• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.104
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• pp.29-33
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• 2004

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.31
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• pp.19-23
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• 1998

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
• /
• no.159
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• pp.12-19
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• 2011

• The Science & Technology
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• v.33 no.6 s.373
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• pp.26-28
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• 2000

• The Korea Swine Journal
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• v.13 no.6 s.142
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• pp.38-39
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• 1991

정부는 우리가 처해있는 농촌의 현실,양돈업의 현실과 미래를 깊이 인식하여 숲을 보면서 나무를 못보는 우를 범하지 않기를 바란다

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.23 no.1_2
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• pp.5-70
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• 2001

The often raised arguments against allowing Chaebol's ownership of banks, that is, 1) the banks may virtually be transformed into private cash vaults of owners, and 2) conflicts of interests may develop and be possibly abused by chaebols, do not hold under ordinary free market circumstances. Only under some special circumstances in which government imposes artificial regulations on banks such as interest rate ceilings, or provides preferential protection like guaranteeing bank's liabilities, the aforementioned worries can be materialized.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.10 no.5
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• pp.207-213
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• 2012

ICT industry in Korea was constituted an industry in early 1980's and has been growing more and more since then. In the process of this growth, most of the large ICT companies in Chaebeols has been absorbing in undemocratic economic behaviors. As a result, the sales and the profit of Cheabeols and large companies has been increasing by geometrical progression, but most of small and medium cooperative companies of these big corporations have been eking a scanty existence. And many of them had gone belly up. This article will propose the digital economic democratization as an alternative to overcome the present undemocratic economic situation in the digital economic field and to develop the healthy ICT industry, and to preliminarily study the concept, elements and meaning of the digital economic democratization.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.103-135
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• 2000

After scrutinizing the actual conditions of labor participation in management decision makings through analysing the collective agreements and the regulations of labor-management committee at the affiliated companies of Korea's top-five Chaebols, we could get some conclusions as follows. First, because the labor participation in management decision makings is in very inactive situations at the long-term management strategy level and the workplace practice level of industrial relations, both parties of the industrial relations in those companies surveyed show the serious lack of abilities to tackle the new and rapidly changing business environments as nowadays actively and cooperatively. Second, we could find the fact that in the surveyed companies the device of collective bargaining was used more commonly at the collective bargaining level of industrial relations and the device of labor-management committee was often used relatively at the long-term management strategy level and the workplace practice level. Third, we could conclude that the separating type of the labor-management committee which was able to keep a safe distance from the more antagonistic device, the collective bargaining, was much more efficient device of the labor participation in management decision makings.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.12 no.12
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• pp.385-394
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• 2012

This study investigates whether earnings management behavior of chaebol firms differ from that of non-chaebol firms. The ownership structure of chaebol firms is characterized by the dominance of one largest shareholder and his family members who typically participate in the management of the firm directly or indirectly and influence most of the important management decision. This study adopts the random effect model and the hausman and talyor model, using a panel of 5092 firm-year over a period from 1991 to 2010 to control for potential heterogeneity and endogeneity that may cause sever bias. This study finds that there is no difference in accrual based earnings management level between chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms. However, chaebol firms appeared to engage less real earnings management that is known to negatively affect future earnings and share prices. The results are consistent when controlling for potential heterogeneity and endogeneity in the hausman and taylor model. The results may be of interest to various stakeholders, policy makers, standard setters and academic researchers.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.16 no.10
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• pp.7118-7125
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• 2015

This study examined one of the concerned or even imperative issues in the field of contemporary finance related to approaching an optimal level of cash holdings for the firms belonging to the chaebols in the Korean domestic capital markets. However, the subject may not have been drawn much attention so far, even if there are still ongoing and active debates among the interest parties at the macro- or micro-level. Two primary hypotheses were postulated to be empirically tested. On the results of the first hypothesis test for the existence of an optimal cash reserves for the sample firms, two estimation techniques were performed in terms of a quadratic regression equation and a relationship between a firm's value and the residuals derived from the static panel date model. As a primary financial implication of the study which may contribute to the practitioners and the academics in finance, the optimal level of cash holdings can be estimated by controlling for the a priori significant components for the sample firms towards maximizing firm value.