The aim of this paper is to examine the so-called theory of automatic action attributed to Plotinus, according to which the sage can act automatically without deliberation or reasoning. Concerns were raised that such a theory runs the risk of turning the agent into an automaton by reducing action to mechanical reflexes to external stimuli. I attempt to show that Plotinus does not hold a theory of automatic action by arguing that the Plotinian sage's non-deliberative action is not automatic at all. For this purpose, I first draw attention to the non-deliberative action of the World-Reason (i.e. the reason of the World-Soul), which is supposed to present an ideal model of action. Indeed, Plotinus mentions that the World-Reason rules the world "as if automatically". This is, however, meant to indicate the spontaneous and natural manner in which the World-Reason rules. In this respect, the way the World-Reason works is compared to the way nature (i.e. the productive power of the World-Soul) works. But Plotinus points out that the World-Reason knows what to do, whereas nature works without knowing. In this connection, Plotinus makes it clear that the World-Reason does not calculate or deliberate about what to do because it already knows it. To clarify this point, I turn to Plotinus' analogy of practical wisdom (phronêsis) and skill, according to which the World-Reason is compared to an accomplished craftsman or artist, who confidently works without any doubt, hesitation or difficulty, thereby expressing her intelligence, unmediated by deliberation. From this perspective, non-deliberative action according to practical wisdom turns out to be superior to deliberative action. Plotinus admits that there are difficult circumstances in which even the skilled craftsman, unlike the World-Reason who always controls the whole situation, needs to deliberate or calculate, but he is nevertheless confident that the craftsman easily finds the solution. This suggests that the sage, who possesses practical wisdom, can act normally like a great master or virtuoso without deliberation, but in an emergency situation he also employs deliberation, but resourcefully and creatively responds to challenge. The attempt is made to elucidate the Plotinian model of sage's action with the help of Csikzentmihalyi's concept of 'flow' and Annas' application of it to the analogy of virtue and skill. Finally, it is shown that the sage's virtuous action, in spite of being a habituated action, is not a passive, routinized, automatic action, but an active, flexible, intelligent action.