• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.719-746
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• 2014

This study attempts to estimate the value of the water quality improvement by deriving the equilibrium price of the water pollutant emission permit for the imaginary water pollutant emission trading market. It is reasonable to say that there is already an implicit social agreement for the unit value of water pollutant, when the government set the Total Water Pollutant Loading System for the major river basin as a part of the Comprehensive Measures for Water Management, particularly for the Nakdong River Basin. Therefore, we can derive the unit value of water pollutant emission, which is already implied in the pollution allowance for each city or county by the Total Water Pollutant Loading System. Once estimated, it will be useful to the economic assessment of the water quality related projects. An imaginary water pollutant emission trading system for the Nakdong River Basin, where Total Water Pollutant Loading System is already effective, is constructed for the estimation of the equilibrium price of water pollutant permit. By estimating marginal abatement cost curve or each city or county, we can compute the equilibrium price of the permit and then it is regarded as the economic value of the water pollutant. The marginal net benefit function results from the relationship between the emission and the benefit, and then the equilibrium price of permit comes from constructing the excess demand function of the permit by using the total allowable permit of the local government entity. The equilibrium price of the permit would be estimated to be $1,409.3won/kg{\cdot}BOD$. This is within reasonable boundary compared for the permit price compared to foreign example. This permit price would be applied to calculate for the economic value of the water quality pollutants, and also be expected to use directly for the B/C analysis of the business involved with water quality change.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.245-253
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• 2020

If the conversion rate of jeonse price to monthly rent is the market interest rate or the landlord's expected return, then the conversion rate of jeonse price to monthly rent in the country should be the same. However, the conversion rate of jeonse price to monthly rent has always been higher than the market interest rate. This study identifies the supply cost components of rental housing as a risk premium in the presence of current housing prices, market interest rates, depreciation costs, holding taxes, and leases, and identifies the relationship between the current housing prices and each factor. Housing rent is expressed as the current price. This overcomes the shortcomings that implicitly assume fluctuations in housing prices or do not include current housing prices in the conversion rate of jeonse price to monthly rent. This study found that the conversion rate of jeonse price to monthly rent is the required rate of return or required rate of renter, not market interest rate, by expressing the supply cost of rental housing as a combination of components. This not only explained the fact that the conversion rate of jeonse price to monthly rent was always higher than the market interest rate, but also explained the regional differences. It also explained why the conversion rate of jeonse price to monthly rent varies by type of housing.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.185-212
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• 1995

전통적인 산업조직이론에서 널리 사용되는 시장구조-행동-성과 분석 도구 (The SCP Paradigm)는 시장성과가 가격정책, 기술개발투자(R&D), 광고투자, 생산설비 변경 등 시장행동의 함수라는 암묵적 가정에 근거한다. 최근 시장행동 중에서 기업의 관심이 크게 높아진 R&D 및 광고투자가 시장성과에 미치는 영향이 크게 부각되었으며, 시장성과를 구성하는 주요요인으로 주목받고 있다. R&D 및 광고 투자의 성격과 행태, 그리고 시장성과에 미치는 영향이 상호 유사함에도 불구하고 두 가지 변수를 동시에 다룬 연구는 매우 드물다. 몇 안 되는 연구들도 기업의 행태를 실증적으로 설명하는데 치중함으로써 이론적 근거를 소홀히 하는 경향을 보이고 있다. 즉, 논리의 전개상 이론적인 근거를 바탕으로 수리모형이 먼저 제시된 후에야 이를 검증하는 방법으로 통계모형을 사용하는 것이 옳을 것이다. 이 논문은 기존의 SCP 분석방법을 사용하여 기업이 한정된 재원을 어떤 원칙아래 R&D 및 광고에 분산 투자하는 가를 설명하기 위해 수리모형을 설정한 후, 정태와 동학, 확실성과 불확실성, 단발성과 균등투자전략의 개념을 도입하여 다양한 분석을 시도하였다. 또 R&D 및 광고투자 함수를 이론적 근거에 의해 도입하되, 각 모형에 균형이 존재하는가를 검증하였다. 수리모형을 이용해 분석한 결과 (1) 기업의 투자는 R&D 및 광고투자간에 한계원리(Marginal Principle)가 지켜지도록 분배할 때에 효율적임이 판명되었고, (2) 동학모형이 정학모형을 포함하는 일반모형의 성격을 가지고 있었으며, (3) 투자는 확실성이 높을수록, 분산시킬수록 투자효과가 큰 것으로 나타났다. 한국을 대상으로 한 실증적 모형추정은 앞의 수리모형 및 그 결과에 근거를 두었으며, 한국기업에 적절한 R&D 및 광고투자함수를 추정한 뒤 이를 이용해 업종, 기업규모, 상품유형별로 적합한 모델(Fixed Effects Model)을 결정하고, 각각에 해당하는 통계모형을 구축하였다. 이 결과 (1) 업종 및 기업규모별로 그룹간에 유의한 특성이 발견되었으며, (2) R&D 및 광고투자는 기업의 시장성과를 설명하는 중요한 변수이나, (3) R&D 투자의 경우는 광고에 비해 불확실성이 존재하는 것으로 나타났고, (4) 수리모형에서 도출된 한계원리가 통계모형에서도 유효한 것으로 드러났다.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.263-285
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• 2011

