• Journal of Convergence for Information Technology
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.93-98
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• 2017

To recover the capital market's confidence, interest in accounting ethics education has increased recently. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a simple classroom games for moral hazard problem and to analyze the results. This case study introduces the classroom games in which well-known experiment of principal-agent dilemma in experimental economics implemented accounting ethics education. This paper suggests that game lesson is effective and efficient way to understanding moral hazard problem. During the games, cause and effect of players' decision making react upon each other. This paper contributes to generating further discussion on accounting ethics education and providing practical implication.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2000.04a
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• pp.731-734
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• 2000

정보통신 연구개발과정에서 사회적인 효율성이 현저하게 저하될 수 있는데, 과제선정 시 역선택 문제와 연구개발과제를 관리하는 과정에서 도덕적 해이가 대표적인 문제점이라고 할 수 있다. 따라서 이에 대한 문제점을 고찰해 보았다 이를 통해 과제선정 및 관리과정에서 나타날 수 있는 역선택 문제와 도덕적 해이문제에 대한 해결책을 제시하였다. 역선택의 경우 신호, 선별행위, 평판 등을 통한 해결책을 제시할 수 있고, 도덕적 해이의 경우엔 최적의 유인체계를 설계해서 이를 통한 규제 및 모니터링 등의 해결책을 제시할 수 있다. 그리고 이에 따른 효율적인 정부부문의 투자에 대한 개선방안에 대해서 간략히 언급하였다.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2000.04a
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• pp.739-742
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• 2000

본 연구에서는 현 연구개발 과제의 선정과 관리 체제하에서 발생할 수 있는 역선택과 도덕적 해이의 문제점을 방지하지 위한 연구개발 과제 선정·관리 체제의 효율화 방안을 고찰해 보고자 하였다. 선정과정에서는 효율화를 위한 이론적 논의와 함께 정부주도의 연구개발 사업의 선정과정의 변천을 살펴보았다. 관리과정에서는 프로젝트 수행자의 도덕적 해이를 방지하기 위한 방편으로 엄격한 성과 중심의 관리체제 도입에 중점을 두었으며, 이와 관련한 우리 나라의 현행 성과 관리체제 및 성과측정 방법에 관한 이론적 접근과 성과측정 모형 등의 성과 중심의 관리에 대한 고찰을 하였다.

• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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• v.10 no.11
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• pp.1285-1296
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• 2015

As examples of the region's transition to quasi-public goods a previous stage of full public goods also extremely limited in research. However, in this way can it compensate for this paper as a system to minimize moral hazard by electronic information and communication systems focused on safety in accordance with the methods and gave public goods introduction of grafting of electronic information systems played the Yeosu area to specific cases I went to the deployment.

• 대학교육
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• s.109
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• pp.2-3
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• 2001

• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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• 2005.02a
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• pp.42-56
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• 2005

Firms cooperating in R&D face a moral hazard problem, because with R&D effort not being observable each partner will focus on its own profit when choosing its effort level. This paper aims to explain the use of optimal license contract for R&D cooperation such as cross-licensing agreement. We argue that in the situations of asymmetric information, the optimal incentive scheme that can solve moral hazard problem is . a linear function of the likelihood ratio. Especially in the case of parallel research, each firm has an extra incentive for cooperative R&D effort, given by the license fee that considers the profit of the cooperating firm, which solely depends on his R&D success if the cooperating firm fails.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.81-110
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• 2011

Credit rating agencies(CRAs) are accused of failing to provide accurate and fair credit ratings and hence being responsible for the crisis. This paper tries to add on to the literature on credit rating reform through examining the CRAs in a model where rating quality is unobservable. We show that unobservability of rating effort results in the sub-optimal level of quality. Then the paper extends the model to incorporate ancillary services, competition and reputation. We show that ancillary services worsen the conflict of interests of the CRAs and that competition and reputation may not be strong enough to discipline the CRAs. Hence regulatory oversight and imposition of liability may be necessary in order to increase the accuracy of ratings.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.119-142
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• 2011

The storm and flood insurance, which was introduced recently to substitute the disaster relief system to moderate government's financial burden and enhance people's effort to reduce damage, seems to suffer various problems. This paper conducts a theoretical analysis on various aspects of the storm and flood insurance to provide insight on those issues and draw policy implications. First, the coexistence of disaster relief with the storm and flood insurance is likely to harm the penetration of the storm and flood insurance. Second, the current premium system is likely to induce people to make less efforts to reduce damage due to moral hazard problem. Third, current support for damage-reducing efforts may not fulfill its purpose and hence should be scrutinized carefully.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.31-52
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• 2010

Internal labor market in a firm is normally designed to solve the adverse-selection problem as well as the moral hazard problem in the world of information asymmetry. The internal labor market of a Korean university as a non-profit organization should have the same function as the firm. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the economic performances of a university's internal labor market, using confidential data. And I suggest how to improve the performances of a Korean university's interal labor market. Specifically, I suggest incentive pay for university professors. I also suggest eight job classification and job-related pay system for staffs and secretaries to enhance the efficiency of the university's internal labor market.

• Digital Contents
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• no.2 s.93
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• pp.24-25
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• 2001

대부분의 인터넷 사이트들은 회원 등록시 상세한 개인 정보 기재를 요구하고 있다. 문제는 거기에 있다. 보안이 완벽하다 해도 사이트관리자의 모럴헤저드(도덕적 해이)에 의한 유출은 어떠한 방법으로든 막을 길이 없다는 것이다. 때문에 인터넷 사용자들은 웬만하면 회원 등록을 하지 않거나 거짓으로 기재하는 경우가 많다. 따라서 자사의 회원 정보가 모두 알짜배기라는 것을 믿는 회사는 그리 많지 않다.