• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.1-28
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• 2000

본 연구에서는 경영자 소유지분과 자본적 투자지출의 관계를 이론과 실증분석의 양 차원에서 분석하였다. 우선 이론적인 분석에서는 경영자가 기업가치 극대화뿐만 아니라 규모극대화를 동시에 추구할 때, 기업의 자발적 투자지출은 경영자 소유지분의 함수라는 점을 보였다. 특히 2차효용함수의 가정하에서 자본적 투자지출과 경영자 소유지분의 관계는 경영자의 소유지분과 위험회피도, 확실성 등가에 의한 프로젝트의 순기대현금 흐름 수준에 따라 달라지는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 자본적 투자지출은 경영자의 효용함수 행태에 따라 경영자 소유지분이 낮은 수준에서는 소유지분의 감소함수이나 높은 수준에서는 증가함수로 반전되는 구조적인 전환점이 존재한다는 점을 밝혔다. 한편 90-95년 중 우리나라 상장 제조업의 자료를 바탕으로 규모극대화 기업과 규모비극대화 기업에 대하여 경영자 소유지분과 자본적 투자지출의 관계를 비교한 결과, 규모극대화 기업에서 경영자 지분이 약 30%인 구조적인 전환점을 중심으로 그 이전에서는 경영자 지분의 증가에 따라 자본적 투자지출이 감소하나 그 이후에는 증가함수로 단전되는 것으로 나타나 이론의 내용을 지지하였다. 그러므로 본 연구의 결과는 기존의 연구에서와는 달리 안주가설(entrenchment hypothesis)에 의하지 않더라도 경영자의 효용함수의 행태에 따라 일정한 경영자 소유지분 이상에서는 가치비극대화 행위가 지배할 있다는 점을 보여주고 있다.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.45-63
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• 2012

The purpose of this study is to investigated the association between the percentage of common stock held by a company's CEO and measure firm performance in down and up markets. We found that managerial ownership is associated positively with firm performance. We also found that although firms with high insider ownership generally outperform other firms, this relationship is diminished in down markets and is increased in up market. These results suggest that investment strategies based on the assumption that high insider ownership is associated positively with financial performance may be faulty in declining market.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.9-16
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• 2023

This study analyzed the effect of manager's ability on compensation policy (compensation level and performance-reward sensitivity). To this end, the final 14,150 company-year data were used for KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed companies excluding the financial industry from 2012 to 2019. As a result of the empirical analysis, the higher the manager's ability, the higher the next reward level (the manager's ability hypothesis), but the performance-reward sensitivity decreased. This confirms the manager ability hypothesis through a positive (+) relationship between manager ability and compensation, and means that high compensation for manager ability may be additional compensation for manager ability other than performance, rather than due to performance. This study differs from previous studies and has contributions in that it examines the more complex effects of managerial ability and compensation system.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.333-357
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• 2010

Purposes of this paper are to investigate whether managers' compensation is sticky as accounting performance(ROA) vary or not and explore further what factors influence the managers' compensation stickiness. To empirically study the stickiness of managers' compensation, we used the financial data from manufacturing firms lised in the Korea Stock Exchange(1,000 firm-year data for 4 years). The results are as follows : First, managers' compensation is sticky with respect to change in accounting performance. That is, the increase in managers' compensation as accounting performance increases is greater than the decrease in managers' compensation in respect to equivalent decrease in accounting performance. Second, the degree of managers' compensation stickiness increases when managers have influence and contribution to firm value. Specifically, the degree of stickiness is positively associated with investment opportunity set, intangible assets' value, uncertainty of firms' operating environment, complexity of organizational hierarchy. But firms' size reversely impacts on the degree of managers' compensation stickiness.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.107-114
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• 2019

This study analyzes the effect of the accuracy of future management performance, which managers voluntarily announce in the previous year's disclosure, on managers compensation. In the case of a company that disclosed the bad news in the previous year, the ability to predict uncertain future will be more important, and expects executives with better predictability to receive more compensation. The results of this study show that there is a significant negative(-) relationship between the accuracy of the manager's earnings forecast and the performance - compensation of the firms that disclosed the bad news in the previous year. The accuracy of the manager's disclosure is important, and it is confirmed that the manager's compensation increases as the incentive of the manager's effort to reduce future uncertainty. The results of this study are as follows: there is a positive relationship between the managerial performance and the managerial competence of managers. It is important to note that there is a difference and that we have identified additional determinants of the manager compensation contract.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.177-188
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• 2013

