• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.493-518
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• 2005

It has been taken for 10 years since Climate Change Convention could it be made. And Kyoto Protocol will come into force as an international law as from 16. Feb 2005. As based on it, Annex I countries will implement their mitigation projects on GHG reductions and press developing countries on GHG reduction target. Korea has not duty target on it yet. But it will be held a COP(Conference of Party) on negotiation for reduction target of second commitment period. If Korea has a real duty, Industry sector should reduce GHG emissions. Then Market mechanism will be need to introduce for this. This study started having a question "Is it possible to introduce emissions trading in Korea?". To solve the problem, this study analysed GHG emissions, marginal abatement cost, market price with 11 companies of industry (about 36% of Korea emissions). minus target is impossible to implement reduction target ver base year (2002). And emissions trading scheme also can't make the market without additional policy and measures. This study suggest that it is need to import credits and give a subsidy of government to encourage it. The imported credit can reduce the demand curve within the marginal abatement cost curves. But the effectiveness of credit is not the same as continually growth. As a result, Allowing 40% credit into emissions trading market is the best to reduce costs. However, a subsidy is the little bit difference. A subsidy make marginal abatement cost curves down for itself. Giving 30% for subsidy, it is the best. Considering both of importing credits and subsidy, it is the best effects in the reducing cost for company. especially 30% is the best effects respectively. This Study show that government wants to consider designing emissions trading, encourage participants competitiveness, and encourage the early action, government has to allow credit trading and give a subsidy to participants.

• JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL WORLD
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• s.456
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• pp.33-40
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• 2014

• Cement Symposium
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• s.39
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• pp.23-37
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• 2012

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.261-290
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• 2022

Although market stabilization measures have been triggered in the K-ETS, carbon price is still under uncertainty. Considering Korea's 2030 enhanced reduction target announced in October 2021, it is crucial to have practical stabilization measures to appropriately deal with price uncertainty. This study examines the quantitative effects of a price collar, which is considered as a means of alleviating price uncertainty, on expected cumulative emissions and abatement costs. There are three main scenarios: carbon tax, emissions trading system, and emissions trading system with a price collar. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted to reflect uncertainty in emission. There are several results as follows: 1) In a price collar, domestic emission target is likely to be achieved with a lower expected abatement cost than other scenarios. In addition, there is a small amount of excess emissions in this research and it would be not critical(0.1% excess than target); 2) Prohibiting banking increases the expected abatement cost. This is because firms can not intertemporally reallocate allowances to match the firm's optimal emissions path; 3) With the adoption of a price collar, government's net revenue can be positive even if the government's purchase volume of emissions allowances is more than sales volume. This is because the government sells them at price ceiling and purchases them at price floor.

• Korea Petroleum Association Journal
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• s.300
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• pp.8-11
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• 2016

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.403-419
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• 2016

Cap-and-trade policies that allow firms to trade emission allowances are designed to reduce emissions at least cost and are shown to be efficient when there is no uncertainty over emissions. This paper examines how uncertainty in emissions affects firms' decisions about permit purchase and abatement. The results show that whether firms abate more under uncertainty compared to a case with no uncertainty depends on the expected penalty cost and marginal abatement cost. If the expected marginal penalty cost is greater than the marginal abatement cost, the firm will choose to reduce emissions and abate more under uncertainty. When the expected marginal penalty is greater than the marginal cost of abatement, increases in uncertainty result in reduced emissions. This paper also examines whether the order of abatement and permit trading and the realization of uncertainty affect firms' decisions. The results show that total expected emissions are the same regardless of the order of moves.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.173-204
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• 2012

This study examines the equilibrium investment on the pollution abatement when firms are facing Cournot competition in the output market while the pollution permit market is perfectly competitive. Unlike standard perfect competition scenario, the abatement investment delivers an indirect effect in which it reduces other firms' equilibrium output. Consequently, compared with the socially optimal level, overinvestment arises. I also overview the potential inefficiencies that imperfect market structure induces under the emission trading scheme, presenting policy implications.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.95-124
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• 2009

This study aims to introduce greenhouse gas emission trading in Korea as a highly cost-effective mechanism for controlling emissions. The Basic Act on Low-Carbon Green Growth will cover methods of emissions allocation, national inventory, and trading systems (i.e. emissions trading platforms, national registry,and clearing and settlement platforms). The Korean emission scheme will be based on the Korean Climate Change Act proposed by the National Assembly and Government with a cap-and-trade scheme. The national allowances will be allocated by the hybrid system. To establish the national inventory, TRADEMARKS (Telemetering System) and emissions factors are effective for greenhouse gas emissions measurement. It will likewise be effective for the national registry to be implemented via a Korean Integrated Registry, the emissions trading platform via the KRX (Korean Exchange), and the clearing and settlement platform via the KSD (Korean Securities Depository). In other words, the KRX will manage product development and marketing for Korean Carbon Financial Instruments (including commodities, futures, and options contracts) listed and admitted to trading on the KRX. All emissions trades will be standardized and cleared by the KSD.

• Korea Petroleum Association Journal
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• s.285
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• pp.47-50
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• 2012

• 주류산업
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.41-47
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• 2013