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Implementation and Evaluation of Multi-level Secure Linux  

손형길 (행정자치부 행정망운영)
박태규 (한서대학교 컴퓨터정보학과)
이금석 (동국대학교 컴퓨터공학과)
Abstract
A current firewall or IDS (intrusion detection system) of the network level suffers from many vulnerabilities in internal computing servers. For a secure Linux implementation using system call hooking, this paper defines two requirements such as the multi-level security function of TCSEC B1 and a prevention of hacking attacks. This paper evaluates the secure Linux implemented in terms of the mandatory access control, anti-hacking and performance overhead, and thus shows the security, stability and availability of the multi-level secure Linux. At the kernel level this system protects various hacking attacks such as using Setuid programs, inserting back-door and via-attacks. The performance degradation is an average 1.18% less than other secure OS product.
Keywords
Secure Linux; Security Kernel; Multi-level Security;
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