• Title/Summary/Keyword: 의회 의사규칙

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Institutional Development of the U.S. House: Reforms in Legislative Rules (미국 의회 의사규칙의 역사적 진화와 이론적 쟁점)

  • Ryu, Jae-Sung
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.15 no.2
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    • pp.35-65
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    • 2009

  • This paper describes the changes in legislative rules in the U.S. House of Representatives and discusses the roles of legislative rules in public policy making. I argue that much of reform experiences in the U.S. House provide good references by which the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea may follow for its reforms. For this, I summarize primary reforms of legislative rules in the U.S. House and discuss dynamics in power distribution between committees and party leadership. These reforms are then reviewed on the basis of political stability, protection of minority rights, and legislative deliberation.

Institutionalization of Legislative Rules, Political Saliency of Bills, and Operation of the National Assembly in Korea: An Analysis of the Constitutional Court's Law Reports (의사규칙의 제도화와 정치적 현저성, 그리고 한국 국회의 의사진행: 헌법재판소 청구사건들에 대한 분석)

  • Kim, Yong-Cheol
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.15 no.2
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    • pp.5-34
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    • 2009

  • Why the Korea National Assembly shows often limping in its operations despite the introduction of various democratic legislative rules? Regarding the question, this article pays attention to the institutionalization of legislative rules and political saliency of bills, and analyzes the Constitutional Court's law reports. According to the analysis, the National Assembly goes on smoothly when dealing with the bills with low political saliency, but shows anomaly in its operation when dealing with the bills with high political saliency. This indicates that the institutionalization of the legislative rules is relatively low. The low level of the institutionalization is derived fundamentally from a distinguishing characteristic of the power structure in which political power is too much concentrated on the president. Within the power structure, the ruling party has to play the role of protecting and advocating the president, whereas the opposition parties become actors criticizing and checking the president. Consequently, the parliamentary decision-making processes have been dominated by the political strifes between the ruling and opposition parties, often producing limping operations of the National Assembly and delayed institutionalization of the legislative rules.