Despite the process of neoliberalization has made a decisive influence on our society as a whole, there seems little interests in neoliberal urbanization and entrepreneurial urban projects promoting it. This study is to see relationships between neolibealization process and recent urbanization and urban policies in terms of entrepreneurial city mediating them. In particular, this paper tries to reconceptualize entrepreneurial city as corresponding to privatization and commodification, financialization, state redistribution, and management and manipulation of crises which Harvey(2005) suggests as four main features of neoliberalization process in general and 'accumulation by dispossession' in particular, and to characterize it in terms of 'creative destruction' and of 'entrepreneurial governance'. As examined in the later part of this paper, recent cases of these entrepreneurial urban projects in S. Korea include volatility of land and housing price in the Capital region and urban regeneration and newtown projects, project for free economic zones construction in Incheon and other 5 regions, project for SOC construction heavily relying on private investment, in particular project financing pursued nationwidely including Daegu, and project of urban cultural marketing to promote capital inflow tacitly as well as to enhance urban imagine explicitly.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.242-261
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• 2012

Early stages of technology valuation have been often overlooked or under-represented. The early stage technologies are even riskier due to their inadequacy of commercial development and market applicability. More than 95% of patents fail to earn any revenues so that the majority of patents were valueless. Technology transfers from laboratories at universities and research institutes to industrial firms have increased to acquire value from invented technologies. Technology transfer, a process of transferring discoveries and innovations resulted from research to commercial sectors, typically comprises several steps: disclosing the discoveries and innovations, i.e., intellectual property (IP), evaluating the IP's economic prospects, securing a patent, copyright or trademark for the IP, commercializing the technology through licensing, forming a joint venture, or selling. At each of those stages in the research and development of technology, the value of technology would play a very important role of making decision on the movement toward the next step, however, the financial value of technology is not easy to determine due to a great amount of uncertainty in the course of research and development, and commercialization. This paper refers to technology embodied as devices, equipment, software or processes primarily developed at public research institutions such as universities. Sometimes it is also as the result of externally financed projects contracted with industry. Nearly always technology developed at public research entities results in laboratory prototypes. When it is required to define the technology transfer contract terms for the license of the university patrimonial rights to external funding companies or other interested parties, a question arises: what is the monetary value? In this paper, we present a method for technology valuation based on the identification of specific value points related to its development. The final technology value must be within previously defined value limits. This paper consists of the review of issues related to technology transfer and commercialization, the identification of characteristics of technologies in the early stage of technology development, the formulation of framework of methods to value the early stage technologies, and the conclusion and implication of the previous review.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.101-120
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• 1999

The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of agricultural polices on the change of regional structure based on the specialization during the productivism period. Analysis are carried on through the comparison of distribution in 1950s and 1997. Since the 1950s, governmental policy has played a leading role in shaping the pattern of farming in Great Britain. The range of British measures have also been employed in an attempt to improve the efficiency of agriculture and raise farm income. Three fairly distinct phase can be identified in the developing relationship between government policies and British agriculture in the postwar period. In the 1st phase, The Agricultural Act of 1947 laid the foundations for agricultural productivism in Great Britain until membership of the EC. This was to be achieved through the system of price support and guaranteed prices and the means of a series of grants and subsidies. Guaranteed prices encouraged farmenrs to intensify production and specialize in either cereal farming or milk-beef enterprise. The former favoured eastern areas, whereas the latter favoured western areas. Various grants and subsidies were made available to farmers during this period, again as a way of increasing efficiency and farm incomes. Many policies, such as Calf Subsidy and the Ploughing Grant, Hill cow and Hill Sheep Schemes and the Hill Farming and Livestock Rearing Grant was provided. Some of these policies favoured western uplands, whilst the others was biased towards the Lake District. Concentration of farms occured especially in near the London Metropolitan Area and south part of Scotland. In the 2nd stage after the membership of EC, very high guaranteed price created a relatively risk-free environment, so farmers intensified production and levels of self-sufficiency for most agriculture risen considerably. As farmers were being paid high prices for as much as they could produce, the policy favoured areas of larger-scale farming in eastern Britain. As a result of increasing regional disparities in agriculture, the CAP became more geographically sensitive in 1975 with the setting up of the Less Favoured Areas(LFAs). But they are biased towards the larger farms, because such farms have more crops and/or livestock, but small farms with low incomes are in most need of support. Specialization of cereals such wheat and barely was occured, but these two cereal crops have experienced rather different trend since 1950s. Under the CAP, farmers have been paid higher guaranteed prices for wheat than for barely because of the relative shortage of wheat in the EC. And more barely were cultivated as feedstuffs for livestock by home-grown cereals. In the 1950s dairying was already declining in what was to become the arable areas of southern and eastern England. By the mid-1980s, the pastral core had maintained its dominance, but the pastoral periphery had easily surpassed arable England as the second most important dairying district. Pig farming had become increasingly concentrated in intensive units in the main cereal areas of eastern England. These results show that the measure of agricultural policy induced the concentration and specialization implicitly. Measures for increasing demand, reducing supply or raising farm incomes are favoured by large scale farming. And price support induced specialization of farming. And technology for specialization are diffused and induced geographical specialization. This is the process of change of regional structure through the specialization.