• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.67-99
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• 2018

This study analyzes the revision bills of the National Assembly Law in the 19th National Assembly in which the National Assembly Advancement Act was enacted, with the question "who are involved in the revision of the procedural rules, and what motivates them?" The cosponsor network analysis focusing on primary sponsors of the revision bills shows that the network was constructed by party affiliations. A small number of members with high degree centrality attempted to cooperate with each other at the cosponsoring stage, but the legislation did not pass through the related committee. In addition, this study tests the four competitive hypotheses (the committee hypothesis, the distributive politics hypothesis, the ideological distance hypothesis, and the partisan affiliation hypothesis) about the motivation to propose amendments by using the regression models which include newly measured variables. Only the committee hypothesis and the partisan affiliation hypothesis are empirically supported. This implies that partisan consideration is still significant in amending the National Assembly Law even after the National Assembly Advancement Act, and thus party leaders' willingness to seek bipartisan compromises is at the heart of problem-solving.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.103-133
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• 2018

This paper examines whether the budget making process has improved since the Automatic Submission of Budget Bills to Plenary Session Act was enacted. The budget bill was passed before the Dec. 2 deadline from 2014 to 2016. Several researchers, therefore, concluded that the clause is in favor of the ruling party and the majority party. However, this study confirmed that the argument is valid only under the condition of unified government. In other cases, the government party can have a limited impact on the budget-review process, and the aspects of the budget screening process are similar to those before the Act was enforced. Under the conditions of the divided government and two-party system, it is difficult that the budget bill is passed by the legal deadline. In the case of the divided government and multi-party system without majority party, the third party exerts a very significant influence on the budget-review process.