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The Complementarity of the Principal Principle and Conditionalization  

Park, Ilho (Department of Philosophy, Chonbuk National University)
Publication Information
Korean Journal of Logic / v.21, no.3, 2018 , pp. 321-352 More about this Journal
Abstract
This paper is intended to examine a relationship between the Principal Principle and Conditionalization. For this purpose, I will first formulate several versions of the Principal Principle and Conditionalization in Section 2. In regard to the relationship between the two norms in question, I will show in Section 3 that the Principal Principle and Conditionalization are complementary in two particular senses. The first complementarity is that we don't have to formulate every version of the Principal Principle if the credences evolves by means of Conditionalization. The second complementarity is that we don't have to require for rational agents to update overall credal state by means of Conditionalization if the agent satisfies the Principal Principle. This result can be regarded as a result that criticizes and supplements some existing works about the relationship between the norms.
Keywords
Credences; Chances; the Principal Principle; Conditionalization; Complementarity;
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