• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.41
• /
• pp.71-92
• /
• 2014

A series of the tragic 16th-century Sahwas sent Toegye into the depths of despair. In the face of the ensuing social disruption in which any criterion or direction is utterly lost, he could not but to reexamine the problem of human nature and good and evil. For Toegye, criterion or direction is connected with Principle, and human nature and the problem of good and evil are related with Mind. In other words, these problems are none other than the question: "As the subject of history and society, how a human being can set principle in a real world and realize it? How one can successfully control his wants and feelings with his rationality?" Toegye proposes that while laws and regulations should be reformed when they are outdated, good laws and regulations are not necessarily to be discarded. He also warns that ideal governance is not likely to be realized if only too conservatives take the lead while radicals, depended upon exclusively, would create too many problems.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.137
• /
• pp.225-247
• /
• 2016

This research examines the philosophy of Toegye and Spinoza in the postneo-Confucian and post-modern perspective in emphasizing the activity of Ri(理) and reason beyond the similarities of system in their thought. There is no disagreement in viewing Toegye and Spinoza as balanced opposites in their attempts to harmonize man and nature. In this discussion, I will infer the similarities of Toegye and Spinoza in terms of an 'activity-passivity' thesis.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.116
• /
• pp.313-350
• /
• 2010

This article studies criticism leveled at Yulgok scholarship by the Toegye School in the northern Gyungbuk region. The Toegye School (Yulgok School) was formed both by theoretical contention and constructive criticism with its counterparts. Accordingly, the main intellectual traits of the Toegye School may not be fully appreciated by inquiring into its theoretical structure and context only; rather, this study proposes that a sound understanding of the Toegye School must be accompanied simultaneously with an analysis on aspects of the altercation with the Yulgok School of the time. In this regard, this article primarily aims to shed light on the Toegye School's theoretical context through surveying the criticism leveled by the Toegye School in the northern Gyungbuk region, which hold steadfast adherents to the discipline among other regions, against the Yulgok scholarship. Embracing the Confucian ethic, the philosophical principles of the Toegye School based on autonomy of 'Li'(理), i.e. ethical objectivism, basically aimed at reaching the state of self-manifestation. Namely, the main objective of the Toegye School was to anchor the way how the school understood existential form and cause of the universe to an ethical foundation in a crystal clear way and, accordingly, this belief in which the Toegye School gave a priority to 'Li' rather than 'Gi'(氣) must have given an advantageous position in terms of theoretical clarity over its counterparts. Furthermore, the crux of the Confucian ethical world view in the Toegye School's modes of inquiry could berevealed by the Toegye's 'Libal(理發)-theory'. From this point of view, the fundamental criticism that could be waged by the Toegye School was against Yulgok scholarship's gross misconception of perceiving 'Gi' as 'Li.' Scholars and commentators in the Toegye School severely disapproved of the possibility of ethical objectivism of Yulgok scholarship.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
• /
• no.54
• /
• pp.45-76
• /
• 2014

The purpose of this paper is to examine Toegye(退溪 李滉, 1501~1570)'s interpretation of Chungyong(中庸) who led the completion of the $Chos{\breve{o}}n$-style acceptance of Neo-Confucianism. This paper is focused on revealing the way that how he understood it according to the system of Neo-Confucianism that was proposed by Chu Hsi, rather than revealing the unique perspective of Toegye. I have the following configuration in this paper. First, I have set two directions of research for understanding of Chungyong, these were derived through the work that is an overview of cases of interpretation of Chungyong of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$. 1) How to understand the overall structure of Chungyong? 2) How to understand key concepts of Chungyong? Next, basing on these directions of research, I analyzed Toegye's interpretation of Chungyong. To grasp the structure of the whole, Toegye followed the segmentation system and structure of Chungyong changgu: Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean, and to understand key concepts of Chungyong, he conducted in collaboration with concepts of Neo-Confucianism. Concretely, I analyze his work : Chungyong $suk{\breve{u}}i$(中庸釋義) and Chungyong $jil{\breve{u}}i$(中庸質疑) for asserting that he accepted the segmentation system and structure of Chungyong changgu. And I analyze his documents: letters to and from his disciples. This analysis focus on concepts of Chungyong for asserting that his understanding is in the context of Chu Hsi and other Neo-Confucian scholars's commentary. Toegye tried to reduce the diversity of interpretation and present one meaning.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.29
• /
• pp.33-54
• /
• 2010

