• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.19 no.5
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• pp.13-19
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• 2021

In this study, the relationship between R&D investment and firm value was approached from ESG's G(governance) perspective to verify the moderating effect of the corporate governance and ownership structure. To this end, a panel analysis was conducted on a total of 2,825 samples of 405 manufacturing companies listed on the KOSPI market during 2013~2020. The main analysis results are as follows. First of all, we found that R&D investment has a negative impact on firm value, at least in the short term, and that these relationships are moderated by corporate governance and ownership structure. When professional CEO with high level of expertise in business and management does lead R&D investment, the negative impact of R&D investment on firm value is mitigated compared to owner-manager. Also, the stronger the power of outside blockholders, the more transparent the management and disclosure of information, alleviating the information asymmetry between internal and external shareholders, which mitigates the negative impact of R&D investment on firm value. The findings suggest that the factors of ESG may not only have a direct impact on firm value, but also have a moderating effect on firm value.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.38 no.3
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• pp.35-53
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• 2019

A standing auditor can perform the monitoring and control activities for the opportunistic behaviors of top manager. However, for this purpose she/he must have the independence from top manager. Thus, this study is designed to analyze the factors that influences the independence of standing auditor. The independence of standing auditor as dependent variable was measured in terms of school and company ties to top manager. The relationship between the shareholding of professional top manager and independence of standing auditor, and the moderating effects of the shareholdings of related-party, institutional investors, and foreign investors were examined by implementing multiple regression and conditional moderating effect analyses. The findings present a negative relationship between the shareholding of professional top managers and the independence of standing auditor. They also reveal a positive moderating effect of the shareholding of related-party on that relationship. On the other hand, the shareholdings of foreign and institutional investors did not significant change the relationship between the shareholding of professional top manager and the independence of standing auditor. The findings imply that professional manager might be able to lower the controlling mechanism by appointing a standing auditor having low independence. Related-party as an internal control mechanism might be beneficial to reduce this effect while institutional investors or foreign investors as an external control mechanisms might not. This is the first study that examine the antecedents of the independence of standing auditor in terms of the characteristics of ownership structure. It provides a guideline for selecting an effective standing auditor with the consideration for ownership structure.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.1151-1156
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• 2011

Leveraged buyouts (LBO) means the acquisition of a company using bonds and loans. There are the prolific volumes of LBO transactions in the international M&A markets, and its influence to the financial market is increasingly huge. However, there are very few LBO transaction in the domestic M&A market and there are also few researches in this field due to the private nature of LBO transactions. Once a company is privatized through a LBO transaction, it is not so long before it is relisted on the stock exchange or it is resold to a third-party investor. In order to repay the borrowed money, an LBO investor may decide to end a company's private status through an exit via an initial public offering (IPO) or a takeover. In this paper, we expand Kaplan's study on the organizational status of post leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction. We find that there is a significant change starting 1986. Most notably, fewer LBOs remain private, the median holding period of the LBO was cut in half to 3.2 years and of those that exit, IPO exits had significantly shorter holding periods. Regression analysis shows that good market conditions lengthen the holding period of a LBO investment whereas the size of the transaction shortens it.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.175-182
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• 2019

The purpose of this study is to test whether credit rating agencies highly evaluate the credit ratings of corporate bonds based upon management participation and ownership share by family governance in ownership structure forms. The samples of this study for empirical analysis were 1,449 non-financial companies listed on Korean Exchange from 2011 to 2016, over whose firm/year data this study conducted regression analysis. The results of empirical analysis in this study are as follows. First, family businesses had positive effects on the evaluation of corporate credit ratings. Second, if the ownership share of family businesses was higher, corporate credit ratings were higher. This result means that high ownership share in family businesses has very positive effects on the credit ratings of related businesses. It is meaningful that this study tested the effect that family businesses can alleviate agency problems and reduce information asymmetry. Furthermore, it is also academically meaningful that this study can contribute to future studies on the role of ownership structure.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.81-111
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• 2007

