper, I raise three questions. First, Professor Lee seems to misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that he considers only the analytically valid arguments as materially valid inferences. Second, Professor Lee seems to misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that whereas Sellars-Brandom talks about the common features of all kinds of conditionals including counterfactual conditionals, Professor Lee takes it as the analysis of the indicative conditional only. Third, either Professor Lee's analysis is incompatible with Sellars-Brandom inferentialism or his analysis is too general.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.31-58
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• 2009

This paper defends Stalnaker's theory of indicative conditionals. His theory consists of selection functions and pragmatic constraints. The selection function takes a certain possible world(W) and a proposition(A) to yield a possilble world that is similar to W and in which A is true. And the pragmatic constraints plays role to make selection functions apply just to indicative conditionals. According to Stalnaker, as indicative conditionals has strong truth-value, uncontested principle always holds but passage principle does not always hold. However, his theory can explain why passage principle sometimes holds by means of pragmatic constraints. Also, this paper argues that Stalnaker's theory is the most acceptable one among others, by replying to criticisms suggested by Adamsians and the problem raised by Gibbard and other criticisms.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.273-294
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• 2012

In my previous article "An Inferentialist Account of Indicative Conditionals" and "An Inferentialist Account of Indicative Conditionals and Hasuk Song's Objections", I argued that the so-called Uncontested Principle is not uncontestable. According to the Uncontested Principle, an indicative conditional '$A{\rightarrow}C$' logically implies a material conditional '$A{\supset}C$'. In his recent paper "On the Recent Controversies surrounding the Uncontested Principle" Wonbae Choi presents three objections to my claim. First, my denial of the Uncontested Principle implies rejecting modus ponens. Second, my denial of the Uncontested Principle is tantamount to taking the truth-conditions of an indicative conditional as weaker than those of a material conditional, which are usually taken to be the weakest among conditionals. Third, my view that we can warrantedly assert '$A{\rightarrow}C$' even when 'A ${\therefore}$ C' is inductively justified is based on a misunderstanding of the way in which indicative conditionals are justified. In this paper I argue that Choi's objections are all based on misunderstandings of my view. First, I do not deny the validity of modus ponens (as a form of deductive reasoning). Second, the fact that the inductive warrantability of 'A ${\therefore}$ C' does not imply the truth of '$A{\supset}C$' does not show that the truth-conditions of an indicative conditional is weaker than those of a material conditional. Third, Choi's claim that a contingent conditional '$A{\rightarrow}C$' is true only when 'C' can be deductively derived from 'A' in conjunction with a hidden premiss is not well grounded, nor does it fit the facts.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.197-217
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• 2014

In my previous papers, I have argued that the so-called 'Uncontested Principle' does not hold for indicative conditionals based on inductive reasoning. This is mainly because if we accept that a material conditional '$A{\supset}C$' can be inferred from an indicative conditional based on inductive reasoning '$A{\rightarrow}_iC$', we get an absurd consequence such that we cannot distinguish between claiming 'C' to be probably true and claiming 'C' to be absolutely true on the assumption 'A'. However, in his recent paper "Uncontested Principle and Inductive Argument", Eunsuk Yang objects that my argument is unsuccessful in disputing the Uncontested Principle. In this paper, I show that his objections are irrelevant to my argument against the Uncontested Principle.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.85-100
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• 2011

Recently Byeong Deok Lee has denied the validity of the so-called uncontested principle, which says that the indicative conditional implies the material conditional. I show that his denial means that modus ponens is not valid and that the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals are weaker than that of material conditionals. It seems that what made him hold this view is related to some misunderstanding of indicative conditionals.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.87-115
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• 2013

In my previous article "The Uncontested Principle and Wonbae Choi's Objections", I argued that the validity of modus ponens (as a deductive inference) is compatible with the claim that the Uncontested Principle is controversial. In his recent paper "The Uncontested Principle and Modus Ponens", Wonbae Choi criticizes my view again by making the following three claims: First, even though I do not take an inference of the form 'If A then (probably) C. A. $\therefore$ C' as an instance of modus ponens, this form of inference can be taken to be such an instance. Second, there is no grammatical indicator which allows us to distinguish between an indicative conditional based on a deductive inference and an indicative conditional based on an inductive inference, so that inferences based on these conditionals should not be treated as different types of inferences. Third, if we allow an indicative conditional based on an inductive inference, we thereby violate the so-called 'principle of harmony', which any logical concept should preserve. In this paper, I reply that his criticisms are all implausible.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.347-375
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• 2012

In my article published in 2008, I offered an inferentialist account of indicative conditionals. In her recent paper, Professor Seawha Kim raises three objections. First, I misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that I take only concept-constitutive inferences as materially valid inferences. Second, Sellars and Brandom talk about the common features of all kinds of conditionals including counterfactual conditionals, but I construe their view as the analysis of the indicative conditionals only. Third, either my analysis is incompatible with Sellars-Brandom inferentialism or my analysis is too general. In this paper I argue that Seawha Kim's objections are all based on insufficient understandings of Sellars's and Brandom's views. First, it is Sellars's view that materially valid inferences are restricted within concept-constitutive inferences. Second, neither Sellars nor Brandom proposes a specific theory about the indicative conditional. Instead, they argue for the expressive role of the conditional. What I accept from their views is this expressive role of the conditional. The detailed proposals about the indicative conditional in my aforementioned article are my own. Third, the differences among conditionals have no direct bearing on Sellars-Brandom inferentialism. In addition, the meaning and role of the conditional expression 'if-then' do not require more than what I have argued for it.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.323-347
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• 2012

After Byeongdeok Lee(2008) argued against the so-called uncontested principle (UP), Song(2008) and Choi(2011) gave arguments against Lee(2008) and instead for UP. One important point to mention in their arguments is that they all accept that UP is justifiable in deduction. First, I show that there are some problems in their arguments. Next, I show that UP itself is not justifiable in deduction; it is only justifiable under some (restrictive) conditions.