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http://dx.doi.org/10.12985/ksaa.2017.25.4.161

The Effect of Organizational Influence on Precondition for Unsafe Acts in Pilots - Focused on HFACS -  

Yu, TaeJung (한국방송공사(KBS) 항공팀)
Song, Byeong-Heum (한국항공대학교 항공운항학과)
Publication Information
Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics / v.25, no.4, 2017 , pp. 161-169 More about this Journal
Abstract
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is a general human error framework originally developed and tested within the U.S. military as a tool for investigating and analyzing the human causes of aviation accidents. Based upon Reason's (1990) model of latent and active failures, HFACS addresses human error at all levels of the system, including the condition of aircrew and organizational factors. As a result, this study aims to examine the influence between the latent conditions based on HFACS. This study seeks to verify the factors of "Organizational Influence" effecting the "Precondition for Unsafe Acts" of HFACS. The results of empirical analysis demonstrated that the organizational influence had a positive influence on precondition for unsafe act, especially the "Organizational Climate" of organizational influence had even greater influence on precondition for unsafe acts.
Keywords
HFACS; Latent Condition of Accident; Organizational Influences; Precondition for Unsafe Acts;
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