• Title/Summary/Keyword: 미국 동북아 정책

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Comparison of NSC system in the U.S., Japan, and the Republic of Korea (NSC(국가안전보장회의) 체제의 한미일 비교)

  • Kwon, Hyuck-Bin
    • Korean Security Journal
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    • no.37
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    • pp.29-50
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    • 2013
  • With the recent global threats of terrorism as well as religious conflicts, Northeast Asian countries including South Korea, China, and Japan are experiencing particularly serious security crises as demonstrated by North Korea's threats of nuclear weapons testings and long-range missile launching as well as military provocation toward South Korea such as sinking of ROKS Cheonan and bombardment of Yeonpyeong island and the territorial dispute between China and Japan over Senkaku Islands(Diaoyu Islands). As a result, Park Geun Hye Administration of South Korea and the 2nd Abe Shinzo Cabinet of Japan, both recently established, are making efforts to improve their national security and crisis management policies. One of the key elements of such efforts is the strengthening of National Security Council(NSC) or its equivalent organization as the control tower of national security policy, modeled after the NSC of the United States. This paper compares NSC organization of Korea, the U.S., and Japan and draws policy insights focusing on the current political and national security situation South Korea is facing. Although organizational structure, function, and history of NSC of each country differs, it can be inferred from this comparison that NSC-type of organizations can play an important role as a control tower of security and emergency management policies.

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Japan's Missile Detection Capability using Electromagnetic Wave in free space (일본의 자유공간에서 전자파를 이용한 미사일 탐지능력)

  • Lee, Yongsik
    • Journal of Satellite, Information and Communications
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    • v.12 no.4
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    • pp.78-86
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    • 2017
  • Japan has a lot of interest about weapons systems development of surrounding national and has invested heavily in securing intelligence assets to get information about them, because of conflict issues between Japan and Russia with four northern islands, China with Senkaku Islands and entry policy into the Pacific. Japan has used a large budget to detect and intercept ballistic missile for reasons of the launch of the Taepodong missile in 1998. After took over SIGINT equipments which U.S. force had operated in 1950s~1960s, Japan made a technological analysis and advanced IT technology to produce superior equipments. Japan's SDF has installed them in 19 locations across Japan. In addition, Japan's JASDF has installed advanced early warning RADAR to detect aircraft and high speed ballistic missile entering JADIZ with S-band in 28 locations across Japan. It is possible to detect missile launch preparations, engine tests, and launch moments at any time for operation of 6 satellites high resolution reconnaissance system and 6 aegis ships. In close cooperation with the US, Japan is accessible to the SBIRS networks which detects the launch of a ballistic missile in neighboring countries. In the future, Because the United States wants Japan to act as part of the United States in East, south Asia, it is believed that the exchange of intelligence on the surrounding countries between two countries will be enhanced.

Analysis of technological competitiveness and technology-industry linkage structure of Korea, China and Japan utilizing the patent information in the field of biotechnology (생명공학분야 특허정보를 활용한 한.중.일 기술경쟁력 및 기술-산업연계구조 분석)

  • Cho, Sung-Do;Lee, Cheon-Mu;Hyun, Byung-Hwan
    • Journal of Technology Innovation
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    • v.21 no.1
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    • pp.141-163
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    • 2013
  • As the importance of biotechnology has been increased as a growth engine for country, most countries get focused on securing technological competitiveness in the field of biotechnology. Under the fierce global competition, it is very important to identify technological competitiveness of Korea and our neighboring countries in order to carry out effective research and development. Expert opinion survey such as Delphi is mainly conducted to analyze the technological competitiveness, but the method based on experts' intuition may produce different results depending on survey respondents due to the strong subjective inclination. In this study, the patent registered in US was utilized to analyze the technological competitiveness based on objective data. Targeting countries were Korea, China and Japan which were leading nations in the Northeast Asia. As analytical indexes, NP(Number of Patents), CPP(Cites per Patent), PII(Patent Impact Index), TS(Technology Strength), TI(Technology Independence), PFS(Patent Family Size) were used for analysis. Moreover, the industrial linkage with biotechnology was analyzed by matching IPC code of patents with 44 industries. Based on this analysis, technological convergence and utilization were quantified. The findings can be utilized as basic data when policy is established to improve technological competitiveness in the field of biotechnology.

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The Status of North Korean Airspace after Reunification (북한 공역의 통일 후 지위)

