Browse > Article
http://dx.doi.org/10.5393/JAMCH.2012.37.2.084

The Influence of Private Health Insurance on Admission among Some Patients with Cervical or Lumbar Sprain  

Jang, Dong-Ryul (Graduate School, Chosun University)
Kang, Myung-Geun (Ansung Medical Cooperative)
Publication Information
Journal of agricultural medicine and community health / v.37, no.2, 2012 , pp. 84-95 More about this Journal
Abstract
Background: In Korea, private health insurance has neglected to induce externality on national health insurance by moral hazard. Therefore, we conducted this study in order to explore the influence of private health insurance on unnecessary medical utilization among patients with cervical or lumbar sprain. Method: The study examined a population of 449 patients (admission, 384; out-patient; 85) diagnosed with simple cervical or lumbar sprain without neurological symptoms at 20 small hospitals or clinics in Gwangju and Jeollanam provinces from Jul. 1 to Aug. 31 2008. The data were collected using structured, self-administrated questionnaire which collected information such as whether or not the patient was admitted (as a dependent variable), whether or not they had private health insurance (as a independent variable), and covariates such as socio-demographic characteristics, the factors related to the sprain, and characteristics of the insurance provider. Results: From hierarchical multiple logistic regression analysis, it was found that the admission rate of patient with private health insurance was higher than that those without it (Odds ratio=3.31, 95% Confidence interval; 1.14-9.58), meaning that private health insurance was an independent factor influencing the admission of patients with these conditions. Other determinants of admission were patient age and physician referral. Conclusions: This study is the first empirical study to explore the influence of private health insurance on inducing moral hazard in admission services, specifically among patients with cervical or lumbar sprain. Regulation of benefits provided by private health insurance may be necessary, as the effect of this moral hazard may mean existence of externality.
Keywords
Private health insurance; Moral hazard; Sprain of the cervical or lumbar spine; Admission;
Citations & Related Records
Times Cited By KSCI : 4  (Citation Analysis)
연도 인용수 순위
1 Lee YC, Im BH, Park YH. The Determinants and Comparison of Health Behavior and Health Service by Private Medical Insurance on National Health-Nutrition Survey. Journal of Korean Contents Association 2011;10(12):190-204 (Korean)   DOI
2 Kim SY, Won CW, Rho YG. The Validity and Reliability of Korean Version of Bathel ADL Index. Korean J Fam Med 2004;25(7): 534-541
3 Park HS, Won HT. A Study on the Measurement of Clinical Pain: A Review. Psychological Science 1994;3(2):1-22 (Korean)
4 Andersen RM. Revising the Behavioral Model and Access to Medical Care: Does It Matter? J Health Soc Behav 1995;36:1-10   DOI   ScienceOn
5 Svenson JE, Spurlock CW. Insurance Status and Admission to Hospital for Head Injuries: Are We Part of a Two- Tiered Medical System? American Journal of Emergency Medicine 2001;19(1):19-24   DOI   ScienceOn
6 Bae SS. Health-related Behaviors: Theoretical Models and Research Findings. J Preventive Medicine Public Health 1993;26(4):508-553 (Korean)
7 Kam S, Park KS. Utilization and Outof- pocket Expenditure of Complementary and Alternative Medicine in Low-income Patients with Osteoarthritis in a City. J Agric Med & Community Health 2008;33(2): 181-192 (Korean)   DOI
8 Kang SW, Kwon YD, Kim SA. Effects of Private Health Insurance on Hospitals in Korea. Korean J Health Econ Policy 2004;10(2) :23-36 (Korean)
9 Huh SI, Lee SY. Impact of Complementary Private Health Insurance on Public Health Spending in Korea. Korean J Health Policy Administ 2007;17(2):1-17 (Korean)   DOI
10 Kang SW, Kwon YD, You CH. Effects of Supplemental Insurance on Health Care Utilization and Expenditures among Cancer Patients in Korea. Korean J Health Policy Administ 2005;15(4):65-80 (Korean)   과학기술학회마을   DOI
11 Atherly A. The Effect of Medicare Supplemental Insurance on Medicare Expenditures. International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 2002;2:137-162   DOI   ScienceOn
12 OECD. Private Health Insurance in OECD Countries: The Benefits and Costs for Individuals and Health Systems. Paris, OECD Publishing, 2004, pp.35-37
13 Jung KT, Shin EK, Kwak CH. An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Private Health Insurance and Moral Hazard. Journal of Korean Insurance Academic Society 2006;75(6):1-25 (Korean)
14 Lim JH, Choi KS, Kim SG, Park EC, Park JH. Effects on Privte Insurance on Health Care Utilization and Expenditures in Korea Cancer Patients: Focused on % Major Cancers in One Cancer Center. J Prev Med Public Health 2007;40(4):329-335 (Korean)   DOI   ScienceOn
15 Yun HS. Effects of Private Insurance on Medical Expenditure. KDI Journal of Economic Policy 2008;30(2):99-128 (Korean)   DOI
16 Kang SW, You CH, Oh EH, Kwon YD. The Impact of Having Private Health Insurance on Healthcare Utilization with controlling for Endogeneity. The Korean Journal of Health Economics and Policy 2010;16(1):139-159 (Korean)
17 Lee CW. The Effect of Private Health Insurance on Hospitalization. Health and Social Welfare Review 2010;30(2):463-483 (Korean)   DOI
18 Park SB, Jeong KH. The Determinants of Private Health Insurance and Its Effects on Medical Utilization in Korea. Journal of Korean Insurance Academic Society 2011;88(4):23-49 (Korean)
19 Arrow KJ. Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. The American Economic Review 1963:53(5);941-973
20 Pauly MV. The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment. American Economic Review 1968;53:941-973
21 Zweifel, P. and W. Manning, "Moral Hazard and Consumer Incentives in Health Care," in Handbook of Health Economics, Vol. 1, Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam, 2000, pp.409-460
22 Sapelli C, Vial B. Self-selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance. J Health Econ 2003;22(3):459-476   DOI   ScienceOn