• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.253-293
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• 2016

In Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the concept of 'identity' gives rise to several puzzles as follows. What is an equation(Gleichung) in the Tractatus? Is an equation identical with so called an identity statement? Frege asserts that identity is not a relation between signs but one between objects or of a thing to itself. Then how does Wittgenstein criticize this Frege's conception? Furthermore Wittgenstein explicitly criticizes about Russell's definition of identity. Then What is the point of such Wittgenstein's critique? In a nutshell, what is early Wittgenstein's idea on the nature of identity? In this paper, I will endeavor to answer these questions.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.1-39
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• 2015

Are properties and relations objects in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? In this paper I will discuss essentially important problems concerning that question. That is, I will try to show that in a sense the concept of objects of the Tractatus is closely intertwined with that of Frege, and moreover the former was suggested to overcome Frege's predicament concerning the concept of objects. In the process of our discussions, it must be kept in mind that these discussions have no relations with metaphysical disputes, but proceed only from a logical point view. Futhermore it is Ramsey that made a most decisive contribution on these problems. In this paper I will try to show that in the Tractatus, properties and relations are objects via the discussions of Ramsey who was under the direct influences of Wittgenstein.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.69-96
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• 2017

Wittgenstein criticizes explicitly Russell's theory of types and, in particular, his axiom of reducibility in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. What, then, is the point of Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's theory of types? As a preliminary study to answer this question, I will examine how Wittgenstein criticized Russell's axiom of reducibility. Wittgenstein declares that Russell's axiom of reducibility is not a logical proposition, that if it is true it will be so mere by a happy chance and that "we can imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not valid." What, then, is the ground for that? I will endeavor to show that by explicating the ideas of Wittgenstein's 1913 letter to Russell, those ideas decisively influenced on Ramsey's and Waismann's model which intended to show that the axiom of reducibility is not valid.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.83-100
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• 2010

In his recent paper "Early Wittgenstein, Logic, and Metaphysics" Professor Jinho Kang argues that there has been an important change in Wittgenstein's view on the nature of logic between October 1913 and December 1916, which resulted in his change of attitude toward metaphysics. In my paper, raising some questions regarding his basic assumptions and arguments, I attempt to show that Professor Kang's paper fails to provide convincing solution to the points at issue.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.163-196
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• 2017

Wittgenstein declares in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that he resolved Russell's Paradox. According to him, a function cannot be its own argument. If we assume that a function F(fx) can be its own argument, a proposition "F(F(fx))" will be given, where the outer function F has a meaning different from the inner function F. In consequence, "F(F(fx))" will not be able to have a definite sense. Why, however, does Wittgenstein call into question a function F(fx) and "F(F(fx))"? To answer this question, we must examine closely Russell's own resolution of Russell's Paradox. Only when we can understand Russell's resolution can we do Wittgenstein's resolution. In particular, I will endeavor to show that the idea in Wittgenstein's 1913 letter to Russell provides a decisive clue for this problem.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.309-346
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• 2013

This paper deals with the problem, which logic of language and which metaphysics Wittgenstein suggests in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus. I will ultimately show how he bases the metaphysics on the logic of language. The logic of language by which Wittgenstein sets the limit to the language 'in the language' is the logical syntax of the language. And Wittgenstein extends the idea of the logical syntax to the understanding the nature of the world, i.e. to the metaphysics. The logical form the language(proposition) must have is the form of the world(or the nature of the world), and it can be determined only together with the logical syntax of the language. But what is the logical form(form of the world) 'cannot be said', since the proposition saying it is devoid of 'sense' and 'says nothing'. Therefore Wittgenstein expresses that the logical form(form of the world) 'can only be shown' in the proposition that has sense. The Metaphysics Wittgenstein wants to base on the logic of language(the logical syntax) must be mystical.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.141-170
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• 2009

We can witness the recent surge of interest in the controversy over the scientific status of mathematics among Jesuit Aristotelians around 1600. Following the lead of Wallace, Dear, and Mancosu, I propose to look into this controversy in more detail. For this purpose, I shall focus on Biancani's discussion of scientiae mediae in his dissertation on the nature of mathematics. From Dear's and Wallace's discussions, we can gather a relatively nice overview of the debate between those who championed the scientific status of mathematics and those who denied it. But it is one thing to fathom the general motivation of the disputation, quite another to appreciate the subtleties of dialectical strategies and tactics involved in it. It is exactly at this stage when we have to face some difficulties in understanding the point of Biancani's views on scientiae mediae. Though silent on the problem of scientiae mediae, Mancosu's discussions of the Jesuit Aristotelians' views on potissima demonstrations, mathematical explanations, and the problem of cause are of utmost importance in this regard, both historically and philosophically. I will carefully examine and criticize some of Mancosu's interpretations of Piccolomini's and Biancani's views in order to approach more closely what was really at stake in the controversy.