• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.69-100
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• 2006

We examine the effect of controlling shareholders ownership structure and related-party transactions(hereafter 'RPT') of publicly traded companies on their firm values during the post-IMF period. In the multivariate regression analysis using control variables such as firm size, capital structure, investment, dividend, profitability and industry dummy that might affect firm values, we find that there exists a significant negative relation between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values proxied by Tobin's Q, and also find that there is a significant negative relation between RPT and the firm values. Those evidences seem to support the controlling shareholders' expropriation hypothesis. Additionally, we investigate the relation between ownership structure and rim value through the piecewise regression analysis. We find a significant 'inverse' U-shape pattern between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values. This result is quite different from the existing literatures that have usually reported an U-shape pattern. In conclusion, the findings in this study do not support the notion that the ownership concentration to the controlling shareholders does negatively affect the firm values monotonically.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.163
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• pp.22-31
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• 2012

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.20 no.3_4
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• pp.63-109
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• 1998

주주와 기업경영자의 대리인관계에서 대주주가 경영자를 감시 감독하는 역할을 항상 하는 것은 아니다. 기업의 주주는 동질적이 아닐 수 있으며, 특히 지배 대주주와 외부주주의 이해관계는 상이할 수 있다. 소유지분이 높아지고 기업에 대한 영향이 증가하는 경우 이를 이용하여 주주들이 자신들의 사익을 추구하고자 할 수 있다. 기업경영 및 의사결정을 자신들의 사적이익에 부합되는 방향으로 유도하기 위하여 주주들은 경영자에게 높은 보수를 제공하는 방법 등으로 경영자와의 담합관계를 추구할 수 있다. 대주주가 경영자와의 담합관계를 추구하는 경우 기업경영의 주목적이 기업주식가격상승 또는 배당금증가에서 멀어지므로 기업의 수익성은 감소할 수 있다. 본 연구는 1982년부터 1992년간 일본 제조업분야의 상장기업을 통해 기관투자자들의 소유지분과 경영자의 보수 그리고 기업성과와의 관계를 살펴보았다. 주거래은행을 중심으로 금융기관투자자는 기업의 주요 채권자인 동시에 소유주로서 일반주주와는 상반된 이해관계를 가지고 있다. 본 연구는 금융기관의 소유지분이 강화됨에 따라 기업경영자의 급여가 성과급이 아닌 고정급의 형태를 통해 증가함을 보여주고 있다. 또한 기업이 차입금에 대하여 지불하는 이자율이 상승할수록 기업경영자의 급여는 증가함을 보여준다. 그리고 금융기관의 소유지분이 높은 기업의 수익성이 낮음을 보여주고 있다. 이런 결과는 1980년대 자본 자유화와 더불어 자본공급자로서의 위치가 약해진 금융기관과 기업과의 관계를 시사하고 있다. 기업수익성보다는 금융기관에게 주요 채권자로서의 위치와 상대적으로 높은 수익성을 보장하도록 경영자의 인센티브급여계약이 설계되었음을 의미한다. 또한 많은 기업들이 주거래은행의 전직 경영자를 이사 또는 최고경영자로 임명하고 있는 사실을 고려할 때, 금융기관 경영자와 기업경영자간의 담합관계를 암시하기도 한다.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.119-127
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• 2022

In order to analyze the effect of strengthening the disclosure of remuneration for high-paid workers among the measures to improve the governance structure of financial companies by the Financial Services Commission in 2018, this study demonstrated the compensation system, management performance, and improvement of governance for Korean financial companies from 2015 to 2020. Analysis was performed. As a result of the empirical analysis, it was found that financial companies after 2018 decreased the employee compensation disparity and the majority shareholding ratio, while the stock performance and foreign ownership ratio increased. This study has the greatest contribution in that it is the first domestic study to verify the effect of applying the so-called Say on Pay, which discloses management's remuneration and allows shareholders to check its appropriateness through voting.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.12 no.10
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• pp.121-134
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• 2014

This study investigated the stock market reaction to the announcement of conversion to holding company and its influence on the market value and corporate governance before and after the event. Generally, it is known that the conversion to holding company strengthens corporate governance because of diversification effects. Accordingly, it is expected that holding companies have a significantly positive influence on the short and long term stock value and improve firm performance. The results are as follows. First, companies have significantly positive short-term abnormal returns for a day. It confirms the stock market reaction hypothesis. Second, it is found that corporate governance is improved in two ways, protection of stock holders' right and distribution of corporate income in the year after converting to holding companies. However, the degree of business concentration appears to be decreased but the result is statistically insignificant after the conversion. Third, there is no significant positive relation between market performance and both protection of stock holders' right and distribution of corporate income. Thus, the results do not adequately support the hypothesis between corporate transparency and market performance.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.1-39
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• 2003

Using a comprehensive sample of convertible security offerings by Korean firms from 1981 to 1999, we examine the effect of convertible bond issues on firm value. We find that the announcement of convertible bond issues has a positive effect on firm value. However, the announcement of private convertible bond issues by chaebol firms has a significant negative effect on their market values. This result is different from that in Japan, suggesting that the efficiency of the financing decision by Korean chaebol is different from that by Japanese keiretsu. In addition, we find that the announcement effect of private convertible bond issues by chaebol firms has a significant relation with the corporate governance variables such as ownership structure, bank relationship. These results indicate that convertible bond issues can be used as a mechanism for chaebol owner-manager to give rise agency problems at the expense of the wealth of minority shareholders.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.19 no.5
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• pp.13-19
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• 2021

In this study, the relationship between R&D investment and firm value was approached from ESG's G(governance) perspective to verify the moderating effect of the corporate governance and ownership structure. To this end, a panel analysis was conducted on a total of 2,825 samples of 405 manufacturing companies listed on the KOSPI market during 2013~2020. The main analysis results are as follows. First of all, we found that R&D investment has a negative impact on firm value, at least in the short term, and that these relationships are moderated by corporate governance and ownership structure. When professional CEO with high level of expertise in business and management does lead R&D investment, the negative impact of R&D investment on firm value is mitigated compared to owner-manager. Also, the stronger the power of outside blockholders, the more transparent the management and disclosure of information, alleviating the information asymmetry between internal and external shareholders, which mitigates the negative impact of R&D investment on firm value. The findings suggest that the factors of ESG may not only have a direct impact on firm value, but also have a moderating effect on firm value.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.33-61
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• 2009

From the perspective of corporate governance, we examine the acquirers' performance of mergers and acquisitions in KOSDAQ Market. The empirical results of our study show that inside an executive shareholders and outside minor shareholders, affect acquirers' performance in M&A's : the ownership of outside minor shareholders is positively correlated with the performance of acquirers. and, the ownership of insiders, such as that of an executive shareholders, does have significant effect on the performance of M&A's. Since the current literature concludes that the improvement of corporate governance in KOSDAQ Market would enhance the shareholders' wealth, the results of our study implies that outside minor investors, as well as insiders, are playing an important role in the corporate governance.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.6 no.11
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• pp.8-14
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• 2006

With an analysis of government owned corporations based on Chinese law as a subject and in the light of comparing and assessing intra-company domination called internal management organization with the domination structure of already established advanced nations, the objective of this study is to analyze the reality and possibility of company domination structure of Chinese government owned corporations. Especially, the intra-company domination structure in China from the points of view such as general meeting of stock holders, director and board of directors, and board of auditors, this study examines the direction toward which internal domination organizations in China form. Also, related to chinese corporations, the study proposes the model in which the possession right of general meeting of stock holders, corporation property right of board of directors, corporation representative right of the senior executive and superintendency of board of auditors are mutually restricted and inter-connected.