• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.76-86
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• 2016

Recently, the Contracts of International Construction Business has been decreased from the beginning of 2015 in Korea, although it has been steadily increased until 2014. This trend could be caused by Low-Price Contracts, the lack of Know-how and experience in operating, the poor management of Claims and Low-Profitability in Business. It has been recognized that the qualitative improvement of Business Contacts are necessary for successful Projects. In the Bidding Process, therefore, Experience data as In-House Data and Lessons Learned for projects should be strategically involved to assure riskless offers. Accordingly the Proposal Process are needed to be organized and enhanced by including processes for risks review about technical, marketing and commercial part during the bidding. This paper proposes a Risk Management Process model during Bidding Phase, using Risk Evaluation Method through the project life-cycle. The Concept of Model is to define CSF (Critical Success Factor) in the bidding process and Risk Factors are linked to CSF and Organization based on RAM (Responsibility assignment matrix).

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.16 no.6
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• pp.92-100
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• 2015

This paper examines the extent of China's market liberalization in the construction market seen through the point of view of WTO agreements and Korea-China FTA. Since the environment set by these agreements form the institutional background that Korean firms must work with to successfully access the market, the Korean government must work to reduce Chinese barriers as much as possible through international negotiations on these agreements. The paper sets out three goals for negotiations and the appropriate agreements and fora the government can use to advance these goals.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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• v.10 no.6
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• pp.109-116
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• 2010

A construction project consists of many types of contracts. In the process of selecting the successful contractor after bidding, there will inevitably be fierce competition, which may lead to corruption or bribery. Even after signing the contract, during the period of settling the amount of the contract, bribery could occur. Such corruption could harm the development of the construction industry. It is, therefore, necessary to establish a strategy to prevent corruption by strengthening the transparency of the bidding process. In this study, to prevent corruption in the construction industry, a new service is proposed in which the successful bidder is selected by a professional third party, and the introduction of diverse delivery systems for construction projects and the invigoration of alternative methods of settling disputes are also proposed in this study.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.9
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• pp.461-466
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power. Simulation results show some parameters have an influence on the market power of an electricity market including a hydro generator.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.58 no.4
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• pp.694-699
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• 2009

Combined cycle plants which feature distinct advantages for power generation such as fast response, high efficiency, environmental friendliness, fuel flexiblity represent the majority of new generating plant installations across the globe. Combined cycle plants have different operating modes where the operating parameters can differ greatly depending which mode is operating at the time. This paper addresses the bidding strategy model of combined cycle plants in a competitive electricity market by using a characteristic of multiple operating modes of combined cycle plants. Simulation results of case studies show that an operating mode among multiple ones is selected strategically in generation bidding for more profit of generation company.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.67-72
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• 2004

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of generating firms in a competitive market where the firms are provided with payment for generating reactive power. Reactive support for voltage control is an integral and critical part of power system operations. Since reactive support is unbundled in a competitive market under open access transmission, it is treated as one of ancillary services. The operation costs and opportunity costs for reactive support are compensated by payment to the firms, hence their bidding strategies will be affected. The opportunity costs are evaluated from the foregone profits of a generator in making sales in real power market by providing reactive support instead of real power. Game theory approach is used to analysis the transaction strategies of real power by the bimatrix method in this paper. Through computing the Nash equilibrium in a sample system, an incentive of a generator for improving the reactive generating capacity is found to be effective and the variations of the profits are analyzed as the demand power factor changes.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.807-809
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.713-715
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• 2004

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of biddings and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a model of the combined market , energy market and operating teserve market. The Nash equilibrium is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization , maximization of Social welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 2001.10b
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• pp.85-87
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• 2001

다수의 이익-추구형 에이전트들 간의 자동화된 협상 과정을 통해 합리적으로 작업 분배가 이루어질 수 있도록 조정하는 것은 대부분의 다중 에이전트 시스템에서 매우 중요한 문제이다. 본 연구에서는 대표적인 다중 에이전트 작업 재할당 문제의 하나로서 다중 에이전트 외판원 여행 문제를 설명하고, 이 문제를 풀기 위한 조정 메커니즘으로 Vickrey 경매 프로토콜의 적용을 제안하였다. 대표적인 시장기반의 조정 메커니즘인 Vickrey 경매의 적용을 위해 본 논문에서는 각 에이전트의 이익, 협상의 최종 목표, 경매대상, 각 에이전트의 입찰전략, 전체적인 경매 진행과정 등을 정의하였다. 이와 같이 설계된 시장기반의 조정메커니즘의 장점은 각 에이전트의 이익만을 고려함으로써 문제를 단순화할 수 있고, 복잡도가 큰 중앙-집중식 제어 메커니즘이 필요치 않으며, 따라서 각 에이전트의 자율성을 최대한 보장할 수 있고, 큰 협상비용을 들이지 않고 최적의 할당에 도달할 수 있다는 점등이다. 본 논문에서는 하나의 다중 에이전트 외판원 여행문제에 대한 풀이과정을 통해 앞서 설계된 Vickrey 경매프로토콜의 진행방식을 설명하고 그 효과와 효율성을 예시하였다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.411-413
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• 2001

This paper discusses on an optimal bidding strategy of a generator in a competitive electricity spot market using the information of predicted spot price with some assumptions. Optimal bidding strategy of a generator is derived by solving a profit-maximizing optimization problem with a constraint where the forecasted spot price is treated as a constant value. The main advantage of this methodology is that the optimal bidding strategy of each generator can be obtained independently where the gaming characteristics of generators are merged into the forecasted spot price.