• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.43 no.6
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• pp.420-428
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• 2019

Although marine structures are a risk factor interfering with the passage of ships, there are no obvious guidelines on the required safety distance between ships and marine structures under regulations and laws. In this study, the width of the shipping route width was set based on the AIS data to analyze the separation distance between marine structures and ships, and the ships were classified by the length of each ship. By analyzing the distribution at marine structures, this study confirmed that the ships' traffic volume was in the form of normal distribution. To statistically analyze the separation distance between the traffic distribution results and the normal distribution of ships in this study, the traffic pattern analysis around the marine structures was performed. As a result, the traffic pattern was different by length and the recommended safety distance for each length is presented accordingly. Referring to the IMO (International Maritime Organization) the standard turning circle and reference of safety separation distance between ships and offshore wind turbines of the CESMA (Confederation of European Shipmasters' Associations) and P IANC (World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructures), the analysis was conducted on ships that did not follow the set distance among the AIS data by setting the distance within the recommended ship safety distance to 5-7 overall length. As a result, the 5.5 length over all of the safety recommendations were selected as appropriate, and based on the above results, the two cases recommending ship safety distance were proposed.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.101-127
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• 2017

Even with the most advanced aviation technology benefits, aircraft accidents are constantly occurring while air passenger transportation volume is expected to double in the next 15 years. Since it is not possible to secure aviation safety only by the post aircraft accident safety action of accident investigations, it has been recognized and consensus has been formed that proactive and predictive prevention measures are necessary. In this sense, the aviation safety management system (SMS) was introduced in 2008 and has been carried out in earnest since 2011. SMS is a proactive and predictive aircraft accident preventive measure, which is a mechanism to eliminate the fundamental risk factors by approaching organizational factors beyond technological factors and human factors related to aviation safety. The methodology is to collect hazards in all the sites required for aircraft operations, to build a database, to analyze the risks, and through managing risks, to keep the risks acceptable or below. Therefore, the improper implementation of SMS indicates that the aircraft accident prevention is insufficient and it is to be directly connected with the aircraft accident. Reports of duty performance related hazards including their own errors are essential and most important in SMS. Under the policy of just culture for voluntary reporting, the guarantee of information providers' anonymity, non-punishment and non-blame should be basically secured, but to this end, under-reporting is stagnant due to lack of trust in their own organizations. It is necessary for the accountable executive(CEO) and senior management to take a leading role to foster the safety culture initiating from just culture with the safety consciousness, balancing between safety and profit for the organization. Though a Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport's order, "Guidance on SMS Implementation" states the training required for the accountable executive(CEO) and senior management, it is not legally binding. Thus it is suggested that the SMS training completion certificates of accountable executive(CEO) and senior management be included in SMS approval application form that is legally required by "Korea Aviation Safety Program" in addition to other required documents such as a copy of SMS manual. Also, SMS related items are missing in the aircraft accident investigation, so that organizational factors in association with safety culture and risk management are not being investigated. This hinders from preventing future accidents, as the root cause cannot be identified. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Manuals issued by ICAO contain the SMS investigation wheres it is not included in the final report form of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. In addition, the US National Transportation Safety Board(NTSB) that has been a substantial example of the aircraft accident investigation for the other accident investigation agencies worldwide does not appear to expand the scope of investigation activities further to SMS. For these reasons, it is believed that investigation agencies conducting their investigations under Annex 13 do not include SMS in the investigation items, and the aircraft accident investigators are hardly exposed to SMS investigation methods or techniques. In this respect, it is necessary to include the SMS investigation in the organization and management information of the final report format of Annex 13. In Korea as well, in the same manner, SMS item should be added to the final report format of the Operating Regulation of the Aircraft and Railway Accident Investigation Board. If such legal and institutional improvement methods are complemented, SMS will serve the purpose of aircraft accident prevention effectively and contribute to the improvement of aviation safety in the future.