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Compatibilist Replies to Manipulation Arguments  

Kim, Sungsu (University of Seoul, Department of Philosophy)
Publication Information
Korean Journal of Logic / v.21, no.3, 2018 , pp. 373-393 More about this Journal
Abstract
Manipulation arguments purport to show that source freedom is incompatible with determinism. According to manipulation arguments, (1) intuitively, an agent manipulated in a certain manner to do A is not free, and (2) there is no significant difference between manipulation and determination. It follows that an agent determined to do A is not free. A compatibilist hard-line reply ('HR') denies (1), whereas a soft-line reply ('SR') denies (2). HR, which is arguably compatibilists' favorite, is assessed from the 'neutral stance.' HR turns out to fall short of adequately rejecting manipulation arguments. Recently Sartorio defends HR by claiming that (1) commits some sort of psychological fallacy. I argue that it does not work. I claim that SR is more promising. I examine the difference between intentional manipulation by design and ordinary determination. I argue that this difference suggests some determination scenario without intentional manipulation to which SR and manipulation arguments make different predictions, and that SR is better supported. Finally, incompatibilist objections are considered and replied.
Keywords
Free will; Determinism; Compatibilism; Manipulation arguments; Hard-line reply; Soft-line reply;
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