This study examines how managerial ownership structure affects the borrower's choice of private versus public debt using 2,608 firm-year data for 2006-2008. This paper investigates the relationship between managerial ownership structure and debt choice. Managerial ownership is measured using number of stocks and unexercised stock-options and debt is classified public and private debt. The results find that there is a positive association between managerial ownership and the private debt dependence and also find that when firms finance additional funds, higher managerial ownership leads managers to choose private debt not public debt. Since private debt can be classified into bank debt and non bank debt, this paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and a choice of bank debt. The results indicate that managers with higher ownership are more likely to use bank debt over public debt and non bank debt. By examining the relation between managerial ownership and a debt choice, this paper has following contributions. First, this study shows that managerial ownership affects the choice of the source of financing using three different proxies of managerial ownership. Second, this study classified private debt into bank debt and non-bank debt and provide the evidence of preference toward private debt especially bank debt among other financing sources. Finally, there are extensive studies related to capital structure and managerial ownership, but there is little empirical research on the debt choice and managerial ownership. Thus, this paper adds to literature by exploring the effects of managerial ownership on a debt choice.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.16 no.10
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• pp.125-132
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of managerial predictive accuracy on managerial performance-compensation. In this study, we compared managerial performance with managerial performance, And to analyze the relationship between manager compensation and manager compensation using managerial profit prediction accuracy. As a result of this study, there is a significant positive relationship between profit prediction accuracy and manager compensation, which can be interpreted as a result of manager's ability to compensate manager's ability to predict the future well. In this paper, we propose a new methodology that can be used to analyze the effects of managerial compensation on managerial compensation. This is because there is a difference in that it is proved to be a factor. Therefore, it is important to note that the prediction of the future of the company also identifies the additional determinants that affect manager compensation contracts with the key managerial capabilities.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.12
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• pp.321-329
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• 2021

A measure of managerial ability was derived using DEA, a measure of management efficiency, and the correlation coefficient between discretionary accrual and non-discretionary accrual, net income and operating cash flow standard deviation was used as a proxy for income smoothing. verified. In addition, the manager's compensation was used by taking the natural logarithm of the cash compensation per manager. The analysis results are summarized as follows. The analysis period for hypothesis testing is from 2004 to 2017, as a result of the hypothesis analysis of the correlation with the level of manager's compensation, it was suggested that the income smoothing behavior decreased the performance-based compensation and increased the performance-controlled compensation. This can be said to be the result of indirectly confirming that additional compensation is differentially paid for income smoothing. This study has a contribution to the study by empirically analyzing whether income smoothing affects the relationship between managerial ability and managerial compensation. However, although a number of previous studies empirically analyzed that there are upper and lower bounds for manager compensation, there is limitations that could not be analyzed for asymmetric compensation due to income smoothing is expected to expand.

• Journal of Service Research and Studies
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.1-22
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• 2020

This study was conducted to derive the new manager model in service economy era. It was logically explained that the modern economic society is different from the existing economic society, the modern organization that is the subject of management is different from the existing organization, and the tasks required by management are different from the existing tasks. It suggested the managerial model required for new managers. According to the proposed manager's model, the tasks required of new managers and essential qualities as managers to perform the tasks were presented. It suggested the role model that managers with required qualities should play. The role of a manager who becomes one with customers, the role of a manager who controls even his irrationality, the role of a manager who combines discernment and indiscriminateness, a flexible leadership role that combines charisma and tenderness, an administrator role that embraces regulations and non-regulations, and vision and non-vision. We derived the role of a manager who manages management, and a manager role model that utilizes both competition and non-competition. The managers engage in two opposing roles and perform management activities in a spiral dialectical cycle that develops while resolving the contradictions of each role. The method of embracing the two opposing parties internally and externally and the dialectical management execution process according to the change of the space-time axis were presented by borrowing the models of The Book of Change. Future research needs an empirical analytical study on this new Model. There is a need for studies that expand this study and develop it into a practical model and verify it in an analytical way.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.179-196
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• 2015

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of variable cash compensation depending on short-term performances instead of stock compensation for the executives on the investment in tangible assets, investment and R&D, and profit reconciliation. The detailed objectives of the study include, first, to examine the influence of the cash compensation on investment in tangible assets and profit reconciliation depending on the characteristics of the company and, second, to examine the influence of cash compensation on the profit reconciliation of the investment in R&D depending on the characteristics of the company. The results of the analysis in this study can be summarized as follows; Firstly, the result of the positive analysis, as the compensation for the executives increased, by the characteristics of the companies conducted on the significant 'positive' (+) on the investment in R&D and the profits reconciliation showed that the high tech industry and the share ratio of the executives did not show a significant result, while the debt ratio showed a significantly positive result. Secondly, the result of the positive analysis, as the compensation for the executives increased, by the characteristics of the companieson the significant 'positive' (+) of the investment in tangible assets and reconciliation of profits showed that the high-tech industry did not show a significant result, while the hypothesis on the share ratio of the executives and the hypothesis on the debt ratio showed results that are significantly positive as expected. In other words, it can help Korean companies, which have to investment in R&D and tangible assets to increase their competitiveness and promote future growth dynamics, to design a manager compensation system that is appropriate for our country to support efficient investment decision-making.