• Review of KIISC
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• v.22 no.5
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• pp.54-61
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• 2012

최근의 전력난, 일본 후쿠시마 원전사태 등은 전력생산이 상대적으로 적은 나라에게는 큰 부담이 아닐 수 없다. 이러한 배경에서 스마트그리드라는 지능형 전력망의 개념이 도입되었고, 우리나라도 녹색성장에 힘입어 적극 추진하고 있다. 그러나, 스마트그리드에도 소규모 분산 전원공격, 양방향 통신 프로토콜 공격, 배전망 관리센서 공격, 보안에 취약한 스마트 미터에 대한 공격 등의 사이버공격이 이루어지고 있어 전력 공급은 물론 전체 시스템에 타격을 줄 수 있다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 보안 체계에 대한 요구 사항을 정리하고, 안전성이 보장하기 위하여 필요한 이슈를 제기하고자 한다.

• Review of KIISC
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• v.30 no.5
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• pp.35-44
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• 2020

정보화 시대의 도래와 함께 원자력발전소 등 사회 간접자본의 중요 시설에서 운영되는 각종 장치들 역시 디지털화되면서 기존에 존재하지 않았던 사이버 공격에 대한 위협이 현실화되고 있다. 이러한 중요 사회 간접자본 등의 운영에 위협을 가하는 행위는 사회적으로 경제적으로 매우 큰 재난을 발생시킬 수 있기 때문에 공격 발생 이전에 사전 방어 체계를 구축해야 하는데, 이때, 실질적으로 위협이 되는 취약점의 존재 여부를 사전 인지하는 것이 매우 중요하다. 이를 위하여 본 논문에서는 원자력발전소의 계측제어계통에서 운영되는 국산화된 디지털 장치에 대하여 관련 취약점을 확인하고 확인된 취약점의 실질적인 위험도를 장치의 운영환경 특징을 반영하여 도출하며, 주요 기기의 운영 규제지침의 준수 여부를 점검하는 도구의 개발 결과를 소개한다. 본 논문은 원자력발전소 상에서 운영되는 시스템을 주요 대상으로 작성되었다.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.1129-1135
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• 2016

The NH-NongHyup network and servers were paralyzed in 2011, in the 2013 3.20 cyber attack happened and classified documents of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd were leaked on december in 2015. All of them were conducted by a foreign country. These attacks were planned for a long time compared to the script kids attacks and the techniques used were very complex and sophisticated. However, no successful solution has been implemented to defend an APT attacks(Advanced Persistent Threat Attacks) thus far. We will use big data analytics to analyze whether or not APT attacks has occurred. This research is based on the data collected through ISAC monitoring among 3 hierarchical Korean Defense System. First, we will introduce related research about big data analytics and machine learning. Then, we design two big data analytics models to detect an APT attacks. Lastly, we will present an effective response method to address a detected APT attacks.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2016.05a
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• pp.317-320
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• 2016

The NH-NongHyup network and servers were paralyzed in 2011, in the 2013 3.20 cyber attack happened and Classified documents of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd were leaked on December in 2015. All of them were conducted by a foreign country. These attacks were planned for a long time compared to the script kids attacks and the techniques used were very complex and sophisticated. However, no successful solution has been implemented to defend an APT attack thus far. Therefore, we will use big data analytics to analyze whether or not APT attack has occurred in order to defend against the manipulative attackers. This research is based on the data collected through ISAC monitoring among 3 hierarchical Korean defense system. First, we will introduce related research about big data analytics and machine learning. Then, we design two big data analytics models to detect an APT attack and evaluate the models' accuracy and other results. Lastly, we will present an effective response method to address a detected APT attack.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.15 no.6_2
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• pp.29-36
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• 2015

The hacking threats made against the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power(KNDP) and the leakage of critical information on nuclear power safety raised the public awareness on the importance of protecting and managing national infrastructure necessary for sustaining the state and society. Cyber security activities and relevant institutions in the ROK, however, are still insufficient, because of which there is a possibility that similar incidents would reoccur and cause serious damages. Hence, a grave and direct threat is posed to the national security of the ROK. In this thesis, I would like to give my analysis and assessment on the recent cyber intrusions against infrastructure at home and abroad, measures established in response and their implementation, and the deficiency of the existing infrastructure protection system ; and lastly propose measures to reinforce infrastructure protection of the ROK.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2008.10b
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• pp.209-210
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• 2008

In the case of unauthorized individuals, systems and entities or process threatening the instrumentation and control systems of nuclear facilities using the intrinsic vulnerabilities of digital based technologies, those systems may lose their own required functions. The loss of required functions of the critical systems of nuclear facilities may seriously affect the safety of nuclear facilities. Consequently, digital instrumentation and control systems, which perform functions important to safety, should be designed and operated to respond to cyber threats capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of digital based technologies. To make it possible, the developers and licensees of nuclear facilities should perform appropriate cyber security program throughout the whole life cycle of digital instrumentation and control systems. Under the goal of securing the safety of nuclear facilities, this paper presents the KINS' regulatory position on cyber security program to remove the cyber threats that exploit the vulnerabilities of digital instrumentation and control systems and to mitigate the effect of such threats. Presented regulatory position includes establishing the cyber security policy and plan, analyzing and classifying the cyber threats and cyber security assessment of digital instrumentation and control systems.

• Journal of Korea Society of Digital Industry and Information Management
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.99-109
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• 2020

In the past, conservative concepts have been applied in terms of the characteristic of nuclear power plants(NPPs), resulting in analog-based equipment and closed networks. However, as digital technology has recently been applied to the design, digital-based facilities and communication networks have been used in nuclear power plants, increasing the risk of cybersecurity than using analog-based facilities. Nuclear power plant facilities are divided into a safety system and a non-safety system. It is essential to identify the difference and cope with cybersecurity threats to the safety system according to its characteristics. In this paper, we examine the cybersecurity regulatory guidelines for safety systems in nuclear power plant facilities. Also, we analyze cybersecurity threats to a programmable logic controller of the safety system and suggest cybersecurity requirements be applied to it to respond to the threats. By implementing security functions suitable for the programmable logic controller according to the suggested cybersecurity requirements, regulatory guidelines can be satisfied, and security functions can be extended according to other system requirements. Also, it can effectively cope with cybersecurity attacks that may occur during the operation of nuclear power plants.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.295-310
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• 2014

DCS (Distributed Control System), the main control system of power plants, is an automated system for enhancing operational efficiency by monitoring, tuning and real-time operation. DCS is becoming more intelligent and open systems as Information technology are evolving. In addition, there are a large amount of investment to enable proactive facility management, maintenance and risk management through the predictive diagnostics. However, new upcoming weaponized malware, such as Stuxnet designed for disrupting industrial control system(ICS), become new threat to the main control system of the power plant. Even though these systems are not connected with any other outside network. The main control systems used in the power plant usually have been used for more than 10 years. Also, this system requires the extremely high availability (rapid recovery and low failure frequency). Therefore, installing updates including security patches is not easy. Even more, in some cases, installing security updates can break the warranty by the vendor's policy. If DCS is exposed a potential vulnerability, serious concerns are to be expected. In this paper, we conduct the penetration test by using NESSUS, a general-purpose vulnerability scanner under the simulated environment configured with the Ovation version 1.5. From this result, we suggest a log analysis method to detect the security infringement and react the incident effectively.