• Proceedings of the Korea Society of Information Technology Applications Conference
• /
• 2005.11a
• /
• pp.247-250
• /
• 2005

Recently, a concept of bid-rigging is issued in electronic auction. To prevent this attack, Abe-Suzuki proposed firstly receipt-free scheme based on bidding-booth. Chen-Lee-Kim pointed out that Abe-Suzuki's scheme only provides receipt-freeness for losing bidders. Also, they introduced a new receipt-free sealed bid auction scheme using the homomorphic encryption technique. The main participants of their scheme are Auctioneer, Auction Issuer, Bidder and Seller. Bid-rigging can happen by a seller in their scheme. We propose receipt-free sealed-bid auction scheme using a universal re-encryption mixnet. For our receipt-free sealed-bid auction, we use Pseudo ID of a bidder and universal re-encryption technique of Golle et al. Also, our scheme satisfies privacy, correctness, public verifiability, non-reputation, and receipt-freeness.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.32 no.1
• /
• pp.15-26
• /
• 2007

This study analyzes revenue-maximizing strategies of online auction sellers in terms of setting up starting bids and buy-it-now options. To this end, a series of field experiments is conducted where women's hair accessories of unique designs are listed in an established online auction site. The results of the experiments argue that high starting bids could increase sellers' revenue while buy-it-now options have no significant effects. Our findings suggest that online auction sellers listing items with uncertain demand - mainly individual sellers - should be cautious with auction tips which generally support low starting buds.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.33 no.1
• /
• pp.19-33
• /
• 2008

In the previous double auction research for the market optimization, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, and (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, each buyer and seller in a double auction market may have diverse utility functions for trading goods. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. In particular, the flexible mechanism is more useful in a synchronous double auction because traders can properly change utilities in each round. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a flexible synchronous double auction mechanism in which traders can express diverse utility functions for the price and quantity of the goods, and optimal total market utility is guaranteed. In order to optimize the total market utility which consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders. We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through a several simulation experiments.

• ETRI Journal
• /
• v.35 no.6
• /
• pp.1126-1133
• /
• 2013

The first spectrum auction in the Republic of Korea is attention-worthy owing to the fierce competition for the only 1.8-GHz spectrum license, the winning bidder of which was suspected of overpaying for its acquisition. This study empirically investigates the existence of a "winner's curse" in the first Korean spectrum auction by using a standard event study methodology. The results show that both the winner and loser experienced significant positive returns on the completion day of the auction. The results imply that there was no winner's curse in the auction and that the losing firm might increase its competitive advantage by acquiring other spectrum licenses despite failing to achieve its initial target spectrum. Therefore, these results suggest that regulators may need to consider bringing about positive short-term wealth benefits to all bidders by appropriately designing a spectrum auction, such as by performing multiband auctions.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
• /
• v.14 no.6
• /
• pp.678-686
• /
• 2004

This paper presents a new method to securely conduct online sealed-bid auctions with a single auctioneer server The sealed-bid auctions have several vulnerable security problems when they are performed on the Internet. One of such problems is the trust establishment between an auctioneer and bidders who participate in an auction. Several online sealed-bid auction methods have been developed to address this trust problem. The proposed method solves the security problems that would happen in the sealed-bid auction using a blind signature scheme and a contract signature protocol. It prevents the auctioneer from illegally manipulating the bidders' bidding information, repudiating the reception of some bid, manipulating the auction period, and illegally adding or deleting bids. In addition, it keeps the bidders from modifying the bidding information after issuing their bid and doing intentional mistake to invalidate their own bid. The method can be easily implemented using the multiagent architecture.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
• /
• v.27 no.2
• /
• pp.115-124
• /
• 2022

In this paper, we present an NFT auction service for the next generation, named NextAuction, which can reliably trade ownership of individual content using DID technology. Recently, as the types and sizes of tradable digital assets have expanded, the number of NFT transactions has also increased, and a significant number of marketplaces are being operated. But, the current user authentication methods of NFT marketplaces are done only through the associated blockchain wallets. It is desirable that ownership transfer through NFT transactions be transparently managed based on a more reliable identity authentication service. NextAuction increases the reliability of auction service participants by transparently and consistently providing identity authentication for users of auction services based on the DID technique using the Klaytn blockchain. In addition, in preparation for server failure that may occur during the auction of individual content, it provides users with a robust auction service using the BR2K technique that continuously provides consistent service through the replication of a target service. The NextAuction service is developed by extending BCON, a blockchain-based content management service.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
• /
• v.23 no.4
• /
• pp.41-53
• /
• 2016

According to the price-decline effect, the art auction prices are known to decrease with the order of auction sale. Our empirical study investigates the presence for the price-decline effect using the data for Korean antique art hosted by the Seoul Auction in September, 2015. We apply the Hedonic price model to the data and examine the relation between the sale order and auction price. Our empirical evidences show that the well-known price decline effect is not present for the case of Korean antique auction in 2015. We confirm our results by estimating the ordered probit model. From the view of the price-decline effect, our results suggest that the Korean antique auction data exhibits different characteristics from most of the foreign art auction data.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.28 no.2
• /
• pp.17-33
• /
• 2003

The explosive growth of the internet-based transactions requires not only a secure payment system but also an appropriate trust measuring methodology and secure transaction protocols to guarantee the minimal risk for the transacting entities involved in specific transactions. Especially, in internet auction systems where either buyers or sellers or both can be more than one in one transaction, providing those systems that make sure no one transacting entity takes a major risk becomes critical. In this paper, an improved trust measuring method using a relationship-based internet community for an auction system is proposed. The proposed system incorporates fuzzy set and calculation concepts to help build trust matrices and models, which is used to measure the level of risk involved in a specific auction trade concerned. Also, to optimize the auction trade process in terms of cost and time, the proposed system recommends a differentiated trade protocol according to the risk level involved in each auction trade. To test the appropriateness of the proposed trusted auction system, a prototype system has been developed under a Windows-NT environment.

• The Transactions of the Korea Information Processing Society
• /
• v.7 no.5S
• /
• pp.1620-1628
• /
• 2000

Existing internet auction systems have adopted the form which gives a win to the auction bidder who proposes the top bid price for the goods posted on the auction board. But they haven't been satisfying the automatical one-step processing for user's convenience because they must require continuous care of user for bidding and checking as well as neglecting the convenience of user interface while participating in the electronic bidding system. The AuctionBot system of Michigan Univ. is known as the representative internet auction system. It has merit allowing the various kids of bidding. But it does not support automatic a process which can replaces what user has to do using an agent. To improve this kind of user interface, we propose an automatic bidding price strategy algorithm which composes the auction system using agent and design for auto-bidding system using agent so that I can replace user's bidding activity. This mechanism gives an auction system the efficient bidding price strategy.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
• /
• v.12 no.1
• /
• pp.139-161
• /
• 2006

In this paper, we introduce a new combinatorial auction mechanism - N-Bilateral Optimized Combinatorial Auction (N-BOCA). N-BOCA is a flexible iterative combinatorial auction model that offers optimized trading for multi-suppliers and multi-purchasers in the supply chain. We design the N-BOCA system from the perspectives of architecture, protocol, and trading strategy. Under the given N-BOCA architecture and protocol, auctioneers and bidders have diverse decision strategies f3r winner determination. This needs flexible modeling environments. Hence, we propose an optimization modeling agent for bid and auctioneer selection. The agent has the capability to automatic model formulation for Integer Programming modeling. Finally, we show the viability of N-BOCA through prototype and experiments. The results say both higher allocation efficiency and effectiveness compared with 1-to-N general combinatorial auction mechanisms.