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Severe Tests and Mechanisms Generating an Evidence-Hypothesis  

Chun, Young-Sam (College of Liberal Arts, Korea University)
Publication Information
Korean Journal of Logic / v.23, no.2, 2020 , pp. 71-115 More about this Journal
Abstract
It seems certain that even if the same evidence is in itself given for any hypotheses, the way how it is obtained makes some differences in its support degree of them. In this respect, it is worth paying our attention to Mayo's conception of "severe test" and her technical development of it, which are just concerned with the procedures of getting evidence. Nonetheless, there have been criticisms against her theory from various respects. Among them, here this paper focuses on those especially raised by Jung (2018) and Iseda (1999). And it attempts to defend Mayo's theory on behalf of her against their critiques. For this purpose, the paper also proposes particularly a new concept of what is called the "mechanism generating an evidence-hypothesis". On the way, Mayo's own faults are revealed as well.
Keywords
Severe tests; Mechanisms Generating an evidence-hypothesis; Mayo; Jung; Iseda;
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