• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.111-141
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• 1998

Why are auctions so prevalent in fisheries fields\ulcorner One answer is, perhaps, that fisheries products have no standard value. The price of any catch of fish (at least of fish destined for the fresh fish market) depends on the demand and supply conditions at a specific moment of time, influenced by prospective market developments and prices must be remade for each transaction. There are various auction schemes including written-bid method in Korea. It is difficult to make decision the application of auction selling in market distribution. One reason is the absence of adequate data on which to base firm statements. There is very little precise information about the relative volume handled by auction scheme as compared with other sales schemes Because of the paucity reliable data, one must depend largely on qualitative in attempting to above this problem. This paper is designed to examine which auction scheme is more efficient as a economic tool by introducing the three auctions, as samples, utilized in Koheung peninsula. Koheung coast with abundant fisheries resource, locates on the Middle-South part in Korea and has three auction firm operating by fisheries cooperatives. fur selling of dry fish included sea weed, live fish and fresh fish respectively, As a result, 1 found that there are three interesting auction schemes as follow : 1. More than one winners are selected as buyers. The highest bidder can at first get fishes he wants to buy, second winner can get surplus fishes after the highest bidder employes one's privilege with the highest pay, and next winner would be a buyer if fishes would be left in sequence after being sold with higher price. Every fisherman can sell one' s fishes with equal unit price if he delivery it to the winner within one day. Therefore, all the vendors feel they are equal members of fisheries cooperation. 2. Written-bid pricing on the cover of handy book. It is easy to write and to erase the figure more than on the small black board, and is convenient also to keep in the pocket. 3. Auctioning on the fixed platform with fixed fish tank is a very fast auction scheme in spite of short displaying time. Auctioneer presides bidding at one place on the fixed platform, instead of moving, vendors should carry a container of live fishes in the fish tank into showing table in front of would-be buyers and auctioneer. Although the applicability of the auction system to a marketing problem depends in part on subjective considerations by those making decision, basically it is a matter of comparative economic efficiency. In general, if the scheme maximizes returns in relation to the effort expanded by both buyers and sellers, it will be utilized. If it does not, a more efficiency may take place over a period of time, but, even more important, those making decisions may become aware of the potentialities of new schemes. Therefore, in order to applicate the three interesting auction schemes introduced in this paper to other fisheries market, it is necessary not only to analyze many other auction schemes but also to compare the economic efficiency those schemes utilizing in other fisheries market.

• Journal of KIISE:Computing Practices and Letters
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• v.7 no.6
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• pp.641-652
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• 2001

Most of current internet auction systems are single auction server program that partly automates the function of the conventional auction house. So these systems do not provide sufficient independence, distribution and parallelism between the functions of the conventional auction house. In these suction systems, only some of suction management facilities are automated by the server program, but still users need to execute a repetitive task to monitor the dynamic progress of a certain auction, decide the proper bid price, and submit the bid. Another problem is that they support only the single auctions such as English suction and Dutch auction, but they do not support the double auctions that are superior to the single auction in terms of speed, efficiency, and the fair distribution of profit. In this paper, we present are design and implement of an agent-based continuous double auction system, called CoDABot, in order to overcome the limitations of current auction systems. CoDABot supports the continuous double auction, provides various bidding agents for users to select, and has been implemented with a multi-agent system to realize more independent, and parallel subsystems.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.38A no.11
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• pp.944-954
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• 2013

Cognitive radio technology gives secondary users chances that they can use specific spectrum of the primary user when the primary user doesn't use it. This paper proposes the algorithm that maximizes the benefit of the primary user considering spectrum price and auction period by using the auction game theory. According to the ratio of spectrum that secondary users bid, primary user allocates spectrum to secondary users. In the process of repeated auction, the primary user gets to find the optimal price of spectrum. Using the price and the proposed utility function of primary user, we derive the optimal auction period. At the same time, the primary user finally determines the price of spectrum appropriate for the optimal period.

