The effect of life insurance settlement on insurance market and consumer welfare

This study investigates the effect of life settlement on the monopolistic insurance market. In particular, we consider liquidity cost, which is the cost incurred to the insurer to meet the request of surrender, and trading cost, which is the transaction cost of the policyholders for the settlement. We first show that the introduction of a life settlement can increase insurance demand and enhance consumer welfare even when the trading cost is higher than the liquidity cost. That is, even if the settlement market is less efficient than the insurance market, both insurance demand and consumer welfare can be increased. Second, the insurer's profit can also be increased when settlement is introduced because not only can the insurer save the liquidity cost but also the demand of insurance increases. Lastly, insurance demand does not always decrease when both costs increase. Depending on the population distribution over the liquidity risk, the demand of insurance can be increased or decreased.