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http://dx.doi.org/10.13089/JKIISC.2007.17.3.117

A Blinding-Based Scalar Multiplication Algorithm Secure against Power Analysis Attacks  

Kim, Chang-Kyun (National Security Research Institute)
Ha, Jae-Cheol (Hoseo University)
Moon, Sang-Jae (Kyungpook National University)
Publication Information
Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology / v.17, no.3, 2007 , pp. 117-121 More about this Journal
Abstract
Most existing countermeasures against classical DPA are vulnerable to new DPA, e.g., refined power analysis attack (RPA), zero-value point attack (ZPA), and doubling attack. More recently, Mamiya et al proposed a new countermeasure (so-called BRIP) against RPA, ZPA, classical DPA and SPA. This countermeasure, however, also has a vulnerability of scalar multiplication computations by exploiting specially chosen input message. Therefore, to prevent various power analysis attacks like DPA and new SPA, we propose an enhanced countermeasure by developing a new random blinding technique.
Keywords
DPA; BRIP; ECC; Countermeasure;
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