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Efficient and Practical Appraoch to Check Certificate Revocation Status of the WLAN Authentication Server's Public Key  

Park DongGook (순천대학교 정보통신공학부)
Cho Kyung-Ryong (순천대학교 정보통신공학부)
Abstract
WLAN user authentication is mostly based on user password resulting in vulnerability to the notorious 'offline dictionary attack'. As a way around this problem. EAP-TTLS and PEAP protocols are increasing finding their way into WLANs, which are a sort of combination of password protocols and the TLS public-key protocol. This leads to the use of the public-key certificate of the WLAM authentication server, and naturally the concern arises about its revocation status. It seems, however, that any proper soulution has not been provided to address this concern. We propose a very efficent and proper solution to check the certificate revocation status.
Keywords
CRL; EAP-TTLS;
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  • Reference
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