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http://dx.doi.org/10.5762/KAIS.2012.13.8.3417

Empirical Analysis on Agent Costs against Ownership Structure in Accordance with Verification of Suitability of the Model  

Kim, Dae-Lyong (Dongguk Business School, Dongguk University)
Lim, Kee-Soo (Dongguk Business School, Dongguk University)
Sung, Sang-Hyeon (Dongguk Business School, Dongguk University)
Publication Information
Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society / v.13, no.8, 2012 , pp. 3417-3426 More about this Journal
Abstract
This study aims to determine how ownership structure (share-holding ratio of insiders, foreigners) affects agent costs (the portion of asset efficiency or non-operating expenses) through empirical analysis. However, as existing studies on correlations between ownership structure and agent costs adopted Pooled OLS Model, this study focused on additionally formulating Fixed Effect Model and Random Effect Model aimed to reflect the time of data formation and corporate effects as study models based on verification results on the suitability of Pooled-OLS Model before comparative analysis for the purpose of improvement of credibility and statistical validity of the results of empirical analysis based on the premise that the Pooled OLS Model is not reliable enough to verify massive panel data. The data has been accumulated over 10 years from 1998 to 2007 after the IMF crisis hit the nation, from a subject 331 companies except for financial institutions. As a result of the empirical analysis, verification of the suitability of model has determined that the Random Effect Model is appropriate in terms of asset efficiency among agent costs items. On the other hand, the Fixed Effect Model is appropriate in terms of non-operating costs. As a result of the empirical analysis according to the appropriate model, no hypothesis adopted in the Pooled OLS Model has been accepted. This suggests that developing an appropriate model is more important than other factors for the purpose of generating statistically significant empirical results by showing that different empirical results are produced according to the type of empirical analysis.
Keywords
One-Way Error Component Regression Model; Ownership structure; Agency Costs;
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