[KSCI] Korea Science Citation Index Service

http://dx.doi.org/10.5516/NET.2009.41.1.091

"3+3 PROCESS" FOR SAFETY CRITICAL SOFTWARE FOR I&C SYSTEM IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Jung, Jae-Cheon (NSSS Engineering and Development Division, Korea Power Engineering Company)
Chang, Hoon-Sun (NSSS Engineering and Development Division, Korea Power Engineering Company)
Kim, Hang-Bae (NSSS Engineering and Development Division, Korea Power Engineering Company)

Publication Information

Nuclear Engineering and Technology / v.41, no.1, 2009 , pp. 91-98 More about this Journal

Abstract

The "3+3 Process" for safety critical software for nuclear power plants' I&C (Instrumentation and Control system) has been developed in this work. The main idea of the "3+3 Process" is both to simplify the software development and safety analysis in three steps to fulfill the requirements of a software safety plan [1]. The "3-Step" software development process consists of formal modeling and simulation, automated code generation and coverage analysis between the model and the generated source codes. The "3-Step" safety analysis consists of HAZOP (hazard and operability analysis), FTA (fault tree analysis), and DV (design validation). Put together, these steps are called the "3+3 Process". This scheme of development and safety analysis minimizes the V&V work while increasing the safety and reliability of the software product. For assessment of this process, validation has been done through prototyping of the SDS (safety shut-down system) #1 for PHWR (Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor).

Keywords

Safety Critical Software; Validation and Verification; Safety Analysis; Model Driven Architecture;

Citations & Related Records

Times Cited By Web Of Science : 0 (Related Records In Web of Science)
Times Cited By SCOPUS : 0

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