• Korean Journal of Labor Studies
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.1-45
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• 2017

This study aims at explaining organizational mechanisms of inequality that has been rising rapidly alongside the proliferation of irregular employment in the post-crisis Korean labor market. It argues that inequality is not sufficiently explained by individual gap in human capital or widespread marketization as such. Social categories into which each individual worker falls seems more important as a source of labor market inequality. Employment types that are composed of regular and irregular employment do not simply indicate the different economic meanings of employment contracts but have rather been institutionalized as a social category of status in the context of inequality over the past two decades. They are also often matched with other social categories such as gender that have created and reproduced greater labor market inequality. We pay attention to the organizational practice of dominant incumbents who make claims for advantages of return based on their exclusive accessibility to limited organizational resources and explain how that particular practice plays a role to increase relational inequality between those insiders who achieve advantageous returns and outsiders mostly irregular workers who are excluded from those resources because of the social categories that they belong to. In this study, we identify seniority based pay as the key organizational practice that justifies categorical differences within the workplace and examine how that particular practice contributes to organizational level segmentation and income ineqaulity.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.41 no.1
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• pp.83-124
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• 2018

In this study, with the data of Human Capital Corporate Panel(HCCP) we find that the explaining power of the new hiring rate of experienced regular workers is very strong and statistically significant as a main causal factor to the decreasing trend of investment on education and training for workers in corporates, which means a sign of weakening of the internal labor market. Possibility of wage penalty from switching jobs has been weakened considerably too. The effective alternative policy measures to the weakening or laxity of the internal labor markets and whereby followed reduction in investment on education and training for workers in corporates are construction of social system outside of individual corporates to upbring field-tailored manpower of high quality for young generations and small and medium sized enterprises.