• Journal of the Korean Society of Surveying, Geodesy, Photogrammetry and Cartography
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.149-155
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• 2011

As the depletion of land resources, the attention about marine resources has been focused on. Neighboring countries such as Japan and China to expand their marine territory invest more governmental money. The exact territorial sea baselines can be the scientific data which cad resolve the dispute between the neighboring countries. So, those territorial sea baselines should be maintained systematically and continuously. Because territorial sea baselines surveyed 10 years ago without updating, the review may be needed. In this study, we compared 2009 year surveying results with past territorial sea baselines results for reviews. As a results, Jeju Island represents a large difference. So, the outputs of territorial sea baselines around Jeju Island should be readjusted. Through this study, the ongoing maintenance of the territorial sea baselines is required. The continuing interest in the maritime boundary, as well as defend in terms of protection for undersea resources are needed.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.277-295
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• 2016

It is undoubtedly true that national security in Korean peninsula is on the road to destabilization. The main factors are known to be North Korea's development and experiment on nuclear arms, especially the forth nuclear experiment on January 6th, ICBM launch February 7th, and encroachment upon the territory the NLL on the 8th along with the shutdown on Gaeseong Industrial Complex. Also, China's trouble with other nations over sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea and the fact that Japan's government is veering to the right side and having territorial dispute are making the case worse. Nations in Northeast Asia are striving to obtain the interest for the sake of their own country. In order to do so, they're walking the path to achieve national security. Until then, they are not so willing to participate foreign matters or economical race. Even in our perspective, these issues are many of the main problems which our country is currently facing. However, it is important for them to avoid making policies which may take away the citizen's happiness. The number one priority for the nation or any form of a group is to act in the best interest for the national security and the citizen's happiness. They are the main factors why a nation could exist. They are the symbols of a nation's sovereign authority. Countries outside are proving it by increasing their national defense budget even in this unprecedented economical crisis. If we are willing to stay the same as ever, the disparity in the military force will not be the same in the future. In conclusion, the study examines the problem which changes in Northeast Asia's defense environment could bring and the appropriate amount of national defense budget in order to support the nation's integration of its abilities to move toward South and North Korea's unification.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.211-235
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• 2021

As a result of the Falkland Islands War from April 2 to June 14, 1982, Britain overcame severe economic depression and reclaimed the glory of the former British Empire by winning the war. On the other hand, Argentina was greatly affected by the collapse of a military dictatorship and the birth of a democratic government. This study suggests strategies for responding to maritime disputes that may occur in Dokdo Island in the future by applying "DIME on PMESII" to the Falkland Islands dispute. In particular, the study analyzes how DIME (diplomacy, information, military, and economy) capabilities have an effect as a means of the total national power of a country that effectively controls the disputed territory. Based on the results of this study, the response strategies related to the Dokdo maritime dispute are as follows. First, effective control over the disputed territory should be effectively maintained and strengthened like in Britain. This strategy inspires patriotism, supports the government during warfare, secures a just cause for war, and gains international support. Second, 'DIME on PMESII' was effective in modern warfare by focusing our DIME capabilities on the weaknesses of the other country's PMESII system. That is, wars are not won simply by the conflict of armed forces but by a nation's overall national strength, such as diplomatic, information, and economic capabilities. Third, appropriate strategies for neighboring countries are needed to overcome the possibility of limited warfare in the sea through preparations for Dokdo maritime disputes in the future.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.31-76
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• 2018

This article explores why the two Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam and the Philippines, choose different strategies to cope with the Chinese threat. Despite the evident Chinese threat in the South China Sea, Vietnam has not meaningfully expanded the military cooperation with the United States, whereas the Philippines, ironically, has distanced itself with its ally, the United States. Existing studies on the topic does not offer a satisfactory explanation. We assign that two cases are examples of "underbalancing" - the failure of balancing even though there is an evident threat. Furthermore, we demonstrate the difference between cases of the Philippines and Vietnam by arguing that the number of veto players affects the outcome of foreign policy, underbalancing of two countries. The Philippines has only one veto player, the president, hence its response to external threats is incoherent. On the other hand, the number of veto players in Vietnam is more than one and those players demand negotiation among them on the matter of foreign policy. Upon analyses on two cases we argue that the former is the case of underbalancing caused by a lack of policy stability, while the latter is the case of underbalancing caused by a lack of policy responsiveness.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.65-86
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• 2024

