• Korean Business Review
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.19-41
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• 2005

The informativeness of accounting earnings to investors may be used as a measure of the quality of accounting information. The ownership structure is considered to be related to both of two variables, the reliability of earnings reflecting the economic performance of the enterprise and the existence of alternative information sources. Earnings manipulation may mitigate the correlation between accounting earnings and the economic performance and alternative information sources decrease the value of accounting earnings as an information. Thus ownership structure could influence the informativeness of accounting earnings. This paper classifies ownership into three categories, management or inside ownership, institutional investors and large outside blockholders, and diffuse outside ownership and examines theoretically the difference of information effectiveness under each ownership structure. The earnings manipulation hypothesis supports the assertion that the separation of ownership from control motivates earnings manipulation. And differential information hypothesis suggests that more non-accounting information of firms with institutional or concentrated outside ownership is provided. Outside blockholders have alternative information sources that make accounting manipulation ineffective. While most previous studies have examined the effect of ownership on the informativeness of earnings from earnings manipulation hypothesis, this study is motivated by both earnings manipulation hypothesis and differential information hypothesis.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.239-270
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• 2017

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and the intensity of R&D expenditures of a firm by analyzing the panel data composed of 553 manufacturing firms in KSE(Korea Stock Exchange) and KOSDAQ listed firms for the period of 2007-2014. The major findings are as follows; (1) Regarding the relationship between CEO stockholding and R&D intensity, we find the inverted-U shape relationship in KOSDAQ firms, consistent with the theoretical discussion and empirical studies on U.S. firms. The result suggests that management stockholding reduces agency problem at the R&D margin. On the contrary, the insignificant result in KSE firms seems to be due to the scant stockholding of most 'non-owner' CEOs. (2) Regarding the relationship between the largest shareholder's portion and R&D intensity, KSE firms exhibit negatively significant relationship, suggesting the existence of serious agency problem between the largest shareholder and the minor shareholders. This agency problem seems to be alleviated in KOSDAQ firms mainly because the founders with technology expertise are still in charge of the business. (3) Foreign investors seem to fail in effectively encouraging R&D expenditures in either KSE or KOSDAQ listed firms. This study contributes to the existing literature by showing for the first time that ownership structure affects R&D activities in different ways between KSE and KOSDAQ firms.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.69-100
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• 2006

We examine the effect of controlling shareholders ownership structure and related-party transactions(hereafter 'RPT') of publicly traded companies on their firm values during the post-IMF period. In the multivariate regression analysis using control variables such as firm size, capital structure, investment, dividend, profitability and industry dummy that might affect firm values, we find that there exists a significant negative relation between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values proxied by Tobin's Q, and also find that there is a significant negative relation between RPT and the firm values. Those evidences seem to support the controlling shareholders' expropriation hypothesis. Additionally, we investigate the relation between ownership structure and rim value through the piecewise regression analysis. We find a significant 'inverse' U-shape pattern between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values. This result is quite different from the existing literatures that have usually reported an U-shape pattern. In conclusion, the findings in this study do not support the notion that the ownership concentration to the controlling shareholders does negatively affect the firm values monotonically.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.257-263
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• 2010

We studied about the difference of division public announcements by corporation size and ownership structure from 1999 to 2005. The results is as follow : First, we found most positive numbers in division corporation's CAR. This supports the existing research that corporation division is evaluated positively in the market. We found CAR as largest shareholders' holding more than 40%, which is greater than 0-20% & 20-40%, that shows relatively more negative CAR. So, the exceeded largest shareholders' holding rate (i.e., over 40%) can be a factor for decreasing corporations' value. Also, most positive CAR shows relatively small variation regarding corporation size knowing that big sized corporations have relatively small variation than small sized corporations. Second, we studied about relationship between corporate ownership structure and division public effects and found relatively a little effect by large shareholders, foreign investors' holding variables on division public.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.145-158
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of the ownership structure of unlisted firms on KOSDAQ listing. There are few studies analyzing the characteristics of listing success based on ownership structure. For startup executives, there is not enough data to refer to the ownership structure that can increase the possibility of listing. This paper examines the effects of ownership structure on IPO success through comparison between listed successful and failed companies among the companies in application for KOSDAQ listing eligibility review. The major findings are as follows; (1) Venture capital investment and shareholding have a statistically positive effect on the success of KOSDAQ listing. This results indicate that the venture capital's investment alleviate the problem of information asymmetry, and it is a valid signal for market participants. The result means the role of venture capital seems to be important when companies are listed on the KOSDAQ. (2) The largest shareholder's stake has an inverted-U shape relationship with listing success. In other words, the ownership concentration mitigates moral hazard problem, which leads to listing success. However, if the ownership concentration exceeds a certain level, the chances of success in listing will decrease due to concerns over the pursuit of private interests. The result suggests that the largest shareholder's stake reduce agency problem. This study academically contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the ownership structure affects IPOs, and explaining the results based on agent theory and signal theory. Our results provide practical implications for companies preparing for an IPO on the KOSDAQ.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.277-293
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• 2015