Woodam(愚潭) Jeong Si-han(丁時翰, 1625-1707) played an important role in the formation and development of the Toegye School. This writing explores the way Woodam understood the thought of Toegye(退溪, 1501-1570) as presented in The Book of Four-Seve Demonstration(四七辨證) The 17th century that Woodam lived in was the period in which monism and dualism coexisted. Woodam's understanding of Toegye's thought can be summarized as follows: 1) Woodam followed Toegye's li(理)-qi(氣) defense and his view on the origin of nature and emotion, acknowledging Toegye as the orthodox transmitter of Zhu Xi's teachings, 2) Woodam considered that the difference between the past and the contemporary teachings was simply caused by the difficulty of comprehending the character "li (principle) ". Thus he criticized Yulgok(栗谷, 1536-1584)'s claim that "that which rises is qi (material force), and that which gives rise to qi is li," and followed instead Toegye's views of the entivity, dynamism, and ultimacy of li and its substantial function. Yet, Woodam further developed Toegye's thought and asserted that "in the midst of the marvelous unity of li and qi, li is always dominant and qi is always ancillary." 3) Woodam criticized Yulgok's thought and advocated Toegye's doctrine of the mutual motion of li and qi(理氣互發說), thereby following Toegye's insistence that difference can be observed in sameness and sameness can be observed in difference, that integrative thinking is needed to constructively embrace both analytic and synthetic judgments. In conclusion, Woodam understood profoundly and correctly Toegye's views on the relationship between li and qi and between nature and emotion, and explained them more concretely. In so doing, he endeavored to live the life by the teachings of Toegye.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.142
• /
• pp.241-263
• /
• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to investigate Toegye's simhak in relation to spiritualism. In general, we call Chu Hsi's learning "lihak" (the learning of principle) while Wang Yangming's learning is described as "simhak" (the learning of mind). However, we sometimes call Toegye's learning "simhak" in spite of his respect for Chu Hsi's philosophy of li. Toegye's simhak is different from Wang Yangming's. Nonetheless, Toegye too, highlighted the existential meaning of truth. Toegye regarded simgyung (the book of mind) as one of the most important classics for self-cultivation. As is well known, Toegye's main concern was concentration on mind and heart cultivation. Toegye understood li as a spiritual being, which can actualize itself. The goal of simhak is to become a sage. For a sage, there is no contradiction between moral norm and human desire. To become a sage, Toegye developed the theory and practice of mind cultivation. Toegye's simhak has some common characteristics with Louis Lavelle's philosophy of spiritualism. Both Toegye and Louis Lavelle lay great emphasis on self reflection and spiritual life. In particular, Toegye developed the concrete method of mind cultivation. In the 21st century, human beings are confronted with spiritual crisis in many aspects. Toegye's simhak can be advanced as useful wisdom to keep one's mind in a peaceful and harmonious state.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.52
• /
• pp.107-130
• /
• 2017

The purpose of this study is to catch the characteristics of the Hanju Yi Jinsang (寒洲 李震相, 1818~1886)'s thought of the 'Li(理)' through Hanju's view on the Ido-seol(理到說), the Toegye Yi Hwang(退溪 李滉, 1501~1570)'s latter Mulgyuk(物格) theory, and to establish the foundation for identifying the aspects of development about Toegye School's concept of Li from Toegye's Ido-seol. The Ido-seol was criticized for regarding Li - the immovable principle - as 'living thing'. Toegye School's scholars tried to solve this problem by translating the 'word' correctly. Hanju also translated the word 'Do(到)', the verb of 'Ido', as meaning of 'perfectly understood' based on his translation of the word 'Gyuk(格)' as 'Ku(究)'. On the other hand, he also regarded the principle-application structure of Li and the its characteristic the 'Li as Hwalmul(活物)' as the main point of Toegye's Neo-confucianism thought his methodology 'Three viewpoints[三看法]'. Before Hanju, scholars dose not have more opinion from the translation of the word, and it is too difficult to identifying their scholarly identity through their viewpoints on Ido-seol. On the other hand, Hanju thought that the lack of the idea for comprehensive approach between Xin(心) and Li(理) will cause the misunderstanding the relationship between Xin and Li. In this reason, he evaluated Toegye's Ido-seol based on the concept of 'One principle and its manifoldness[理一分殊]'. Consequently, he concatenated the characteristic of Xin which includes all things with concept of Mulgyuk, and emphasized that Xin which penetrates the principle of all things has the characteristic of 'One principle(理一)'.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.41
• /
• pp.39-70
• /
• 2014

