To achieve the "low carbon green growth" vision, the first step is securing core technologies. Therefore, S&T policy direction for green technology development is urgently needed. As of 2008, investment in green technology (GT) development hovered around 10% of the government's total R&D budget. Thus, the Korean government developed a plan to increase that percentage to 15%, by 2013. To develop reasonable investment strategies for green technology development, targeted strategies that reflect technology and market changes by green technology area are needed. However, the overall planning and coordination of national GT development is currently split among, approximately, 10 government ministries. To establish an efficient green technology development system, the so-called "Green Technology R&D Council" should be launched in collaboration with the Presidential Committee on Green Growth and the National Science and Technology Council. Furthermore, to build a solid foundation for commercializing the outcomes of GT development projects and promote GT transfer, the government should undertake two initiatives. First, the government should reinforce GT R&D performance management, by establishing a GT R&D performance management and evaluation system. Second, the government should implement the "customized packaged support for promoting green technology business rights and commercialization" and present "e-marketplace for market-oriented green technologies". Creating a pan-ministerial policy for GT development policy would necessitate restructuring the HR(Human Resources) development system, which is currently separated by technology area. Based upon mid/long-term HR supply and demand forecasts, the government should design differentiated HR development projects, continuously evaluate those projects, and reflect the evaluation results in future policy development. Finally, to create new GT-related industries, the "Green TCS (Testing, Certification, and Standards) System" needs to be implemented. For objective evaluation and diffusion of R&D results by green technology area, a common standardization plan for testing, analysis, and measurement, like the "Green TCS", should be developed and integrated.

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), known widely as the "stimulus" bill, developed by the U.S. Congress and President-elect Obama in late 2008 and early 2009, is investing a significant portion of its $787 billion infusion of funds in future-oriented programs intended not only to "jump-start" the stalled American economy, but to promote the development of renewable energy sources and increase energy efficiency in appliances, buildings, transportation, and other sectors of the economy. These investments are expected both to create immediate employment in green industries and to build a more sustainable society in the long term. The Obama Administration's green energy initiatives are part of a larger emphasis on science and technology within its agenda. It has roots in the Obama campaign and is supported by an unusually strong science and technology team. Much of the activity is centered in the Department of Energy, which received a huge one-time increase in its fiscal year 2009 budget to support the new and expanded programs. Areas that have been neglected by the federal government R&D program for many years, including smart grid technology, solar, wind, and geothermal energy, received large boosts. Many of these programs - and, in fact, the broader concept of government involvement in commercial innovation - are politically controversial Previous attempts to expand research in these areas by liberal Democratic administrations and Congresses have been criticized and sometimes thwarted by conservatives. Whether President Obama's efforts will meet with more success, both politically and technologically, remains to be seen.

Whatever the country, nanotechnology features as a key priority of most national research and innovation policies. This focus on nanotechnology is due to the promises of this general purpose technology, this new technological wave. As 'one size does not fit all', policies supporting its development cannot just adopt the 'best practices' of the preceding wave. We argue that specific on-going dynamics of nanoscience and technology production justifies the existence of dedicated nanotechnology policies. It also questions the portfolio of instruments mobilized and their balance. In this article, we discuss policies developed for the preceding technological waves and, based on the characteristics of nanosciences and technologies, propose five dimensions of policies to be taken into consideration for their governance at the country and cluster levels.

Recent years have seen an intensified discussion in many OECD countries about the role and mission of public research in the innovation system. This discussion takes place in quite specific national contexts, but should benefit from international experience. However, whereas voluminous literatures address the changing governance methods, organizational forms and missions of universities, much less attention has been devoted to developing a common understanding of the challenges faced by non-university public research institutions. The main goals of this paper is to contribute to clarifying the nature of these challenges, outlines possible policy answers and draws some implications for Korea. In the first section, the paper uses available internationally comparable indicators to review trends in the contribution of government research institutes (GRIs) to R&D and innovation activities. In the second section, the paper identifies the current major changes in the dynamics of innovation that may call for further adjustments in the positioning, organization and steering of public research institutes. Finally, the paper outlines some strategic objectives and orientations for the reform of public research institutes as part of the broader agenda of the Korean innovation strategy.

Over the last decade, some Korean enterprises have emerged to become global players in their specialized products. How have they achieved such tremendous technological progress in a short period of time? This paper explores that question by examining the characteristics of technological innovation activities at major Korean enterprises. The paper begins with a brief review of the stages of economic growth and science and technology development in Korea. Then, the existing literature, explaining the Korean innovation model, is analyzed in order to establish a new framework for the Korean innovation model. Specifically, Korean firms have experienced three sequential phases, and thus, the Korean model, at the firm level, can be coined as "path-following," "path-revealing," and "path-creating." Then, the stylized facts in the first phase (path-following) and the second phase (path-revealing) are discussed, in the context of empirical evidence from the areas of memory chips, automobiles, shipbuilding, and steel. In terms of technology development, the Korean model has evolved as "collective learning" in the first phase, "collective recombination" of existing knowledge and technology in the second phase, and is assumed as "collective creativity" in the third phase. Ultimately, all three can be classified as "collective creation". Korean firms now face a transition in the modes of technological innovation in order to efficiently implement the third phase. To achieve remarkable progress again, as they did in the past, and to sustain the growth momentum, Korean firms should challenge new dimensions such as creative technological ideas, distinctive technological capabilities, and unique innovation systems -- all of which connote 'uniqueness'. Finally, some lessons from the Korean technological innovation experience are addressed.