This study delves into the geopolitical tensions surrounding Ukraine throughout modern European history, aiming to shed light on its significance in geopolitical discourse. Since the 19th century, European powers, particularly the Anglo-Saxons and Germans, have formulated distinct geopolitical strategies concerning the Eurasian continent, with Ukraine at its focal point. The Crimean War and the German-Soviet War serve as key events to analyze these powers' geopolitical ambitions and interests. The British Empire, driven by its doctrine of thwarting land powers with sea power, intervened in the Crimean War against Russia. Its objective was to disrupt Russian dominance over Ukraine, thereby hindering Russian expansion into the Black Sea and Central Europe. On the other hand, the Third Reich of Germany, fixated on creating a European sphere exclusive from Anglo-Saxon sea powers and the Russian land power, initiated the German-Soviet War. This move aimed to secure a vast territory, including Ukraine, to facilitate expansion into the Caucasus and establish a buffer zone against the Soviet Union. Three key insights emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the absence of a dominant power rooted in Ukraine since the fall of the Principality of Kiev made geopolitical clashes inevitable. Secondly, these clashes ultimately result in a hollow victory for all involved parties, signifying the high costs and minimal gains of such confrontations. Lastly, the root cause of these clashes lies in the discord between exclusive geopolitical visions that fail to accommodate sustainable coexistence among diverse geopolitical spheres. In essence, the study underscores Ukraine's pivotal role in shaping European geopolitics and highlights the recurring clashes driven by competing visions of dominance and control over its territory. From the Crimean War to the German-Soviet War, the struggle for influence over Ukraine reflects broader geopolitical dynamics and the pursuit of strategic advantage by major powers. Ultimately, the study emphasizes the enduring significance of Ukraine in European geopolitics and the complexities inherent in managing its geopolitical tensions.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

China's new Maritime Policy Law (MPL) purports to regulate the duties of China's maritime police agencies, including the China Coast Guard, and safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and rights and interest. The MPL has potentially far-reaching application, as China claims extensive maritime areas off its mainland and in the South China Sea. This expansive application of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction is problematic given that most of China's maritime claims are inconsistent with international law. To the extent that the MPL purports to assert jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels in disputed areas or on the high seas, it contravenes international law. Numerous provisions of the MPL regarding the use of force are also inconsistent with international rules and standards governing the use of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the UN Charter's prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. China could use the MPL as a subterfuge to advance its illegal territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas and interfere with coastal State resource rights in their respective exclusive economic zone.

• Proceedings of the Korea Water Resources Association Conference
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• 2012.05a
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• pp.841-845
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• 2012