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Using an agency framework, we examine the relation between ownership structure and capital structure during post-IMF period. We used the balanced panel data for 378 korean listed companies during the 1999-2005. The panel data sets consist of time-series observation on each of 378 cross-sectional units. The results indicate a non-linear U-shaped relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage with the relation reaching a minimum at 58.48 per cent of management share ownership. As managerial share ownership increase from a low level, managers have incentive to reduce the debt level for decreasing the financial risk, resulting in a lower lever of debt. However, when corporate managers hold a significant proportion of a firm's shares, managers have incentive to increase the debt level for leverage effects, resulting in a higher lever of debt.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.257-278
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• 2017

The paper examines the ownership structure and the firm value of online firms in the world. Data are gathered by using FACTIVA database for firms in the Dow Jones index for the 2014 fiscal year. The Ordinary Least Squares regressions, the Generalized Linear Model, and the model selection criteria are employed to analyze the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The paper tests theories such as the convergence of interest theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, and the eclectic theory. The paper finds that the ownership structure has an influence on the firm value depending on the rank of the large shareholders. While the first large shareholders have a negative association with the firm value, the presence of the second and the third large shareholders have a positive influence on the firm value. The paper also finds that the identity of the largest shareholders whether they are insiders or outsiders have an influence on the firm value. The proportion of shareholding by a large shareholder and her identity are variables which predict a firm value.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.137-164
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• 2008

This paper examines the operating performance of firms that for a four-year period, held more than 15% of their assets in cash and cash equivalents. During next four years, operating performance of firms maintaining high cash persistently is greater than the performance of firms matched by size and industry or firms adopting transitory high cash policy. Furthermore, the effect of persistent cash holdings on operating performance depends on the ownership structure and the level of information asymmetry. Foreign investors deteriorate the operating performance of high cash firms, suggesting that potential M&A and the pressure of excessive dividend reduce the usefulness of cash. The level of information asymmetry enhances the operating performance for the firms adopting persistent high cash policy. It suggests that cash holdings reduce the costly external financing and underinvestment problem for firms with high information asymmetry.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.30 no.3
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• pp.187-207
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• 2014

The purpose of this paper is to examine the business performance difference based on the ownership structure type in the aspect of profitability and stability. In order to conduct this analysis in two aspects, the ship financial institutions have been classified into two groups: state-owned banks and private-owned banks. First of all, the difference of ROE and ROA between private and public ship financial institutions is statistically significant, but no difference has been shown in terms of stability measured through BIS capital adequacy ratio. Second, to test the business performance difference according to the ownership structure types before and after the global financial crisis, we examined the outcome difference in the ship financial institutions in terms of profitability and stability. However, in the event that the analysis was conducted with public and private financial institutions, the business outcome difference before and after the global financial crisis has been shown in the sector of private financial institutions, but has not been shown in the sector of public financial institutions. It is meaningful that this study is the first work which examined the difference of the operating performance by the ownership structure types of ship financial institutions. However, it is noted that small sample for this empirical study is a limitation of this thesis.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.15 no.6
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• pp.445-454
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• 2015

The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence of the financial structure of pharmaceutical companies on R&D investment. 358 pharmaceutical firms listed in the KOSDAQ market from 2000 to 2012. Financial statements and comments in general and internal transactions were extracted from TS-2000 of the Korea Listed Company Association (KLCA), and data related to stock price was extracted from KISVALUE-III of NICE Information Service Co., Ltd. STATA 12.0 was used as the statistical package for panel analysis. The summary of the findings and the interpretation of the significance of this are as follows: First, the shareholding ratio of major shareholders and foreigners had a positive influence on R&D investment. Second, the ratio of outside directors had a negative influence on R&D investment. Third, the shareholding ratio of institutional investors did not have a significant influence on R&D investment.