• Korean Journal of Veterinary Service
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• v.46 no.3
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• pp.243-247
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• 2023

This study examined the dermatophytes of calves aged between 6 and 12 months in the Hanwoo calf auction market. Moreover, the research analyzed how dermatophytosis affected the auction price of Hanwoo calves based on their sex and age. The incidence rate of dermatophytosis was found to be 85 cases out of 1,955 calves (4.3%). The major location of dermatophytosis lesions were in the head region. Specifically, the highest prevalence was observed in the forehead (42.4%), followed by the eyes (30.1%), and the ears (18.8%). The auction prices of Hanwoo calves were observed that the average price for normal calves was 2,936,428 won, while calves with dermatophytosis were sold at 2,767,059 won. Comparing auction prices according to gender and age, it was observed that male calves and calves aged between 8 and 12 months had significantly lower auction prices compared to normal calves. The results provided valuable insights into the current situation of dermatophytosis in Hanwoo calves. Moreover, analyzing the impact of dermatophytosis on the auction prices of these calves, it has generated essential data that can serve as a foundation for implementing and enhancing ongoing management and prevention measures for dermatophytosis in cattle.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• The Transactions of the Korea Information Processing Society
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• v.7 no.5S
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• pp.1719-1725
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• 2000

Since the advance of WWW, internet related fields have been growing very rapidly. Especially, the development of electronic commerce ares have changed even or life style. This paper is about the design and implementation of an internet auction system, which is considered as on of the most attractive internet services. An internet auction system has more complex processes compared with other electronic commerce systems. In auction systems, bids and a successful bid are required in trading all goods. In this paper, I designed and implemented all processes of an internet auction system, in which a bid tracing systems is included for the first time. The bid tracing system is implemented using only HTTP in maintain compatibility in WWW environment. I also used th JAVA blocking concept to simulate two-way communication. The proposed system is implemented on Windows NT environment using JAVA, ASP, and the Oracle database.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.43 no.3
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• pp.55-77
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• 2021

In Korea, local governments and local agencies had to apply a version of the first price auction augmented by an ex-post screening process when they procure construction contracts. However, this first price auction had been criticized because it was felt that too much price competition could lead to poor ex-post performance in construction. In response, the existing auction method was recently replaced by a version of the average price auction with a similar screening process. This paper empirically examines the effectiveness of this reform and finds that the replacement only increases the fiscal burden of local governmental bodies without making any improvement in the ex-post performance.

• Advances in robotics research
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• v.2 no.3
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• pp.247-257
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• 2018

Various studies have been performed to coordinate robots in transporting objects and different artificial intelligence algorithms have been considered in this field. In this paper, we investigate and solve Multi-Robot Transportation problem by using a combined auction algorithm. In this algorithm each robot, as an agent, can perform the auction and allocate tasks. This agent tries to clear the auction by studying different states to increase payoff function. The algorithm presented in this paper has been applied to a multi-robot system where robots are responsible for transporting objects. Using this algorithm, robots are able to improve their actions and decisions. To show the excellence of the proposed algorithm, its performance is compared with three heuristic algorithms by statistical simulation approach.

• 한국경영정보학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2007.06a
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• pp.126-131
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• 2007

Most Internet auction studies have focused on examining the determinants of auction success or closing price. However, there has been little previous research which investigates dark-side factors such as overbidding behavior in the Internet C2C transactions. For this reason, this study attempts to find situations with the escalation of commitment to bids using Internet auction systems and also examines whether the bidder's bidding is irrational. Therefore, this study applies escalation of commitment to explain the auction process such as the "going, going, gone period" with competition in Internet C2C auctions. In order to describe the auction process in terms of escalation of commitment, this study proposes psychological sunk costs, completion effect, and self-justification as the key factors of escalation of commitment and also willingness to continue bidding reflecting the decision maker's escalation behavior in terms of persistence perspective as final dependent variable. The results of PLS analysis indicate that a bidder's overbidding behavior is explained by the escalation of commitment.