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http://dx.doi.org/10.13089/JKIISC.2017.27.4.943

Secure Multiplication Method against Side Channel Attack on ARM Cortex-M3  

Seo, Hwajeong (Hansung University)
Abstract
Cryptography implementation over lightweight Internet of Things (IoT) device needs to provide an accurate and fast execution for high service availability. However, adversaries can extract the secret information from the lightweight device by analyzing the unique features of computation in the device. In particular, modern ARM Cortex-M3 processors perform the multiplication in different execution timings when the input values are varied. In this paper, we analyze previous multiplication methods over ARM Cortex-M3 and provide optimized techniques to accelerate the performance. The proposed method successfully accelerates the performance by up-to 28.4% than previous works.
Keywords
ARM Cortex-M3; Side Channel Attack; Software Implementation; Multiplication;
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