• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.335-366
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• 2017

Sorensen proved that 'vague' is vague through a sorites paradox that he presented. I will show that his sorites paradox satisfies the conditions for a sorites paradox and does not satisfy those conditions. So we will face a new paradox which exemplifies inconsistency of conditions for a sorites paradox. But those conditions include a principle which says when two cases are close enough, there will be no change in truth value. It represents an essential feature of vagueness. Therefore the paradox I will present in this article is not only shows inconsistency of conditions for a sorites paradox but also shows inconsistency of vagueness itself.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.117-134
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• 2010

In this paper, I attempted to show that 'Sorensen's Sorites' is not a successful argument for the vagueness of 'vague'. There are a lot of debates about it, but the central issue is whether Sorensen's Sorites is just small sorites; whether the vagueness certified by Sorensen's Sorites is just the vagueness of 'small'. Deas and Hull thought it was and rejected Sorensen's proof based on his sorites. But their rejection was rebutted by Varzi. The basis of his argument is that the subject of Sorensen's sentences - 'n-small' is vague - is not used but mentioned. I tried to reply on behalf of Deas and Hull and to show that the predicate 'vague' has not any effect on determining the truth value of "'n-small' is vague." Then it can be removed from the sentence. Of course I approve 'vague' is a homological term. What I do not agree with is only Sorensen's argument.