• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.59-76
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• 2018

What are the conditions make a being x a moral agent? Can an artifact be moral agent? A moral agent is considered to be a rational being capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. This study critically analyzed Davidson's position on the condition of the rational being and argued that the network of beliefs with propositional attitude and the beliefs as their background cannot be a requisite for the rational being. Later, it proves that the conditions proposed by $Proke{\check{s}}ov{\acute{a}}$ are merely paratactically listed superficial elements. The moral agent in this study includes the rational agent and it is proven that the strong first person viewpoint is the necessary and sufficient condition for rational agent and moral agent. In conclusion, it suggested a the sketch of moderate skepticism which sets the tentative limit on the agent potential in an artifact by suggesting conditions for moral agent instead of intense skepticism that strongly denies the potential as the moral agent.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.144
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• pp.51-82
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• 2017

In Meditation II, Descartes questions "sed quid igitur sum" ("But what then am I?"). To this question to rule our essence, A. Clark insists that "We are soft selves". The idea by Clark is a spontaneous conclusion of the extended mind theory stating that cognitive process, cognitive state, and self may be extended over biological organisms. However, it seems that it is difficult for the extended self to have the qualifications as a moral agent. There have been disputes about expandability of cognitive process and cognitive state, but there have not been many disputes about the possibility of accountability of behavior by the extended self. First of all, in this thesis, it will be revealed that the extended self through the analysis of metaphorical theories and the ontological essence of agent and behavior by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson is just metaphorical rhetoric, which is not suitable for rational comprehension of ontological essence of agent and behavior. Moreover, the analysis of problem about artificial moral agent (AMA) proposes the "Strong First-person Viewpoint" as a requirement of the agent. Finally, the concept of extended self will be shown to be unsuitable for theoretical explanation of us, and the concept of human person will be proposed as an alternative solution.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.592-600
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• 2018

As the field of robots is evolving to intelligent robots that can replace even humans' mental or emotional labor, 'robot ethics' needed in relationship between humans and robots is becoming a crucial issue these days. The purpose of this study is to consider the ethics of robots and humans that is essential in this post-human age. It will deal with the followings as the main contents. First, with the cases of developing ethics software intended to make robots practice ethics, the authors begin this research being conscious about the matter of whether robots can really judge what is right or wrong only with the ethics codes entered forcibly. Second, regarding robot ethics, we should consider unethicality that might arise from learning data internalizing human biasness and also reflect ethical differences between countries or between cultures, that is, ethical relativism. Third, robot ethics should not be just about ethics codes intended for robots but reflect the new concept of 'human ethics' that allows humans and robots to coevolve.