  • Kwon, Chang-Young
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.32 no.1
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    • pp.287-325
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    • 2017
  • Considering the development of aerospace, military science and technology since the 20th century, the sky is very important for the nation's existence and prosperity. The proverb "Whosoever commands the space commands the world itself!" emphasizes the need for the command of the air. This essay is the first study on the status of airspace after reunification. First, the territorial airspace is over the territory and territorial sea, and its horizontal extent is determined by the territorial boundary lines. Acceptance of the present order is most reasonable, rather than attempting to reconfigure through historical truths about border issues, and it could be supported by neighboring countries in the reunification period. For peace in Northeast Asia, the reunified Korea needs to respect the existing border agreement between North Korea and China or Russia. However, the North Korean straight baselines established in the East Sea and the Yellow Sea should be discarded because they are not available under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is desirable for the reunified Korea to redefine the straight baselines that comply with international law and determine the territorial waters up to and including the 12-nautical mile outside it. Second, the Flight Information Region (hereinafter "FIR") is a region defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter "ICAO") in order to provide information necessary for the safe and efficient flight of aircraft and the search and rescue of aircraft. At present, Korea is divided into Incheon FIR which is under the jurisdiction of South Korea and Pyongyang FIR which is under the jurisdiction of North Korea. If North Korea can not temporarily exercise control of Pyongyang FIR due to a sudden change of circumstances, it is desirable for South Korea to exercise control of Pyongyang FIR, and if it is unavoidable, ICAO should temporarily exercise it. In reunified Korea, it is desirable to abolish Pyongyang FIR and integrate it into Incheon FIR with the approval of ICAO, considering systematic management and control of FIR, establishment of route, and efficiency of management. Third, the Air Defense Identification Zone (hereinafter "ADIZ") is a zone that requires easy identification, positioning, and control of aircraft for national security purposes, and is set up unilaterally by the country concerned. The US unilaterally established the Korea Air Defense Identification Area (KADIZ) by the Declaration of Commitment on March 22, 1951. The Ministry of Defense proclaimed a new KADIZ which extended to the area including IEODO on December 13, 2013. At present, North Korea's military warning zone is set only at maritime boundaries such as the East Sea and the Yellow Sea. But in view of its lack of function as ADIZ in relations with China and Russia, the reunified Korea has no obligation to succeed it. Since the depth of the Korean peninsula is short, it is necessary to set ADIZ boundary on the outskirts of the territorial airspace to achieve the original purpose of ADIZ. Therefore, KADIZ of the reunified Korea should be newly established by the boundary line that coincides with the Incheon FIR of the reunified Korea. However, if there is no buffer zone overlapping with or adjacent to the ADIZs of neighboring countries, military tensions may rise. Therefore, through bilateral negotiations for peace in Northeast Asia, a buffer zone is established between adjacent ADIZs.

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A study on Operation Rules of Korean Air Defence Identification Zone (한국 방공식별구역 운영규칙에 관한 고찰)

  • Kwon, Jong-Pil;Lee, Yeong H.
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.32 no.2
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    • pp.189-217
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    • 2017
  • Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

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Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy (유엔의 북핵 대북제재조치의 실효성과 북한의 체제생존전략)

  • KIM, JOO-SAM
    • Korea and Global Affairs
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    • v.2 no.1
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    • pp.69-92
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    • 2018
  • North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

Development Strategy of Korean Economy Through Economic Cooperation with Central Asian Countries (한국의 지속적인 경제성장을 위한 중앙아시아 진출 확대 전략)

  • Chung, Haing Deuck;Lee, Sang Ho
    • International Area Studies Review
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    • v.13 no.2
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    • pp.311-368
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    • 2009
  • In order to survive the on-going natural resource war, Korea needs various efforts such as enhancing self-exploitation ratio, increasing the supply of new-reuse energy, strengthening cooperation with resource rich countries. Central Asian countries are geometrically far away from Korea. However, Korea should try to develop political, economic and ethnic relationship with those countries into much higher dimension to secure various natural resources. Major countries including U.S., EU. Japan and China are approaching Central Asian countries with long term perspective. Improving country-image through enlargement of ODA is the first concern of those countries. Korea should try to follow their practices. Government should try to improve Korea's image in the first place and lead economic cooperation with very detailed supportive measures to induce Korean firms' investment into the Central Asian countries. In the due process, a lot of information about those countries' political climate, social situation, ethnical composition, major religions, educational system, current state and structure of economies and industries, etc should be made available to Korean firms.

An Analysis on the Conditions for Successful Economic Sanctions on North Korea : Focusing on the Maritime Aspects of Economic Sanctions (대북경제제재의 효과성과 미래 발전 방향에 대한 고찰: 해상대북제재를 중심으로)

  • Kim, Sang-Hoon
    • Strategy21
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    • s.46
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    • pp.239-276
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    • 2020
  • The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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Design of Truck Escape Ramps (자동차 긴급 피난 차선의 계획 설계)

  • 구본충
    • Journal of the Korean Professional Engineers Association
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    • v.28 no.4
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    • pp.54-75
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    • 1995
  • This synthesis has been prepared from a review of literature on Truck Escape Ramps technology and a survey of current practice by state department of transportation. Their locations have been determined usually from a combination of accident experience and en-gineering judgement, but new tools are emerging that can identify needs and sites without waiting for catastrophic accidents to happen. The Grade Severity Rating Systems holds promise in this regard. Design Procedures for truck excape ramps continue to evolve. Gravel arrester beds are clearly the preferred choice across the country Rounded aggregate, uniformly graded in the approximate size range of 13 to 18mm. Tech-nical publications typically have dassified TER types as paved gravity, sandpile, and ar-rester bed ramps. The design speed for vehicle entry into the ramp in critical to the deter-mination of ramp length. An escape ramp should be designed for a minimum entry speed of 130km/hr, a 145km/hr design being preferred. The ramps should be straight and their angle to the roadway align-ment should be as possible. The grade of truck escape ramps show the adjustment of ramp design to local topography, such as the tradeoff of ramp length against earthwork requirements. A width of 9 to 12m would more safety acommodate two or more outof con-trol vehicles. Reguarding comments on the most effective material, most respondents cited their own specification or referred to single graded, rounded pea gravel. The consensus essentially Is that single graded, well -rounded gravel is the most desirable material for use in arrester beds. The arrester beds should be constructed with a minimum aggregate depth of 30cm. Successful ramps have used depths between 30 and 90cm.

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