Browse > Article
http://dx.doi.org/10.13089/JKIISC.2005.15.1.17

Formal Methodology for Safety Analysis of Security Protocols  

Kim Il-Gon (Korea University)
Jeon Chul-Wuk (Korea University)
Kim Hyun-Seok (Korea University)
Choi Jin-Young (Korea University)
Kang In-Hye (University of Seoul)
Publication Information
Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology / v.15, no.1, 2005 , pp. 17-27 More about this Journal
Abstract
With the development of wire and wireless based networks, a various security protocols have been proposed to protect important resources and user information against attackers. However, many security protocols have found oかy to be later vulnerable to attacks. In this Paper, we introduce the formal methodology to verify the safety of security protocols in the design phase, and we take advantage of the formal methodology which uses Casper/CSP and FDR tools by introducing the verification example of EKE protocol and BCY protocol. Lastly, we propose a new BCY protocol after verifying it's safety.
Keywords
security; protocol; CSP; Casper; FDR; EKE; BCY;
Citations & Related Records
연도 인용수 순위
  • Reference
1 G. J. Holzman, 'The Model Checker SPIN,' IEEE Trans. on Software Engineering, vol. 23, Issue 5, pp. 279-295, May 1997   DOI   ScienceOn
2 Gavin Lowe, 'Casper : A Compiler for the Anaysis of Security Protocols,' User Manual and Tutorial, Version 1.3, 1999
3 M. Zalewski, 'Remote vulnerability in SSH daemon crc32 compensation attack detector,' Available from : http://razor.bindview.com/publish/advisories/adv_ssh1crc.html, February 2001
4 M. Bellovin and M. Merritt, 'Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols Secure Against Dictionary Attacks,' AT&T Bell Laboratories, Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Conference on Research in Security and Privacy, pp. 72-84, Oakland, 1992
5 M. Burrows, M. Abadi and R. Needham. 'A Logic of Authentication,' In Proceeding of the Royal Society, Series A, 426, 1871, pp. 233-271, December 1989
6 Formal Systems(Europe) Ltd. Failure Divergence Refinement-FDR2 User Manual, Aug. 1999
7 M. J. Beller, L.-F. Chang and Y. Yacobi, 'Privacy and authentication on a portable communications system,' Proceedings of the International Computer Symposium, vol.1, pp. 821-829, 1994
8 P. E. Varner, 'Formal Methods as an Environmental Catalyst for Emergent Security in System Design and Construction,' December 12, 2002
9 G. Lowe, 'Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol,' TACAS 96, pp. 147-166, 1996
10 C.A.R. Hoare, Communicating Sequential Processes, Prentice-Hall, 1985
11 G. Lowe, 'Casper: 'A compiler for the analysis of security protocols,' 10th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1997
12 박영희, 정병천, 이윤호, 김희열, 이재원, 윤현수, 'Diffie-Hellman 키 교환을 이용한 확장성을 가진 계층적 그룹키 설정 프로토콜,' 정보보호학회논문지, 13(5), pp. 3-15, 2003
13 K. L. McMillian, 'Symbolic Model Checking,' PhD thesis, Carneigie Mellon University, May 1992
14 권정옥, 황정연, 김현정, 이동훈, 임종인, '일방향 함수와 XOR을 이용한 효율적인 그룹키 관리 프로토콜 : ELKH,' 정보보호학회논문지, 12(6), pp. 93-112, 2002
15 L. Gong, R. Needham and R. Yahalom, 'Reasoning about Belief in Cryptographic Protocols,' Proceedings 1990, IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pp. 234-248, 1990
16 T. Coffey and R. Dojen, ''Analysis of a mobile communication security protocol,' Proceeding of the 1st international symposium on Information and communication technologies, pp. 322-328, 2003