• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.32
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• pp.79-112
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• 2011

Since Noron(老論) had organized in the period of Sookjong(肅宗), it constantly had led the political situation of Choson until Choson(朝鮮) perished as the grasping political power. Studies and thoughts development of Noron can be devided into four periods. First, the term of politics of faction of the period of Sookjong. Second, a period of Youngjo(英祖) and Joungjo(正祖). Third, a period of politics of power(勢道政治). Fourth, the latter term of 19century. We can look into an origin and development aspect in outline by dividing like this. The general character of Noron can be summarized by the respect of Song Si-yeol(宋時烈, 1607-1689), the theory of a party of a man of virtue(君子黨論) based on the theory of moral civilization of Choson(朝鮮中華論), the succession of Lee i(李珥; 1636-1684)'s neo-confucianism, rejecting all teaching that does not conform to neoconfucianism and protecting right studies, and oppression of Roman Catholic. The noticeable scholars of Noron were Kwon sang Ha(權尙夏; 1641~1721), Kim chang hyup(金昌協; 1651~1708), Lee jea(李縡; 1680~1746) etc. These scholars of Noron following Song Si-yeol had tried to raise "Learning of the Way"(正明道) by respecting Zushi and removing injustice(尊朱子攘夷狄), also believed people should embody moral values in their society and country. and possessed an will guiding to stabilize the country by rejecting uncivilization(尊王攘夷). Above all, they insisted, the King of Choson should rule with 'lighting heavenly reason'(明天理). Also they insisted the King and countrymen should together strive to recover civilization of moral humanity and destroy uncivilzation. But gradually they lost the motive and purpose of moral politics in the seventeenth century. Finally Noron Byeokpa(?派) take over the reins of government. It resulted in the bad effect of politics of autocrat(勢道政治) having their own way to use power of authority after death of Jungjo(正祖). The peculiar character of Noron politics can valued as the extreme aspect of 'according of politics and scholarship'(政學一致).

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.28
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• pp.103-131
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• 2017

As the establishment of self-identity is based on 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence,' the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is the only road to the security and confirmation of self-existence. But given that our ordinary life almost entirely consists of actions objectifying others, the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is by no means easy. The formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' should be based on morality, controlling self-desire, and not objectifying others. Philosophy based on a priori reasoning describes self-control over selfdesire as the domination of the body through a priori reasoning. But this practical philosophy cannot present a self-evidential internal motivation behind moral actions. Due to this, the application of moral order given by a priori reasoning in response to reality is likely to be reinterpreted on basis of self-interest. With regards to this, the 'propensity towards sympathy' is given as new moral norm. The 'propensity towards sympathy' as emotion is direct and consistent given that feeling occurs prior to thinking. The 'propensity towards sympathy' is intuitive in the sense that it is an instinctual response preceeding a reasoned judgment. The 'propensity towards sympathy,' as a natural moral emotion, is self-validating given that all human beings know it and practice it. But previous studies on the 'propensity towards sympathy' have an obvious limitation because they adopt phenomenological approaches to the 'propensity towards sympathy' which eschew the investigation of morality. Though they present the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural emotion based on body rather than reason, they do not philosophically explain the 'propensity towards sympathy.' Thus the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural moral emotion is likely to be interpreted as a subjective and relative moral norm. This paper philosophically explains that the 'propensity towards sympathy' is a universal moral norm on the basis of Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh.' 'Flesh' is formed as the entanglement between oneself and others and presents the 'propensity towards sympathy' as its philosophical basis. In other words, 'flesh' formed as the mixture or entanglement between oneself and others is the material foundation upon which one can activate the 'propensity towards sympathy.' This paper's approach to the 'propensity of sympathy' can be desribed as a phenomenological approach to the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a universal moral norm.