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Fixed-Mobile Interconnection Charging and Optimal Regulation Under Customer Ignorance  

Jung, Choong-Young (한남대학교 경영학과)
Abstract
This Paper deals with the model of fixed-mobile interconnection. Specifically, how interconnection charge and originating price are determined when there is customer ignorance about terminating network or the price. This paper shows that the terminating charge with customer ignorance is higher than without that, and therefore the retail price becomes higher. This paper discusses the several methods to prevent the increase of the retail price and suggests the scheme to regulate the retail price and interconnection charge, simultaneously.
Keywords
Customer ignorance; Interconnection; Retail price; Fixed-mobile; Optimal regulation;
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