• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.99-110
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• 1991

본 논문은 최근 미국에서 성행되고 있는 기업합병(企業合倂)과 기업비공개화(企業非公開化)와 같은 기업재구성(企業再構成)의 동기를 대리인(代理人) 문제(間題)의 관점에서 설명하는데 그 목적이 있다. 기업합병의 경우, 취득기업의 내부자지분율(內部者持分率)이 높을수록 주주의 부(富)는 합병을 통해 증가하는 반면 내부자지분율이 낮은 기업은 합병을 통해 기존 주주의 부(富)는 오히려 감소한다. 이러한 현상은 소유경영자지분(所有經營者持分)이 낮을 수록 대리인비용이 크게 발생한다는 이론과 일관성(一貫性)이 있음을 알 수 있다. 또한 피취득기업의 주식가격은 합병정보가 공시 되기 이전 몇개월동안 크게 하락하였으나 합병 공시와 동시에 크게 상승하는 현상을 나타낸다. 그 이유는 대리인문제(代理人問題)로 설명 할 수 있다. 피취득기업의 경영자는 기업자원을 비효율적으로 운용할 것(지분(持分)의 대리인비용(代理人費用))이므로 합병공시전 주가는 하락하지만, 합병공시후에는 이러한 대리인문제가 개선될 것이므로 주가가 상승한다는 것이다. 따라서 합병의 경우, 취득기업과 비취득기업 모두 대리인문제(代理人問題)와 관련을 갖는다. 또한 1980년 이후 공개기업(公開企業)의 경영자가 자기회사 주식을 매입한 후 비공개기업(非公開企業으)로 환원(還元)다하는 현상이 유행하고 있다. 비공개기업으로 환원한 기업의 경영자는 창의적 기업활동을 통하여 기업가치를 증대시킨 후 다시 발행시장에서 신주를 발행하여 상당한 이익을 얻고 있다. 이는 공개기업으로 존속하는 경우 낮은 내부자지분율로 인해 대리인문제가 발생하므로 비공개 기업으로 전환함으로써 대리인 비용을 자기주식 취득을 통해 절감시킬 수 있는 증거로 간주된다.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.33 no.10
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• pp.743-756
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• 2009

This paper tries to analyze how the governance institutions of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey overcome agent problems in public agencies based on the Principal-Agent Theory, and find the implications that will be helpful to the governance of port authorities in Korea. The Port Authority's governance is characterized by decentralization of personnel rights, open meetings policy, freedom of information policy, public hearings, and fiscally self-supporting system. Those characteristics are helpful in overcoming the agent problems of public agency, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, and complicated external structure, through reinforcing of monitoring agent by principal, easing of information asymmetry between principal and agent, and clarification of organizational ownership structure. Those characteristics may give many implications for the design of governance structures of port authorities in Korea.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.35-67
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• 2010

이글은 대의민주주의에서의 입법 메커니즘에 대한 이론적 논의를 전개한다. 이러한 논의를 근거로 한국 국회의원의 입법생산성에 영향을 미치는 변수들을 도출하고, 이 변수들이 16대와 17대 국회의 입법생산성에 미치는 효과를 분석한다. 이글의 경험분석은 국회의원의 입법생산성은 이들의 학력, 법조경력, 관직경력, 의정경력 같은 개인적 배경과 서로 무관하다는 사실을 보여준다. 이글의 경험분석에 의하면, 국회의원들의 개인배경보다는 원내 정당간의 역학관계와 소속정당의 여당지위, 그리고 의회요인들이 국회의원들의 입법생산성에 영향을 미치는 것으로 밝혀졌다. 이러한 분석결과는 한국 대의민주주의의 작동과 관련된 함의를 제공한다. 국회의원의 입법활동에 대한 정보를 접하기 어려운 환경에서는 국회의원의 개인배경에 의존하는 국회충원 방식이 대리인문제를 유발할 가능성이 높다. 이글은 국회의원 입법활동에서 발견되는 대리인 문제의 해소를 위한 제도적 방안들에 대해 논의한다.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.197-216
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• 2011

Computer technology has enhanced a new transaction between device or software not just between humans. It offers users agent-like functionality and becomes increasingly common. It's roles diverse from gathering informations to automated trading. However, the use of new technology challenges to traditional legal systems and makes issues in adjusting the legal systems. Contract with electronic agents makes some issues such as whether the contract is enforceable or what principle's responsibility about the operation of electronic agents is. This paper analysis these issues and provides some solutions. First of all, we should make a legal act or revise previous laws. It is better that new civil law establishes for electronic communications and approach the law of agency for attribution of the responsibility issue. Secondly, in practice, website such as shopping mall should provide the terms of conditions to bind a contract.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.193-206
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• 2015

