• International Journal of Highway Engineering
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.1-8
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• 2008

Seoul metropolitan government has introduced Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems in some major urban corridors on July 1st, 2004, and has reported that it was successful on the ground that bus speed has been increased in the corridors with BRT system and that it has also resulted in the increase of bus patrons. However, there comes a negative claim that BRT has increased the number of fatalities in the same corridors. This study first aims at developing safety evaluation indicators of pedestrian crossings, then compares values of those indicators from pedestrian crossings with and without BRT systems. The safety evaluation indicators of pedestrian crossing are developed as: the number (or ratio) of conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles, the number (or ratio) of vehicles violating pedestrian signals, the number (or ratio) of pedestrians remaining crossings at red signals, and the number (ratio) of pedestrians walking beyond crossing areas. When we compare values of these indicators for both pedestrian crossings with and without BRT system, it has turned out that crossings with BRT systems has more number of conflicts than the crossings without BRT systems, but it cannot be said that the ratio of conflicts will be different between two crossing types. It means that the number of conflict will increase as the number of pedestrians and vehicles in the crossings. When we note that BRT system intrinsically attract more number of pedestrians who get-in or get-off bus stops, we cannot said that BRT system will be safer for pedestrians.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.