Toegye pursues a life of pleasure, joy and nobility. Anyone who is a scholar shall feel a joy in learning and practicing. However, not everyone can enjoy true pleasure or true calling through self-cultivations. Everybody wants "a joy of distant friends' visitations." But most of Confucian scholars prefer forests as a place of learning and self-cultivation. Toegye especially likes a forest life and then gives same value to walking as to reading. "Not to be angry even if not recognized" must be a high stage of self-cultivation. Toegye does not pursue fame or glory and always resign into a country life. His life-time resignation makes him obtain great after-death fame and glory. Thus, nobody feels jealousy against him but adores him.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.39
• /
• pp.7-27
• /
• 2013

T'oegye placed great emphasis on the cultivation of quiet-sitting. His idea of quiet-sitting, like Zhu Xi's, had various therapeutic effects as well. This can be highlighted as a real-life practice and a diverse application of the "abiding by Gyong" that he stressed; it is also associated with the treatment of physical diseases, composure in the mind, the benefits of reading, meditation in solitude, and many other areas. And We can easily infer that T'oegye would have set some premises before referring to Hualin Simbang. First, he would have been wary of quiet-sitting being the goal of cultivation: Too much obsession with and emphasis on Toinsul would actually obstruct the practice of "abiding by Gyong" and mislead one's effort for the "preservation and nourishment of the mind" and "reflection and examination." T'oegye would have probably used the physical and breathing exercises in Hualyin Simbang mainly as a reference to treat his physical illnesses. Also, his Toinsul would have been employed independently and partially as a sort of supplementary practice-without being used in parallel with quiet-sitting as one of the methods to achieve reverent seriousness.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
• /
• v.36
• /
• pp.79-116
• /
• 2020

This paper examines the nature of the transcendent, absolute, and personal host of ancient philosophical notions of the Higher Power (天觀 cheongwan, literally 'view of heaven'), which flows through Toegye's Principle of Reality (Li), Dasan's Supreme God (Sangje), Suwun's Lord of Heaven (Cheonju), and Jeungsan's Supreme God (Sangje). This confirms the sentiment that despite the conceptual differences relating to appearance, as represented by the Principle of Reality, the Dasanian Supreme God, the Suwunian Lord of Heaven, and the Jeungsanian Supreme God, the contents of these notions do not substantially differ from one another. Moreover, the nature of the ancient philosophical notions of the Higher Power lead to Toegye's Principle of Reality, the Dasanian Supreme God, the Suwunian Lord of Heaven, and the Jeungsanian Supreme God. Toegye emphasized the nature of the Principle of Reality as transcendental and absolute, and also as a personal host. This led to Dasan's Supreme God, and furthermore, it also inspired the Suwunian Lord of Heaven and the Jeungsanian Supreme God. In other words, although Dasan criticizes the Principle of Reality and presupposes a Supreme God, a personal host, this is not especially different from the character or role of Toegye's Principle of Reality. It likewise does not especially differ from the Suwunian Lord of Heaven or the Jeungsanian Supreme God. On the contrary, without the foundation of the religious tradition behind Toegye's Principle of Reality, it would have been difficult to establish a theoretical system leading to the upper system of the Dasanian Supreme God, the Suwunian Lord of Heaven, or the Jeungsanian Supreme God. Of course, the construction of heaven and earth, which in Daesoon Thought is actually performed by the Jeungsanian Supreme God, is, in fact, fundamentally different from Toegye, Dasan, and Suwun's previous notions of the Higher Power. In this sense, it is necessary to present more clearly the religious character of Toegye's Principle of Reality.