• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.225-235
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• 2017

Firms employ one of two stock repurchasing methods, either direct open market repurchase or indirect repurchase through trust contracts. Since these two methods have some regulatory differences, managers of firms may use a repurchasing method as a signal to convey the information to the market. Therefore, this study investigates the relationship between stock repurchasing methods and implied cost of equity of firms. The results show that there is a significant and negative relationship between stock repurchase announcement and cost of equity. In addition, the implied cost of equity for firms employing direct open market repurchase is significantly lower than those of firms that use indirect repurchase method. Overall, the market accurately reflects the information conveyed by two stock repurchasing methods into cost of equity of firms.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.51-84
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• 2008

We investigate the signaling effect of repurchase preceding new equity issue using Korean data. In a short time span, firms announce stock repurchases and equity offerings. The proximity of two events in Korean firms indicates that those are not independent of each other. In this paper, we test the signaling effect of repurchase on equity offerings on the two measures. One is announcement effect, which is measured as CAR(0, +2). The other is the effectiveness which is measured as CAR(0, +30) because the price movement during this window influences on the price of new issues. Previous studies that stock repurchase convey positive signal to equity offerings-Billet and Xue(2004) and Jung(2004)-construct sample without the limit of time interval between two events. This causes the unclear relation between those because of the long time interval. In this study we consider only samples of being within one year each other to reduce this problem and clarify the signal of repurchase on equity offerings. Korean firms are allowed to repurchase own shares with two different method. One is direct repurchase as same as open market repurchase. The other is stock stabilization fund and stock trust fund which trust company or bank buy and sell their shares on the behalf of firms. Generally, the striking different characteristic between direct repurchase and indirect repurchase is following. Direct repurchase is applied by more strict regulation than indirect repurchase. Therefore, the direct repurchase is more informative signal to the equity offering than the indirect repurchase. We construct two sample firms- firms with direct repurchase preceding-equity offerings and indirect repurchase-preceding equity offering, and one control firms-equity offerings only firms-to investigate the announcement effect and the effectiveness of repurchases. Our findings are as follows. Direct repurchase favorably affect the price of new issues favorably. CAR(0, +2) of firms with direct repurchase is not different from that of equity offerings only firms but CAR(0, +30) is higher than that of equity offerings only firms. For firms with indirect repurchase and equity offerings, Both the announcement effect and the effectiveness does not exist. Jung(2004) suggest the possibilities of how indirect stock repurchase can be regarded as one of unfair trading practices on based on the survey results that financial managers of some of KSE listed firms have been asked of their opinion on the likelihood of the stock repurchase being used in unfair trading. This is not objective empirical evidence but opinion of financial managers. To investigate whether firms announce false signal before equity offerings to boost the price of new issues, we calculate the long-run performance following equity offerings. If firms have announced repurchase to boost the price of new issues intentionally, they would undergo the severe underperformance. The empirical results do not show the severer underperformance of both sample firms than equity offerings only firms. The suggestion of false signaling of repurchase preceding equity offerings is not supported by our evidence.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.37-69
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• 2005

This study intends to verify whether stock repurchase, as well as stock dispositions, affects shareholder's wealth and also whether repurchase/dispositions has varying impact de-pending on its purpose. According to empirical analysis, announcement of stock repurchase results in positive abnormal returns when the objective of stock repurchase is stock price stabilization or cancellation of shares. However, when the purpose of stock repurchase is granting incentives to executives/employees, we get the negative abnormal returns. Also, the termination of stock trust for reason of expiration or stock dispositions of which goal is to give incentives to executive/employees has a negative impact on stock price, whereas direct dispositions of stock to raise cash or to improve financial structrue are shown to significantly increase the wealth of shareholders. Cross-section analysis also confirms that stock repurchase and dispositions has different impact on excess returns depending on its purpose. The results of this study imply that the dispositions of stock should be regarded as an important financial strategic tool to be used by companies and what's more, such studies dealing with stock repurchase or dispositions should take firm's purpose into consideration in their approach.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.99-110
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• 1991

본 논문은 최근 미국에서 성행되고 있는 기업합병(企業合倂)과 기업비공개화(企業非公開化)와 같은 기업재구성(企業再構成)의 동기를 대리인(代理人) 문제(間題)의 관점에서 설명하는데 그 목적이 있다. 기업합병의 경우, 취득기업의 내부자지분율(內部者持分率)이 높을수록 주주의 부(富)는 합병을 통해 증가하는 반면 내부자지분율이 낮은 기업은 합병을 통해 기존 주주의 부(富)는 오히려 감소한다. 이러한 현상은 소유경영자지분(所有經營者持分)이 낮을 수록 대리인비용이 크게 발생한다는 이론과 일관성(一貫性)이 있음을 알 수 있다. 또한 피취득기업의 주식가격은 합병정보가 공시 되기 이전 몇개월동안 크게 하락하였으나 합병 공시와 동시에 크게 상승하는 현상을 나타낸다. 그 이유는 대리인문제(代理人問題)로 설명 할 수 있다. 피취득기업의 경영자는 기업자원을 비효율적으로 운용할 것(지분(持分)의 대리인비용(代理人費用))이므로 합병공시전 주가는 하락하지만, 합병공시후에는 이러한 대리인문제가 개선될 것이므로 주가가 상승한다는 것이다. 따라서 합병의 경우, 취득기업과 비취득기업 모두 대리인문제(代理人問題)와 관련을 갖는다. 또한 1980년 이후 공개기업(公開企業)의 경영자가 자기회사 주식을 매입한 후 비공개기업(非公開企業으)로 환원(還元)다하는 현상이 유행하고 있다. 비공개기업으로 환원한 기업의 경영자는 창의적 기업활동을 통하여 기업가치를 증대시킨 후 다시 발행시장에서 신주를 발행하여 상당한 이익을 얻고 있다. 이는 공개기업으로 존속하는 경우 낮은 내부자지분율로 인해 대리인문제가 발생하므로 비공개 기업으로 전환함으로써 대리인 비용을 자기주식 취득을 통해 절감시킬 수 있는 증거로 간주된다.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.1-29
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• 2009

As foreign investors' share holdings in Korean firms have dramatically increased since 1998 following the financial deregulation on the limit of foreign stock investment, the concern over the negative impacts the foreign investors would bring on the firms' financial policy has been growing too. Foreign investors were perceived to require the firms of excessive payments of cash dividends sometimes with threat of hostile takeover trials detering the firm from investing its cash flow in the physical facilities and RandD eroding their potential growth capabilities. We examine the impact of foreign investment on the firms' dividend policy using 234 listed firms' panel data over the sample periods of 1998 to 2005 employing various panel regression methodology. Foreign shareholders are found not to be related or even negatively related to the payout ratio(dividend/net income), but positively and statistically significantly related to the ratio of cash dividends to book of asset, negatively to the dividend yields. Considering the payout ratio is the most appropriate measure for the dividend payment, we can not support the arguments that the foreign investors' holdings have induced the excessive dividend level in Korean firms.