• Title/Summary/Keyword: 익명 모드

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Anonymous Connection Protocol against Location Tracking Attacks in Bluetooth Environment (블루투스에서 위치 추적 공격을 방지하기 위한 익명 접속 프로토콜)

  • Park, Hee-Jin;Kim, Yu-Na;Kim, Jong
    • Journal of KIISE:Computing Practices and Letters
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    • v.14 no.3
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    • pp.266-270
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    • 2008
  • Bluetooth technology provides a way to connect and exchange information between personal devices over a secure and short-range radio frequency without any authentication infrastructures. For this infrastructure-less feature, Bluetooth has several problems which could not occur in other network, and among them location tracking attacks is essential problem which should be solved. In this paper, we introduce the location tracking attack and propose an anonymous connection protocol against it. We also perform security analysis based on possible scenarios of this attack, and estimate both execution time and memory spaces of our scheme and existing methods.

Anonymous Connection Protocol against Location Tracking Attacks in Bluetooth (블루투스에서 위치 추적 공격을 방지하기 위한 익명 접속 프로토콜)

  • Park, Hee-Jin;Kim, Yu-Na;Kim, Jong
    • Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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    • 2007.10a
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    • pp.183-184
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    • 2007
  • 블루투스(Bluetooth)는 별도의 인증시설 없이 각 디바이스간의 독립적인 인증과정을 통해 데이터를 서로 전송하므로, 이러한 특징 때문에 기존 네트워크에서는 발생하지 않았던 취약점들이 발생할 수 있다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 이들 취약점 중 하나인 디바이스 위치추적공격에 대해 살펴보고 그에 대한 해결책으로 익명모드를 제안하였다. 제안된 방법은 발생 가능한 공격시나리오에 대해 분석하고 성능을 평가하였으며, 분석과 평가에 있어서 기존 방법에 비해 수행 시간과 메모리 소비 측면에서 큰 차이를 보이지 않으면서도 위치 추적 공격에 대해 더 강인하게 동작함을 보였다.

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Anonymity of Tor Users on Unsecured Applications (비 암호화 프로그램 사용자의 토르망 익명성 보장 분석)

  • Shin, Seok-Joo;Dahal, Saurav;Pudasaini, Amod;Kang, Moon-Soo
    • The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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    • v.12 no.5
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    • pp.805-816
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    • 2017
  • Tor is a popular, low-latency open network that offers online anonymity to users by concealing their information from anyone conducting traffic analysis. At the same time, a number of conventional passive and active attacking schemes have been proposed to compromise the anonymity provided by the Tor network. In addition to attacks on the network through traffic analysis, interacting with an unsecured application can reveal a Tor user's IP address. Specific traffic from such applications bypasses Tor proxy settings in the user's machine and forms connections outside the Tor network. This paper presents such applications and shows how they can be used to deanonymize Tor users. Extensive test studies performed in the paper show that applications such as Flash and BitTorrent can reveal the IP addresses of Tor users.