• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.15 no.12
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• pp.18-23
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• 2015

This paper proposes a new protection technique against deregistration attack in SIP. Although it is caused by simple spoofing the REGISTER message of a legitimate SIP UA, its impact is serious. This new protection technique identifies and protects the deregistration attack by removing a binding form the location server after delaying a certain period of time instead of removing the binding immediately after receiving deregistration message. Therefore, this technique makes it possible to establish a secure SIP environment defending the deregistraion attack without any additional overhead such as an encryption or authentication.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.9-14
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• 2017

A fingerprint is unique to each person and can be represented as a digital form. As the fingerprint is the part of human body, fingerprint recognition is much more easy to use and secure rather than using password or resident card for user authentication. In addition, as the newly released smart phones have built-in camera and fingerprint sensors, the demand for biometric authentication is increasing rapidly. But, the drawback is that the fingerprint can be counterfeited easily and if it's exposed to the hacker, it cannot be reused. Thus, the original fingerprint template should be transformed for registration and authentication purposes. Existing transformation functions use passcode to transform the original template to the cancelable form. Additional module is needed to input the passcode, so it requires more cost and lowers the usability. In this paper, we propose biometric authentication scheme that is economic and easy to use. The proposed scheme is consisted of cancelable biometric template creation, registration and user authentication protocols, and can control several security levels by configuring the number of fingerprints and scan times. We also analyzed that our scheme is secure against the brute-force attack and the active attacks.

• Journal of the Semiconductor & Display Technology
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.92-96
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• 2016

Although deregistration attack is caused by simple spoofing the REGISTER message of a legitimate SIP UA, its impact is serious. The root cause of this attack is based on the fact that RFC 3261 allows the UA to remove the binding from the Location Server. In this paper, we propose a simple protection method to allow Registrar or Location Server just to ignore deregistration messages. We also show that this method works well by analyzing the process of registration and deregistration. Without any additional overhead such as an encryption or authentication, this method is able to establish a secure SIP environment efficiently protecting against the deregistration attack.