Mutual Savings Banks generally have weaker governance structure than other financial institutions, so the possibility of earnings management by owner-largest or managements of mutual savings banks is higher than other financial institutions. This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and quality of internal control of financial reporting. If the expropriation of minority shareholder hypothesis holds, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the weaker the internal control system by more likely the opportunistic earnings management by bank managers. On the other hand, under the convergence of interest hypothesis, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the stronger the internal control system by reduction in agency costs as owner-manager's holdings increases, and there a negative relationship is expected between internal control weakness and the holdings of the owner-largest shareholder. We find that mutual savings banks with higher owner-largest shareholder equity has significant positive relations with their internal control of financial reporting material weakness. This result suggests that the greater owner-largest shareholder equity, the more likely the opportunistic earnings management, so that decrease quality of internal control. This paper extends the literature on financial institutions corporate governance to verify whether governance system, especially, owner-largest and quality of internal control has significant positive relations.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.73-80
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• 2020

Using 8,499 observations from 5 years-1,878 firms panel data during 2014 to 2018 in Korean stock exchanges, this study examines the impact of National Pension's ownership on corporate philanthropic giving. The empirical study finds that National Pension's ownership has positive relations with the extent of corporate philanthropic giving in terms of the amounts per employee, the expenditures with respect to total asset and total sales, implying that National Pension plays a monitoring role in promoting target firms to increase the extent of corporate philanthropic giving, which lead to increase in target firms' long-term values. The empirical study also finds that when National Pension is a blockholder holding more than 5% ownership in the target firms, it has positive relations with the extent of corporate philanthropic giving in terms of the amounts per employee, the expenditures with respect to total asset, implying that it exercises disciplinary roles on focal firms in promoting the extent of corporate philanthropic giving in order to increase target firms' long-term values. The results overall support that National Pension plays positive effects on target firms in promoting the extent of corporate philanthropic giving, which lead to increase in target firms' long-term values.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• Korean small business review
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.195-220
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• 2020

In this study, we examined the effects of major shareholder's holdings and foreign shareholder's holdings on capital structure with the samples of listed non-financial firms in KOSPI and KOSDAQ. More specifically, we conduct the data on 7,074 large firms and 2,394 SMEs(Small-Medium Enterprises) before and after the adoption of K-IFRS from 2002 to 2019. The main results can be summarized as follows. The results indicate that the adoption of K-IFRS affects the capital structure of large firms more than SMEs. The major shareholder's holdings and the foreign shareholder's holdings of the large and SMEs listed on the KOSPI and the KOSDAQ market have a significant effect on the leverage ratio. It can be seen that major shareholders of large firms and SMEs reduce the leverage ratio by recognizing the use of debt as financial risk. In addition, it can be seen that regardless of whether or not K-IFRS is adopted, foreign shareholders recognize the use of debt as financial risk and reduce the leverage ratio in order to reduce the investment risk.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.4
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• pp.15-29
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• 2015

This study aims to empirically analyze the relationship between management ownership and corporate performance and stock returns indicates the ownership structure of the company to target the listed companies in China over the past five years from 2010 to 2014. The empirical results are as follows: Management ownership gave an impact on stock returns, especially high-stakes management ownership showed significant positive effect with the stock returns. But management ownership don't have significant positive effect with ROA. The contribution of this study is as follows. Chinese companies have the efficiency of the management through the separation of ownership and management in accordance with the changes realized in capitalism. And this study is reflecting the fact of China using the Chinese data. This study has limitations of that. Management ownership measurement of governance structure don't expand the range, and measurement of governance structure is just one. The following studies are expected to be more sophisticated by comparison of countries.