The purposes of this paper are to investigate the impact of managers' agency problem on asymmetrical behavior of SG&C and to examines whether or not the corporate governance mechanisms can have any moderating effects on Asymmetrical behavior of SG&C. To test empirically the above mentioned purposes, we gathered firm-year data of manufacturing firms from 2007 to 2012 and the sample firms are listed on the Korean Stock Exchange. The findings of this research are summarized as follows: Firstly, for those firms whose agency problems are high, the stickiness of SG&A increases as sales variation. The results imply that managers are not willing to reduce their perquisite consumption in proportion with sales reduction. Secondly, we investigate how corporate governance mechanisms influence the cost stickiness behaviors of SG&A for those firms whose agency problem are high(above the median value of free cash flow used as a proxy of agency problem). The results are that as the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms improve the cost stickiness of SG&A mitigation except for the insider ownership. These results show that agency problem has impact on the asymmetrical behavior of SG&A. And effective governance mechanisms have moderate effects on the reducing stickiness behavior of SG&A caused by agency problem.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.1345-1365
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• 2018

Following principal-agent relationship between government and funding agency effects on efficiency and management of project, this paper suppose that project management cost rate variable on outsourcing and administration of institution, applies multiple regression analysis and logit analysis by using factors that procurement status of institutional operating expenses and each subordinates scale (Budget, subject number) and method (Top-down/Bottom-up), not a total amount, for examining factors following project efficiency analysis and way of commission. The major variables which effect on efficiency of institution are management cost scale (0.36), institutional operating expenses ratio (-0.47), way of outsourcing, the factors that affect way of outsourcing are portion of project management cost (-38.5) and institutional operating expenses rate (-11.7). This means both legal and financial stability are necessary and it is avoidable moral hazard and adverse selection on principal-agent problem.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.25-57
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• 2017

In this study, we analyzed the information asymmetry and the agency problem in major affiliated companies on the basis of the R&D investment. As a result of comparing how the R&D investment effects on major affiliated companies and the independent companies, even the achievement of R&D investment effects in a positive way to the firm value, the positive effect appears much lower on major affiliated companies comparing independent companies. In order to analyze the case, we investigated in a separate way according to the shareholding ratio and the affiliated market using the sample of the independent company and the group affiliated company. As a result of such analysis, the cause of this comes from the agency problem in major affiliated company, not the asymmetry information of affiliated company. After we analyzed the sample of the research depending on the affiliation market, we could observe there is a little impact of the asymmetry information in the outcome of the R&D investment of the major affiliated companies. In contrast, the companies which rated lower in the ratio of the shareholding appears much less in the positive effect of R&D investment compared to the companies which rated at a higher level. This phenomenon was also consistently observed when changing the research method or further subdividing the sample of companies belonging to the group based on the ownership share of major shareholders.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.1-39
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• 2003

Using a comprehensive sample of convertible security offerings by Korean firms from 1981 to 1999, we examine the effect of convertible bond issues on firm value. We find that the announcement of convertible bond issues has a positive effect on firm value. However, the announcement of private convertible bond issues by chaebol firms has a significant negative effect on their market values. This result is different from that in Japan, suggesting that the efficiency of the financing decision by Korean chaebol is different from that by Japanese keiretsu. In addition, we find that the announcement effect of private convertible bond issues by chaebol firms has a significant relation with the corporate governance variables such as ownership structure, bank relationship. These results indicate that convertible bond issues can be used as a mechanism for chaebol owner-manager to give rise agency problems at the expense of the wealth of minority shareholders.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.1-34
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• 2009

We test the effect of corporate cash holdings on firm value by using the KOSPI listed firms over the period between 2002 and 2007 from the agency theories perspective, which has not been the central interest of prior studies. Unlike existing studies, using the manager's ownership ratio or foreign investor's shareholder ratio as a proxy variable for agency costs, we use the individual firm's corporate governance scores by the KCGS to test the effect of agency costs on the value of firm's cash holdings. We find that a firm value is positively related with its cash holdings. We also find that a firm with good corporate governance tends to experience a higher value of its cash holdings, compared with a firm with bad corporate governance. These results are consistent even after controlling for the endogeneity problems between corporate governance and firm value, strongly supporting the agency theory of cash holdings. Therefore, a firm's cash holdings, even from liquidity or precautionary motives, could increase the firm cash value, as long as its managers' interest is shareholders' wealth maximization rather than their private benefits.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.57-74
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• 1995

본 연구는 산업(産業)의 배당결정행태(配當決定行態)를 주식시장에 존재하는 비대칭적(非對稱的) 정보구조(情報構造)로 설명하고자 하는 신호가설(信號假說)과 대리인비용가설(代理人費用假說)의 검정에 관한 것이다. 배당자료의 특성과 panel자료의 사용으로 인하여 통상적인 추정 방법을 사용할 경우 문제가 발생하게 된다. 본 연구에서는 특정한 형태의 불균등 분산을 가정한 HAT모형을 대안으로 제시하였다. 모형설정검정을 위한 통계량을 도출하여 설정검정을 해본 결과 HAT모형의 실용적 타당성이 입증되었으며 Lintner모형을 응용한 배당결정모형(配當決定模型)에 HAT모형을 적용시켜 실증분석에 사용하였다. 그 결과 신호가설(信號假說)과 대리인비용가설(代理人費用假說)에 의해 모형에 포함된 변수들은 비유의적(非有意的)인 것으로 판명되어 두 가설(假設)은 모두 기각(棄却)되었다.