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http://dx.doi.org/10.5392/JKCA.2015.15.05.168

Controlling Agent Government in Contract with State  

Lee, Hyukwoo (배재대학교 행정학과)
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Abstract
Besides the imposition of taxes and mandatory actions, why in a special rules needed in the contract between state and civilians. The contract between the state and civilian are unlike with civilian's contract in the comparable effect, even if the effect of the agreement and the parties bear the structural nature of the self-other agreement between private economic actors and there are a variety of different specificity. In other words, the agents of the contract with the state government for control of opportunistic behavior are very specific rules exist. Through this, even if it is the relationship between state and non-mandatory private realms of the contract, even if the area forced me to the fact that the difference can be confirmed. Representative of the government of the country to understand the delegate decisions and judgments and other opportunistic behavior always seem to exist on the possibility of such devices for the pre-control needed.
Keywords
Contract; Government Agents; Opportunism; the State is a Party to the Contract Act;
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