최근 중국과 인도는 공유하천인 야루짱부(중국명: 아로장포(雅魯藏布), 인도명:Brahmaputra)강 유역 내 수력발전용 댐 건설을 놓고 갈등 중이다. 발단은 중국이 2010년 9월에 정식으로 착공한 짱무수력발전댐(장목수전참(藏木水電站))의 건설이다. 총길이 3,848km, 유역면적 71만여 $km^2$인 야루짱부강은 중국과 인도, 방글라데시, 부탄 4개국이 공유하고 있다. 야루짱부강의 발원지는 히말라야 산맥 북쪽 기슭의 지에마양쫑 빙하(걸마앙종(杰馬央宗) 빙천(冰川))이고 중국내 길이가 2,057km에 달한다. 강은 중국의 씨짱(서장(西藏))지역, 인도의 아루나찰 프라데시(Arunachal Pradesh)주와 아쌈(Assam)주를 경유하여 부탄, 방글라데시로 흐른다. 야루짱부강은 티베트로 잘 알려진 시짱자치구에서 발원하여 중국과 인도의 영토 분쟁지역인 아루나찰 프라데시주를 관통함으로 인해 지정학적으로 중요한 의미를 갖고 있다. 짱무수력발전댐은 시짱 지역 최대 수력개발댐으로, 인도와 방글라데시는 중국의 댐 건설로 인해 자국의 수자원의 감소와 생태계 파괴가 발생할 것을 우려하고 있다. 그러나 최근 중국과 인도의 관방은 이 같은 우려를 부인하며 인도의 아루나찰 연방당국 또한 5개 주요 지류에 1,750MW 규모의 수력발전댐을 건설할 계획을 발표하였다. 이와 같이 수력발전댐 건설과 수자원확보를 놓고 중국과 인도가 팽팽하게 경쟁하게 된 데는 중국과 인도 간의 역내 힘겨루기와 자국 내 정치적 이해, 영토분쟁지역의 존재 등이 원인으로 작용하고 있다. 본 연구는 중국의 짱무수력발전댐(장목수전참(藏木水電站)) 건설원인을 중국정부가 가진 시짱지역관리 및 개발의 필요성에서 찾고 짱무수력발전댐(장목수전참(藏木水電站)) 건설에 드러난 중국의 표면적, 내재적 의도의 분석을 통해 중국의 공유하천 접근 방식의 특징과 원인을 규명하였다. 발원지에 위치한 중국이 수자원확보경쟁에서 유리한 입장을 점하고 있는 가운데 중국에 비해 상대적으로 정치적, 경제적 열세에 놓인 하류국가들은 공유하천의 동등하게 이용할 권리를 쟁취하기 위해 필요한 협상력을 갖고 있지 못하다. 따라서 하류국가들은 중국의 의도를 파악하여 이를 토대로 적절한 대안을 마련해야 할 필요성이 있다. 중국의 공유하천접근방식의 원인과 특징에 대한 분석은 남북통일 후 중국과 하천을 공유하게 될 우리나라에 시사하는 바가 클 것이라 생각된다.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2015.10a
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• pp.445-447
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• 2015

The situation in Northeast Asia is rapidly changed because of the territorial dispute between neighboring countries near the East China Sea, North Korean nuclear bomb tests, long-range ballistic missile launching tests frequently and deployment of Chinese Liaoning class aircraft carrier. Especially, unstable political situation of North Korea and Chinese A2/AD strategy by strengthening naval forces are the cause of replanning Asia-Pacific security strategy of Unites States. In this paper, it is surveyed and analyzed that changed Asia-Pacific security strategy of U.S. and rearrangement plan of U.S. Naval forces. And changed environmental situation influence on our security is analyzed.

• Journal of Satellite, Information and Communications
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.78-86
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• 2017

Japan has a lot of interest about weapons systems development of surrounding national and has invested heavily in securing intelligence assets to get information about them, because of conflict issues between Japan and Russia with four northern islands, China with Senkaku Islands and entry policy into the Pacific. Japan has used a large budget to detect and intercept ballistic missile for reasons of the launch of the Taepodong missile in 1998. After took over SIGINT equipments which U.S. force had operated in 1950s~1960s, Japan made a technological analysis and advanced IT technology to produce superior equipments. Japan's SDF has installed them in 19 locations across Japan. In addition, Japan's JASDF has installed advanced early warning RADAR to detect aircraft and high speed ballistic missile entering JADIZ with S-band in 28 locations across Japan. It is possible to detect missile launch preparations, engine tests, and launch moments at any time for operation of 6 satellites high resolution reconnaissance system and 6 aegis ships. In close cooperation with the US, Japan is accessible to the SBIRS networks which detects the launch of a ballistic missile in neighboring countries. In the future, Because the United States wants Japan to act as part of the United States in East, south Asia, it is believed that the exchange of intelligence on the surrounding countries between two countries will be enhanced.